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http://www.archive.org/details/warbetweenstates5833bled

Jefferson Davis

The War Between
the States

or

Was Secession a Constitutional

Right Previous to the

War of 1861-65 ?

Arranged without verbal changes from

"Is Davis a Traitor"

BY

Albert T. Bledsoe, A. M., LL. D.

£:2

1915
J. P. Bell Company, Inc.

LYNCHBURG, VA.

COPYRIGHT 1915

Danville Chapter, U. D. C.

Danville, Va.

CONTENTS

Chapter I Page
Introduction 9

Chapter II
Is the Constitution a Compact? 14

Chapter III

Webster Scouts the Idea that the States "Acceded" to the

Constitution 19

Chapter IV
The First Resolution Passed by the Convention of 1787 24

Chapter V
The Constitution of 1787 a Compact 26

Chapter VI

The Constitution of 1787 a Compact between the States — The

Facts of tlie Case 40

Chapter VII

The Constitution a Compact between the States — The Lan-
guage of the Constitution.- 51

Chapter VIII

The Constitution of 1787 a Compact between the States — ^Tlie

Language of the Constitution — Continued 58

Chapter IX

The Constitution of 1787 a Compact between the States — The

Views of Certain of the Framers of the Constitution 66

Chapter X

The Constitution of 1787 a Compact between tae States — Mr.

Webster Again 79

Chapter XI

Tlie Absurdities Flowing From the Doctrine that the Con-
stitution is Not a Compact between the States, But Was
Made by the People of America as One Nation 91

(3 Contents

Chapter XII Page

The Hypothesis that the People of America Form One Nation 94

Chapter XIII
Arguments in Favor of the Eight of Secession Ill

Chapter XIV
Arguments Against the Right of Secession 148

Chapter XV
Was Secession Treason? 170

Chapter XVI
The Causes of Secession —.. 200

Chapter XVII
The Legislators of 1787 as Political Prophets 237

PREFACE

It is not the design of this book to open the sul)ject of
secession. The subjugation of the Southern States, and
their acceptance of the terms dictated by the North, may,
if the reader please, be considered as having shifted the
Federal Government from the basis of compact to that of
conquest; and thereby extinguished every claim to the
right of secession for the future. ISTot one word in the fol-
lowing pages will at least be found to clash with that sup-
position or opinion. The sole object of this work is to dis-
cuss the right of secession with reference to the past; in
order to vindicate the character of the South for loyalty,
and to wipe off the charges of treason and rebellion from
the names and memories of Jefferson Davis, Stonewall
Jackson, Albert Sidney Johnston, Eobert E. Lee, and of
all who have fought or suffered in the great war of coercion.
Admitting, then, that the right of secession no longer
exists ; the present work aims to show, that, however those
illustrious heroes may have been aspersed by the ignorance,
the prejudices, and the passions of the hour, they were,
nevertheless, perfectly loyal to truth, justice, and the
C'onstitution of 1787 as it came from the hands of the
fathers.

The calm and impartial reader will, it is believed, dis-
cover therein the grounds on which the South may be
vindicated.

Albert Taylor Bledsoe.
Baltimore, 1866.

EXPLANATORY PREFACE

Albert Taylor Bledsoe had been graduated at West Point in
1830. He was there with both Jefferson Davis and Robert E.
Lee, though not a classmate of either. While professor of
mathematics in the University of Mississippi his relations with
Davis were maintained with great cordiality.

He was not in favor of sesession, but with the call for her
quota of 75,000 men from Virginia, to enter the Federal Army,
like Lee and other Virginians he felt that he could not ally him-
self with the enemies of his State, so he entered the Confederate
Army, receiving the title of Colonel; but he was preeminently
a student and a scholar, not a soldier. Later President Davis
gave him a position in the Confederate Cabinet; his title was
Chief of the Bureau of War, his duties those of Assistant Secre-
tary of War. Later on in a consultation between Davis and Lee
it was decided that the greatest service he could render to the
seceded States was to write a constitutional history which should,
if the facts were made clear, justify the South in the right to
secede.

In order to do this it was necessary for him to have access to
the debates in the formation of the constitution, of the United
States as well as of the individual States, then constituting the
Union.

The necessary documents were not to be found south of Mason
and Dixon's Line. He was therefore obliged to go to England
to study there in the British Museum.

My mother, who was born in New Jersey, but for many years
had lived in the South, was an ardent Southerner. She, out of
a very limited inheritance, paid all of the expenses of the trip,
of my father's stay of several years in England, and of the
family while he was gone, as well as of the publication of the
book after his return in 1866.

He had intended to give it the title almost exactly like the sub-
title of the published volume; but on his return to America,
Jefferson Davis was a prisoner in Fortress Monroe, and in peril
of his life. He, therefore, gave the volume when it was issued the
title, "IS DAVIS A TRAITOR?"

Charles O'Connor, Mr. Davis's advocate in the trial for treason,
told my father that without the facts brought to light in his
book, he could not have saved Mr. Davis's life.

My mother never received any compensation for what she had
expended, and she always rejoiced that she had been able to aid
in justifying her beloved South.

These few words of explanation seem necessary in issuing this
volume again, as a book of reference for the schools of the South,

Sophia Bledsoe Herrick.

THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES

CHAPTEE I

in^troduction

The Importance of the Question

The final judgment of history in relation to the War of
1861 will, in no small degree, depend on its verdict with
respect to the right of secession. If, when this right was
practically asserted by the South, it had been conceded by
the North, there would not have been even a pretext for
the tremendous conflict which followed. Is it not wonder-
ful, then, that a question of such magnitude and impor-
tance should have been so little considered, or discussed?
Perhaps no other question of political philosophy, or of
international law, pregnant with such unutterable calami-
ties, has ever been so partially and so superficially examined
as the right of secession from the Federal Union of the
United States. From first to last it seems to have been
decided by passion, and not by reason. The voice of
reason, enlightened by the study of the facts of history and
the princijjles of political philosophy, yet remains to be
heard on the suliject of secession.

C*onfedeeatiox and Union

No one, at present, denies that the States had a right to
secede from the Union formed by the old Articles of Con-
federation. Indeed, this right was claimed and exercised
by the States, when they withdrew from that Confederation
in order to form "a more perfect Union.'^ Yet, while that
Union was standing and in favor with the people, the right
of secession therefrom was vehemently denied. The reason
of this is well stated by Mr. Madison in The Federalist.
Having explained and vindicated the right of the States,
or any portion of them, to secede from the existing I'nion,

10 The War Between the States

he adds,: "The time has been when it was incumbent on
all of us to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits.
The scene has now changed, and with it the part which the
same motives dictate."^ That is to say, the time has been
when it became all Americans, as patriots and worshipers
of the existing Union, to veil the right of secession; but
310W it is the time to unveil this sacred right, and let the
truth be seen! Accordingly, the Convention of 1787 un-
veiled this right, and the States, one after another, seceded
from the Union; though the Articles by which it was
formed expressly declared that it should be "perpetual," or
last forever.

Madison's Argument

The same thing happened, in a still greater degree,
under the new and "more perfect Union." This, unlike
the one for which it had been substituted, did not pro-
nounce itself immortal. Still it was deemed iiicumbent on
all men by Mr. Madison, and especially upon himself, to
veil the right of secession from the new Union ; which he,
more than any other man, had labored to establish and
preserve. But having exercised the right of secession from
one compact between the States, how could he veil that
right under another compact between the same parties?
Having, for the benefit of his age, revealed the truth, how
could he hope to hide it from all future ages? Having
laid down the right of secession from one Federal Union,
as the great fundamental law to which the new Union owed
its very existence, how could he hope to cover it up again,
and make the new compact forever binding on posterity?
There is not, it is believed, in the whole range of literature,
a sophism more ineffably weak and flimsy than the one
employed by Mr. Madison to veil the right of secession
from the new Union.

The first compact, says he, was made by the Legislatures
of the States, and the second by the people themselves of
the States. Hence, although the States had seceded from
the first compact or Union, he supposed, or hoped, they
would have no right to secede from the second.^ The

1 The Federalist, No. xliil. - "The Madison Papers," p. 1184.

The War Between the States 11

first compact was, it is true, originally adopted by the
Legislatures of the States; but then it was approved by
the people themselves, who lived under it as the Constitu-
tion and government of their choice. Were not the States,
then, just as much bound by this compact, as if it had been
originally made by the people themselves ? What would be
thought of an individual who should approve and adopt
as his own a contract made by his agent, and, having
derived all the advantages of it, should seek to repudiate it
on the ground that it was not originally entered into iDy
himself? He would be deemed infamous. Yet, precisely
such is the distinction and the logic of Mr. Madison, in his
attempt to justify the act of secession from the first Union,
and to deny the right of secession from the second Union
between the same parties !

The two compacts are construed differently ; because the
one was originally made by agents and afterwards ratified
by the principals, and the other was originally made by the
principals themselves ! Could any sophism be more weak
or flimsy? Is it not, indeed, in the eye of reason, as thin
as gossamer, as transparent as the air itself? Hopeless,
indeed, must be the attempt to find a difference between
the two cases, which shall establish the right of secession
in the one and not in the other; since James Madison
himself, with all his unsurpassed powers of logic and acute
discrimination, was compelled to rely on so futile a
distniction.

Part Played by Feeling

But the majority needed no veil, not even one as thin as
that employed by Mr. Madison, to conceal the right of
secession from their eyes. The mists raised by its own
passions were amply sufficient for that purpose. The doc-
trine of secession was regarded by the reigning majority,
as simply equivalent to the destruction of "the best Gov-
ernment the world had ever seen," or was ever likely to
see. Hence, before the dread tribunal of the sovereign
majority, the touch of secession was political death. The
public men of the country, and all aspirants after office,
shrank from it as from plague, pestilence, and famine.

12 The Wak Between the States

As to whether secession was a Constitutional right or
otherwise, the multitude knew nothing, and cared less ; but
still, in their passionate zeal, they denounced it as rebellion,
treason, and every other crime in the dark catalogue of
political offences. Their leaders, having studied the subject
as little as themselves, were no less ignorant respecting the
merits of the question, and even more fierce in denouncing
secession as the sum of all villainies, treasons, and rebel-
lions. Thus, what the logic of Mr. Madison failed to ac-
complish was achieve 1 by the rhetoric of angry politicians
and the passions of an unfuriated majority; that is, the
right of secession was veiled. The object of this little book
is simply to appeal from the mad forum of passion to the
calm tribunal of reason.

Why Revive the Discussion?

But Avhy, it may be asked, appeal to reason ? Has not the
war of secession been waged, and the South subjugated?
Can reason, however victorious, bind up the Ijroken heart,
or call the dead to life? Can reason cause the desolate,
dark, waste places of the South to smile again, or the
hearts of her downcast and dejected people to rejoice?
Can reason strike the fetters from the limbs of the doAvn-
trodden Avhite population of the South ? True, alas ! reason
can do none of these things; but still she has a high office
and duty to perform. For, however sore her calamities,
all is not yet lost to our bleeding and beloved South. She
still retains that which, to every true man, is infinitely
dearer than property or life. She still retains her moral
wealth, — the glory of her Jacksons, her Sidney Johnstons,
her Lees, her Davises, and of all who have nobly died or
suffered in her cause. These are her imperishable jewels ;
and, since little else is left to her, these shall be cherished
with the greater love, with the more enthusiastic and
undying devotion.

Let no one ask, then, except a dead soul, Avhy argue tlie
question of secession? For it is precisely as this question
is decided that the Jacksons, the Johnstons, the Lees, and
the Davises of the South will be pronounced rebels and

"The War Between the States 13

traitors, or heroes and martyrs; that the South itself will
be disgraced, or honored, in the estimation of mankind.
History is, at this moment, busy in making up her verdict
on this momentous question,, which is to determine so
much that is most dear to every true son of the South.
Shall we, then, remain idle spectators, mere passive lookers-
on, Avhile the North is flooding the world with volumes
against the justice of our cause? Shall we stand, like the
dumb brutes around us, having no word to utter in the
great cause of truth, justice, and humanity, which is now
pending at the bar of history? Or shall we, on the con-
trary, contribute our mite toward the just decision of that
glorious cause?

The radicals themseh'es might, perhaps, derive some
little benefit from our humble labors. For, if duly weighed
and considered by them, these labors might serve to miti-
gate their wrath, and turn their thoughts from schemes of
vengeance to the administration of justice, from persecu-
tion and ruin to peace and prosperity. Be this as it may,
however, I shall proceed to argue the right of secession ;
because this is the great issue on which the whole Southern
people, the dead as well as the living, is about to be tried
in the person of their illustrious chief, Jefferson Davis.

CHAPTEE II

is the constitution a compact?
The Question Stated

It is coneedecl, both by Webster^ and Story, that if the
Constitution is a compact to which the States are the
parties, then the States have a right to secede from the
Union at pleasure. Thus says Webster: "If a league
between sovereign powers have no limitation as to the
time of duration, and contain nothing making it perpetual,
it subsists only during the good pleasure of the parties,
although no violation be complained of. If, in the opinion
of either party, it be violated, such party may say he will
no longer fulfill its obligations on his part, but will con-
sider the whole league or compact at an end, although it
might be one of its stipulations that it should be perpetual."
In like manner Mr. Justice Story says : "The obvious
deductions which may be, and, indeed, have been, drawn
from considering the Constitution a compact between
States, are that it operates as a mere treaty or convention
between them, and has an obligatory force no longer than
suits its pleasure or its consent continues,"- etc. Thus the
great controversy is narrowed down to the single question —
Is the Constitution a compact between the States? If so,
then the right of secession is conceded, even by its most
powerful and determined opponents; b}^ the great jurist,
as well as by "the great expounder" of the North.

The denial that the Constitution was a compact is pre-
sented in every possible form, or variety of expression.
We are told that it was not made by the States, nor by
the people of the States, but "by the people of the whole
United States in the aggregate."" The States, we are
assured, did not accede to the Constitution ; it was ordained
by the sovereign people of America as one nation. Echo-
ing the bold assertion of Webster, Mr. Motley says, that

1 Daniel Webster.

- ■Oommentaries on the Constitution," vol. iil. p. 287. first published
in 183.''..

^ Webster.

The Waij Between the States 15

"tlie States never acceded to the Constitution, and have
no power to secede from it. It was 'ordained and estab-
lished' over the States by a power superior to the States,
by the people of the whole land in their aggregate
capacity."^ It was not made by the States, and it was not
ratified" by the States. It was, on the contrary, made and
ordained by the people of America as one nation, and is,
therefore, the constitution of a national government. Such
is the doctrine which, in every mode of expression, is
inculcated by the Storys, the Websters, and the Motleys of
the Xorth.

When we consider, in the simple light of history, the
manner in which the Constitution of the United States
was made, or framed, and afterwards ratified, such asser-
tions seem exceedingly wonderful, not to say inexplicable,
on the supposition that their authors were honest men.
But who can measure the mysterious depths of party spirit,
or the force of political passions in a democracy? I know
something of that force ; for, during the greater part of
my life, I followed, with implicit confidence, those blind
leaders of the blind, Mr. Justice Story and Daniel Webster.
History will yet open the eyes of the world to the strange
audacity of their assertions.

Ever since the Declaration of Independence there have
been two great political parties in the United States : the
one, regarding the American people as one nation, has
labored to consolidate the Federal Union ; while the other,
attaching itself to the reserved rights of the States, has
zealously resisted this tendency to consolidation in the
central power. Even under the old Articles of Confeder-
ation, or before the new Constitution was formed, these
political opinions and parties existed. For, however
strange it may seem, there were those who, even under
those Articles, considered "the States as Districts of people
composing one political society" ;- or the "x\merican
people as forming one nation."^ ^ay, iii the great Con-
vention of 1T87, by which the Constitution was formed, it
was boldly asserted by a leading member "that we never

' ••Rebellion Records," vol. 1, p. 211.

' ••The Madison Papers." p. 087.

^ Marshall's -Life of Washington," vol. v, chap. i.

16 The Wae Between the States

were independent States, were not such now, and never
could be, even on the principles of the Confederation.
The States, and the advocates of them, were intoxicated
with the idea of their sovereignty."^ jSTow, if any aberra-
tion of the mind under the influence of political passions
could seem strange to the student of history, it would be
truly wonderful that such an assertion could have been put
forth under the Articles of Confederation which expressly
declared that "■each State" of the Union formed by them
"retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence.""
The author of that assertion did not interpret, he flatly
contradicted, the fundamental law of the government
under which he lived and acted.

The above opinion or view of the old Articles of Con-
federation passed away with the passions to which it owed
its birth. No one, at the present day, supposes that the
old Articles moulded the States into "one political society,"
or "nation," leaving them merely "districts of people."
For since those Articles have passed away, and the struggle
for power under them has ceased, all can clearly see what
they so plainly announced, that "each State" of the con-
federation established by them retained "its sovereignty,
freedom, and independence.'*

But the natures of men were not changed by changing
the objects to which their political passions might attach
themselves. Hence the same opposite tendencies arose
under the new "Articles of Union," as the Constitution of
1787 is habitually called by its authors, and produced the
same conflicting parties. Each party had, of course, its
extreme wing. There were those who, unduly depressing
the States, identified their relations to the central power
with that of so many counties to a state, or of individuals
to an ordinary political community. On the other hand,
there were those who, from an extreme jealousy of the
central authority, resolved the States into their original
independence, or into their condition under the Articles
of Confederation. The watchword of one party was the
sovereignty of the Federal Union : and the watchword of
the other was the sovereignty of the States.

' "The ^lartison Papers." - Art. 2.

The Wmi Between the States 17

The Question of a Compact Debated

It was in the Senate of the United States, in 1833, that
these two theories of the Constitution stood face to face in
the persons of those two intellectual giants — Wel)ster and
Calhoun — then engaged in the most memorable debate of
the New AVorld. It was then predicted, and events have
since verified the prediction, that the destinies of America
would hinge and turn on the principles of that great
debate. The war of words then waged between the giants
has since become a war of deeds and blood between the
sections which they represented. Xow the question is, on
which side was right, truth. Justice?

This is preciselj' the question which, in 1833, the great
combatants submitted to the decision of after-ages. As he
drew toward the close of his speech, Mr. Calhoun reminded
his great antagonist "'that the principles he might advance
would be subjected to the revision of posterity."' "I do not
decline its judgment," said ]\Ir. Webster, in rising to reply,
"nor withhold myself from its scrutiny.'" Mr. Webster's
speech on this occasion is pronounced by his learned
biographer^ the greatest intellectual effort of his life, and
is represented as having annihilated every position assumed
l)y Mr. Calhoun. But the combatants did not -submit the
controvers}^ to the judgment of Mr. Everett; they sub-
mitted it to "the revision of posterity." History is tlie
great tribunal to which they appealed; and history will
settle the great issue between them, and between the two
sections of the .Union.

It was in 1833, for the first time in the history of the
countr}', that it was solemnly asserted and argued that
the Constitution of the United States was not a compact
between the States. This new doctrine was simultaneously
])ut forth by ]\Ir. Justice Story in his "Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States,"" and Ijy Mr. Daniel
AVebster in "the greatest intellectual effort of his life,"
that is, in his great speech in the Senate of the 16th of
February, 1833. In order to show that the Constitution
is not a compact between the States, the position is assumed

* Edward Everett.

18 The Wak Between the States

that it is not a compact at all. If it be a compact, sa}' they,
then the States had a right to secede. But it is not a
compact, and hence secession is treason and rebellion. The
great fundamental questions, then, on which the whole
controversy hinges, are, first. Is the Constitution a
compact? and, secondly. Is it a compact between the
States ? These are the questions which shall and ought to
be subjected to "the revision of posterity."

CHAPTEE III

webster scouts the idea that the states "•acceded"
to the constitution'

"The Great Expounder" (?)

]\Ir. Webster was supposed to have studied the Consti-
tution, and its history, more carefully and more profoundly
than any other man. He habitually spoke, indeed, as if he
had every particle of its meaning-, and of its history, at
his finger's end. Hence he acquired, at least among his
political friends, the lofty title of "the great expounder."
His utterances were listened to as oracles. If, indeed, his
great mind had been guided by a knowledge of facts, or a
supreme love of truth, the irresistible force of his logic,
and the commanding powers of his eloquence, would have
justified those who delighted to call him "the godlike
Daniel." But, unfortunately, no part of his godlikeness
consisted in a scrupulous regard for truth, or the accuracy
of his assertions. He was, however, so great a master of
words that he stood in little need of facts in order to pro-
duce a grand impression by the rolling thunders of his
eloquence. I only wonder that he was not also called "the
thunderer." ISTo one better understood, either in theory
or in practice, the wonderful magic of words than Daniel
Webster.

"Was it Mirabeau," says he, "or some other master of
the human passions, who has told us that words are things ?
They are indeed things, and things of mighty influence, not
only in addresses to the passions and high-wrought feelings
of mankind, but in the discussion of legal and political
questions also; because a just conclusion is often avoided,
or a false one reached, by the adroit substitution of one
phrase, or one word, for another." Nothing can be more
just than this general reflection ; and nothing, as we shall
presently see, can be more unjust than the application
made of it by Mr. Webster.

20 The War Between the States

Did the States "Accede"' to the Constitution?

He finds an example of this adroit use of language in the
first resolution of Mr. Calhoun. "The first resolution,"
says he, "declares that the people of the several States
'acceded' to the Constitution."' As "the natural converse
of accession is secession," so Mr. Webster supposes that
Calhoun has adroitly, and "not without a well-considered
purpose," shaped his premises to a foregone conclusion.
"Wlien it is stated," says he, "that the people of the States
acceded to the Union, it may be more plausibly argued that
they may secede from it. If, in adopting the Constitution,
nothing was done but acceding to a compact, nothing would
seem necessary, in order to break it up, but to secede from
the same compact."

But "this term accede," asserts Mr. Webster, "is wholly
out of place. . . . There is more importance than
may, at first sight, appear in the introduction of this new
word by the honorable mover of the resolutions. . . .
The people of the United States," he continues, "used no
such form of expression in establishing the present Gov-
ernment. ..." It is "unconstitutional language."
Such are a few of the bold, sweeping, and confident asser-
tions of "the great expounder of the Constitution." But
how stands the fact ? Is this really "a new word" ; or is
it as old as the Constitution itself, and rendered almost
obsolete at the North by the progress of new ideas and new
forms of speech? Was it not, in fact, as familiar to the
very fathers and framers of the Constitution of the United
States as it afterwards became foreign and strange to the
ears of its Korthern expounders? This is the question;
and, fortunately, the answer is free from all metaphysical
refinement,- from all logical subtlety, from all curious
speculation. For there lies the open record, with this very
word accede, and this very application of the word, spread
all over its ample pages in the most abundant profusion.
Xo mode of expression is, indeed, more common with the
fathers and the framers of the Constitution, while speak-
ing of the act of its adoption, than this very phrase, "the
accession of the States." Xo household word ever fell more
frequently or more familiarly from their lips.

The Wah Between the States 21

Thus in the Convention of 1787, Mr. James Wilson, to
wliose great influence the historian of the Constitution
ascribes its adoption by the State of Pennsylvania/ pre-
ferred "a partial union'' of the States, "with a door open
for the avcession of the rest,'' rather than to see their dis-
position "to confederate anew on better principles"
entirely defeated.- "But will the small States," asks
another member of the same Convention, "in that case,
accede to it [the Constitution] ?" Mr. Gerry, a delegate
from Massachusetts, was opposed to "a partial confederacy,
leaving other States to accede or not to accede, as had been
intimated.'"^ Even Mr. IMadison, "the father of the Con-
stitution," as b}^ way of eminence he has long been called,
used the expression "to accede'' in the Convention of 1787,
in order to denote the act of adopting "the ncAv form of
government by the States."^

In like manner Gouverneur Bandolph, who Avas also a
member of the Convention of 1787, and who had just
reported the form of ratification to be used by the State
of Virginia, said, "that the accession of eight States
reduced our deliberations to the single question of Union
or no Union." "If it [the Constitution]," says Patrick
Henry, "be amended, every State will accede to it."^
."Does she [Virginia] gain anything from her central posi-
tion," asks ]\Ir. Grayson, "by acceding to that paper?" — the
Constitution.'' "I came hither," says Mr. Innes, "under
the persuasion that the felicity of our country required
that we should accede to this system"'^ (the new Constitu-
tion). "Our new Constitution," says Pranklin, who next
to AA'ashington was the most illustrious member of the
Convention of 1787, "is now established with eleven
States, and the accession of a twelfth is soon expected."^
And, finally, George AVashington himself, who, watching
the States as one after another adopted the new Constitu-
tion, says : "If these, with the States eastward and north-
ward of us, should accede to the Federal Government,"

^ Mr. Curtis, vol. 1, p. 465. - "The Madison I'apers," p. 797.

Mbkl.. p. 1101. -ilbid.. p. 110.3.

^ ••Elliott's Debates." vol. ill, p. 652.

"••The Madison Papers,"' p. 1099.

" •'Elliott's I)ebates." vol. ill.

^ "Franklin's Works," vol. v, p. 409.

32 The Wae Between the States

etc.^ Tims, while the transaction was passing before their
eyes the fathers of the Constitution of the United States,
with the great father of his country at their head,
described the act by which the new Union was formed as
"the accession of the States"; using the very expression
which, in the resolution of Mr. Calhoun, is so vehemently
condemned as '^unconstitutional language," as "a new
word," invented by the advocates of secession for the vile
purpose of disunion.

To these high authorities may be added that of Chief
Justice Marshall ; who, in his "Life of AYashington," notes
the fact that "North Carolina accedes to the Union."-
This was many months after the new Government had
gone into operation. i\Ir. Justice Story is, in spite of his
artificial theory of the Constitution, a witness to the same
fact. "The Constitution," says he, "has been ratified by all
the States ; . . . Ehode Island did not accede to it
until more than a year after it had been in operation";
just as if he had completely forgotten his own theory of
the Constitution.^ If it were necessary this list of
authorities, for the use of the word in question, and for the
precise application made of it by Mr. Calhoun, might he
greatly extended.

There is, as Mr. AYebster says, more importance to be-
attached to the word in question than may at first sight
appear. For if "the States acceded" to the Constitution,
each acting for itself alone, then it was a voluntary asso-
ciation of States, from which, according to his own admis-
sion, any member might secede at pleasure. Accordingly
this position of the great oracle of the North is echoed and
reechoed by all who, since the war began, have written
against the right of secession. Thus says one of the most
faithful of these echoes, Mr. Motley: "The States never
acceded to the Constitution, and have no power to secede
from it." It was "ordained and established" over the
States by a power superior to the States, by the people of
the whole land in theii* aggregate capacity.*

1 "The Writings of Washington." vol. ix. p. 280.
- Vol. V, chap. iii.

2 Book iii, chap, xliii.

* "Rebellion Records." vol. 1. p. 211.

The Wak Between the States 23

If, with the fathers of the C^onstitution, in opposition to
its modern expounder and perverter, he had seen that the
new Union was fonned by an accession of tlie States, then
he woukl have been compelled, on his own principle, to
recognize the right of secession. For he has truly said,
what no one ever denied, that "the same power which estab-
lished the Constitution may jnstly destroy it."^ Hence, if
the Constitution was established by the accession or consent
of the States, then may the Union be dissolved by a
secession of the States. This conclusion is, as we have seen,
expressly admitted by Mr. Webster and Mr. Justice Story.

When, from his high position in the Senate, Mr. Webster
assured the people of the United States that it is "'uncon-
stitutional language" to say "the States acceded to the
Constitution," he was no doubt religiously believed by the
great majority of his readers and hearers. He was sup-
posed to know all about the subject; and was, therefore,
followed as the great guide of the people. But, as we
have seen, he was profoundly ignorant of the facts of the
case about which he delivered himself with so much con-
fidence. The "new word," as he called it, was precisely
the word of the fathers of the Constitution. Hence, if this
word lays the foundation of secession, as Mr. Webster
contended it does, that foundation was laid, not by Cal-
houn, but by the fathers of the Constitution itself, with
"the father of his country" at their head.

So much for the first link in "the great expounders"
argument against the right of secession. His principles
are right, but his facts are wrong.

' "Rebellion Records," vol. 1, p. 214.

CHAPTEE IV

THE FIRST RESOLUTIOX PASSED BY THE CONVENTION OF 1787

A '-'iS'ational" Government ( ?)

Me. Webster lays great stress on the fact tliat the first
resolution passed by the Convention of 1787 declared,
"That a national government ought to be established, con-
sisting of a supreme legislative, judiciary, and executive."
But the fact only shows that the Convention, when it first
met, had the desire to establish "a national government,"
rather than a federal one. This resolution was passed
before the Convention was fully assembled, and by the vote
of only six States, a minority of the whole number. After
the members had arrived, and the Convention was full, the
resolution in question was reconsidered and rescinded.
The Convention, when filled up, changed the name of their
offspring, calling it "the government of the United
States.^-'^i

A fraction of the Convention named it, as Mr. Webster
says, but the whole Convention refused to baptize it with
that name, and gave it anotlier. Why then resuscitate
that discarded name, and place it before the reader, as Mr.
Webster does, in capital letters? Is it because "words are
■things; and things of mighty influence f" or why persist,
as Mr. Webster alivays does, in calling "the government of
the United States" a national onef If the Convention had
called it a national government, this name would have
been so continually rung in our ears that we could neither
have listened to the Constitution itself, or to its histor}',
whenever these proclaimed its federal character. -N"ay,
although the Convention positively refused to name it a
national government, on the avowed ground that it did
not express their views, yet has this name Ijeen eternally
rung in our ears by the Northern School of politicians
and declaimers ; just as if it had been adopted, instead of
having been repudiated and rejected, as it was, by the
authors of the Constitution.

^ "The Madison Papers." p. 90S.

The Wak Between the States 25

In like iiuiinier ^fr. Justice Story, in his ''Commentaries
on the C'onstitiTtion," bnikls an argument on the name
given to the new government.

The Convention, by a vote of six States, decided that "a
national government ought to be established." But, when
this resolution was reconsidered, Mr. Ellsworth "objected
to the term nationol government/'^ and it was rejected.
The record says : "The first resolution 'that a national
government ought to be established,' being taken up,
. . . Mr. Ellsworth, seconded by Mr. Gorham, moves
to alter it so as to run that the government of the United
States ought to consist, etc." This alteration, he said,
would drop the word national and retain the proper title,
"the United States."- This motion was unanimously
adopted by the Convention." That is, they unanimously
rejected "the term national government," and yet both
Story and Webster build an argument on this term just as
if it had been retained by them !

"The name 'United States of America'," says the
younger Story, "is an unfortunate one, and has, doubtless,
led many minds into error. For it may be said, if the
States do not form a confederacy, why are they called
" 'United States ?' "■* This name is, indeed, a most unfor-
tunate one for the purpose of his argument, and for that
of the whole school of politicians to which he belongs. But
then, as we learn from the journal of the Convention of
1T87, it was deliberately chosen by them as the most suit-
able name for the work of their own hands ; and that too
in preference to the very name which the whole JSTorthern
school clings to with such astonishing pertinacity. From
the same journal, as well as from the other records of the
country, I shall hereafter produce many other things which
are equally unfortunate for the grand argument of the
Storys, the Websters, and the Motleys of the North.

1 "The Madison Papers." - Ibid., p. 008. ■' Ibid., p. f»09.

■* "The American Question," by William H. Story.

CHAPTEE V

the constitution of 1787 a compact
The Questions Involved

Was the Constitution a compact? Was it a compact
between the States, or to which the States were the parties ?
Was it a compact from which any State might recede at
pleasure? These three questions are perfectly distinct,
and all the rules of clear thinking require that they
should be so held in our minds, instead of being mixed
up and confounded in our discussions. Yet Mr. Justice
Story, in his long chapter on the "Nature of the Consti-
tution," discusses these questions, not separately and
distinctly, but all in one confused mass, to the no little
perplexity and distraction of his own mind. He carries
them all along together, and, in the darkness and confusion
occasioned by this mode of proceeding, he is frequently
enabled to elude the force of his adversaries' logic.

Thus, for instance, he sets out with the flat denial of the
doctrine that the Constitution is a compact ; and yet, when
the evidences become too strong for resistance, or a cloud
of witnesses rise up to confound him, he turns around,
and instead of fairly admitting that the Constitution is a
compact, asserts that if it is a compact it is not one between
the States. When too hardly pressed on this position,
he rej^lies that if it is a compact between the States it is
not such a compact that it may be revoked at the pleasure
of the parties. Thus, when he is driven from one position,
he falls back upon another, and finally rallies to a second,
a third, and a fourth denial of the main proposition that
the Constitution is a compact. Now, I intend to discuss
each one of these questions distinctly and by itself; hold-
ing Mr. Justice Story to one and the same precise point,
until it is either made good or else demolished. I hope,
in this way, to dispel the mists and fogs he has thrown
around the subject, and to hring out the truth into a clear
and unmistakable light.

The Wae Between the States 27

Webster's Position

Tlie same confusion of thought, and arising- from the
same source, pervades Mr. Webster's celebrated speech of
February 16, 1833 ; though, it must be admitted, not to
the same extent that it prevails in the "Commentaries" of
Mr. Justice Story. Mr. Calhoun very justly complains of
this want of clearness and precision in the positions of his
great antagonist. "x4.fter a careful examination," says he,
-'of the notes which I took of what the Senator said, I am
now at a loss to know whether, in the opinion of the
Senator, our Constitution is a compact or not, though the
almost entire argument of the Senator was directed to that
point. At one time he would seem to deny directly and
positively that it was a compact, while at another he would
appear, in language not less strong, to admit that it was."^

Mr. Webster emphatically and repeatedly denies both
that a Constitution is a compact and also that a compact is
a Constitution ; or, in other words, he conceives that the
natures of the two things are utterly incompatible with
each other.

He is very bold, and asserts that it is new language to
call "the Constitution a compact."

"This is the reason," says he, "which makes it necessary
to abandon the use of Constitutional language for a new
vocabulary, and to substitute, in place of plain historical
facts, a series of assumptions. This is the reason why it
is necessary to give new names to things, to speak of the
Constitution, not as a Constitution, but as a compact, and
of the ratification of the people not as ratifications, but as
acts of accession."- Again, he complains of Mr. Calhoun,
that "he introduces a new word of his own, viz., 'compact,'
as importing the principal idea, and designed to play the
principal part, and degrades Constitution ^nto an insignifi-
cant, idle epithet attached to compact. The whole then
stands a Constitutional compact !"

He is then particularly severe and eloquent upon the
supposed outrage perpetrated on "our American political
grammar," in thus degrading "constitution" (the

' "Mr. Calhoun's Speech." Feb. 26, 1833.
^"Speech." Feb. 16, 1833.

28 The Wae Between the States

capitals are his own) from its rightful rank "as a noun
substantive." But, after all, the plain, simple fact is that
this "new word," as Mr. Webster calls it, was as familiar
to the ears of the authors of the Constitution as any other
in the vocabulary of the great Convention of 1787. The
terms Constitution and compact are, indeed, twin words,
and convertible in the language of the fathers.

Though "the term Constitutional affixes to the word
compact no definite idee," says Mr. Webster, and in such
connection "is void of all meaning," "yet it is easy, quite
easy, to see why the gentleman uses it in these resolutions."
Now, what is the reason, the deep design, that induces
Mr. Calhoun to use an epithet "so void of all meaning?"
"He can not open the book," says Mr. Webster, "and look
upon our written frame of government without seeing that
it is called a Constitution. This may well be appalling to
him." We can not possibly imagine that Mr. Calhoun
should, for one moment, have been disturbed or alarmed
by such a discovery or revelation. It is certain that he
nowhere betrays the least symptom of dismay at "the
appalling" consideration that the Constitution is really a
Constitution. That "noun substantive" seems to have
inspired him with no sort of terror whatever. On the
contrary, it appears to sit as easily on his political faith
and to flow as familiarly from his lips as any other word in
the language. We can imagine, however, why the N'orthern
States should wish to get rid of both the idea of a compact
and of the word; why the powerful should wish to ob-
literate and erase from the tablets of their memory every
recollection and vestige of the solemn compact or bargain
into which they had entered with the weak, but which
they had never observed in good faith.

Opposite Opinioists and Webster's Own Conflicting
Statements

It is perfectly certain that Mr. Webster's horror of the
term compact, as applied to the Constitution, is of com-
paratively recent origin. It was wholly unknown to the
fathers of the Constitution themselves. Mr. Gouverneur

The War BetwpjI':x the States 2i)

Morris, it is well known, was one of the most celebrated
advocates for a strong national government in the Con-
vention of 178T ; and yet, in that assembly, he used the
words : "He came here to form a compact for the good of
America. He was ready to do so with all the States. He
hoped and believed that all would enter into such a com-
pact. If they would not, he would be ready to join with
any States that would. But as the compact was to be
voluntary, it is in vain for the Eastern States to insist on
what the Southern States will never agree to."^

Thus, this celebrated representative of the State of
Pennsylvania, and staunch advocate of a strong national
government, did not hesitate to call the Constitution a
compact into which the States were to enter. Indeed, no
one, at that early day, either before the Constitution was
adopted or afterwards, hesitated to call it a compact.

Mr. Gerry, the representative of Massachusetts, says :
"If nine out of thirteen [States] can dissolve the compact,
six out of nine will be Just as able to dissolve the new one
hereafter." Here again the new Constitution is called a
compact.

"In the case of a union of people under one Constitu-
tion," says Mr. Madison, while contending for the ratifica-
tion of the new Constitution by the people, "the nature of
the pact has always l)een understood to exclude such an
interpretation."- Thus, in the Convention of 1787, Mr.
Madison called the Constitution a compact ; a word which
he continued to applv to it during the whole course of his
life.

In the celebrated resolutions of Virginia, in 1798, Mr.
Madison used these words, "That this assembly doth
explicitly and peremptorily declare that it views the powers
of the Federal Government as resulting from the compact
to which the States are parties." Again, in his almost
equally celebrated letter to Mr. Everett, in 1830, he calls
"the Constitution" "a compact among the States in their
highest sovereign capacity." In the same letter Mr.
Madison speaks of the States as "the parties to the Con-

' "Madison Papei-s," p. 1081-2.
= Ibid.. p. 1184.

30 The Wae Between the States

vStitiitional compact" ; using the very expression which is
so offensive to Mr. Webster's new "political grammar."
Nay, it was only three years before, in the great debate on
Foot's resolutions, that Mr. Webster himself had, like
every one else, spoken of the Constitution as a compact, as
a bargain which was obligatory on the parties to it. "It
is the original bargain," says he, in that debate ; "the com-
pact— let it stand ; let the advantage of it be fully enjoyed.
The Union itself is too full of benefits to be hazarded in
propositions for changing its original basis. I go for the
Constitution as it is, and for the Union as it is." Nor is
this all. He there indignantly repels, both for "himself
and for the North," "accusations which impute to us a
disposition to evade the Constitutional compact." Yet, in
the course of three short years, he discovers that there is
no compact to be evaded and no bargain to be violated !
All such trammels are given to the winds, and Behemoth
is free ! How sudden and how wonderful this revolution
in the views and in the vocabulary of the great orator of
New England!^

This language, in which the Constitution is called a com-
pact, is not confined to Morris, and Gerry, and Madison,
and the Webster of 1830. Mr. Chief Justice Jay, of the
Supreme Court of the Union, in the case of Chisholm vs.
the State of Georgia, expressly declares that "the Constitu-
tion of the United States is a compact."^ "Our Constitu-
tion of the United States," says John Quincy Adams, the
sixth President of the Republic, "and all our State Con-

^ The great mind of Mr. Webster was in general more like the ocean
in repose than in action ; and, as Is well known, his habitual indolence
often Induced him to rely on others for political information. No
one who will attentively compare his speech of 1833 with book iii,
chap, iii, of Story's "Commentaries on the Constitution," can be at any
loss to account for the origin of his "new poltical grammar," his "new
rules of syntax," and his "new vocabulary." If he applies these
epithets to the doctrines of Morris, and Gerry, and Madison, it is
because old things have become new with him, and new things old.
The secret of this revolution will be found, as we shall soon prove, in
the woi'k of Mr. Justice Story, which work was not written in 1830.
Indeed it was not published until 1833 : but then the first volume,
containing book ill, chap, iii, was prepared, if not printed, before the
speech of Mr. Webster, with whom the author was on the most
intimate terms. It would have been well for the fame of Webster, in
the eve of posterity, if he had more carefully examined such a question
for himself.

" 3 Dall. R., p. 419.

The War Between the States 31

stitntions, have been voluntary compacts, deriving all their
autliority from the free consent of the parties to them."

The Virginia Eesolutions of 1708, already referred to as
expressing the opinion of ]\Ir. Madison, assert that "Vir-
ginia views the powers of the Federal Grovernment as
resulting from the compact to which the States are parties."
Again, in the Virginia Eeport of 1800, it is said, "The
States heing parties to the Constitutional compact," etc.
Edmund Pendleton, President of the ratifying Convention
of Virginia, in 1788, in. the course of his argument in favor
of the new Constitution, says, "This is the only Govern-
ment founded in real compact."^ Judge Tucker, in his
commentaries on Blackstone, repeatedly calls the Constitu-
tion in question "a compact between the States" of the
T'Tnion. The third President of the United States, as well
as the sixth, Thomas Jefferson as well as. John Quincy
Adams, considered the Constitution "a compact."

"The States," says Jefferson, "entered into a compact,
Avhich is called the Constitution of the United States."-
The Convention of Massachusetts, which was called to
ratify the Constitution of the United States, was, if
possible, still more emphatic and decided in the expression
of the same opinion. "Having impartially discussed, and
fully considered," say they, "the Constitution of the United
States of America," we acknowledge, "with grateful hearts,
the goodness of the Supreme Euler of the Universe in
affording the people of the United States an opportunity,
deli1:)erately and peaceably, without fraud and surprise, of
entering into aii explicit and solemn compact with each
other, by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution,"
etc. Yet, in the face of all these high authorities, and of
a hundred more that might be easily adduced, running
from James Madison in the Convention of 1787 to Daniel
Webster in the great debate of 1830, and embracing the
lights of all sections and of all parties, it is asserted by
this celebrated statesman, though certainly not as a states-
man, that the term compact, as applied to the Constitution,
is "a new word," is a part and parcel of "the unconstitu-

^ "Elliott's Debates." vol. ill, p. 57.
- ■•("orrespondence."" vol. iv. p. 415.

32 The Wak Between the States

tional language," of the "new vocabulary," which has
been invented to obscure the fundamental principles of the
Government of the United States, and to justify secession !

So far, indeed, is this from being a new mode of speech
that it is one of the most familiar words known to the
fathers of the Constitution itself, or to its more early
expounders. Even The Federalist, in submitting the Con-
stitution to the people, sets it before them as "the com-
pact."^ "The man," says Mr. Webster, "is almost untrue
to his country who calls the Constitution a compact." It
were, indeed, much nearer the truth to say that the man
is not only almost but altogether untrue to himself, as well
as to the most solemn records of his country, who can
assert that the term compact, as applied to the Constitu-
tion, is "a new word," or the exponent of a new idea.

The argunxents of Mr. Webster to prove that the Con-
stitiTtion is not a compact, are, if possible, as unfortunate
as his assertions. If words be not things in reality, as
well as in effect, then it will be found that his arguments
possess an exceedingly small value. There are two words,
in particular, in the use of which he displays far more of
rhetorical legerdemain than of rigid logic. These are the
two words, "compact" and "Constitution."

^o one pretends for a moment that every compact is a
Constitution. There are compacts about soap and candles,
about pepper and calicoes, or some such trifling thing,
which no one would call a Constitution. It is only when
a compact has for its object the institution or organization
of a political society, or a civil government, that it is
properly denominated a Constitution. Hence, in the
ordinary acceptation of the words, compact falls far below
the high-sounding noun substantive Constitution; a cir-
cumstance of which any rhetorician may, if he choose, very
easily avail himself. Mr. AVebster has done so, and that,
too, with no little popular effect. "AA^e know no more of a
Constitutional compact between sovereign powers," says he,
"than we do of a Constitutional indenture of partnership,
a Constitutional deed of conveyance, or a C^onstitutional
bill of exchange. But we know what the Constitution is,"
etc.

' No. xxxix.

The War Between the States 33

Perhaps we do, and perhaps Ave do not; that is the very
point in dispute. But certain it is that if we do know
what the Constitution is we need not seek to illustrate its
nature or to exhibit its history by any such deceptive use
of words. Akin to this sort of reasoning, or rhetoric, is
all that is said by Mr. Webster and Mr. Justice Story
about lowering the Constitution by considering it as a
"mere compact/' or as "nothing but a compact." It is,
indeed, something more than a compact, something more
high, and holy, and honorable. Though in its nature it is
a mere compact, yet in its object, which is no less than to
institute or organize a political society, it is the most
solemn and sacred of all earthly transactions. Such com-
pacts should not be despised, nor should they be explained
away, or trampled under foot by the powerful ; they involve
the destiny of millions.

Mr. Webster admits that the Constitution is "founded
on consent or agreement, or on compact" ; meaning no
more by that word than "voluntary consent or agreement."
But he denies that it is itself a compact. "The Constitu-
tion is not a contract," says he, "but the result of a con-
tract ; meaning no more by contract than assent. Founded
on consent it is a government proper." Now, Mr. Webster
hunself being the judge, the Constitution is not a govern-
ment at all; for a government is, says he, "the political
being created by the Constitution or fundamental law."
But "founded on consent," not on implied or necessitated,
but on "voluntary consent," it is a compact proper.. Mr.
Webster is compelled to call the Constitution a govern-
ment in direct violation of his own definitions and princi-
ples, in order to keep from calling it a compact.

In what manner the Constitution is founded on consent,
on a deliberate and voluntary consent, Mr. Webster has
himself told us only a few pages in advance of the above
admission. "It is to be remarked," says he, "that the
Constitution began to speak only after its adoption. Until
it was ratified by nine States it was but a proposal, the
mere draft of an instrument. It was like a deed drawn
but not executed." This is most exactly and perfectly true.
The Constitution was a dead letter, a powerless and in-

34 The War Between the States

operative thing, until the ratification or solemn "voluntary-
assent'^ of nine States breathed into it the breath of life.
It was from this consent, from this compact of nine States,
that "the Constitution resulted" as a living or. an authori-
tative document. But when the nine States assented to
that "proposal or mere draft of an instrument," and
ratified the same by signing it, then each and every
article therein specified and written became an article of
agreement between the parties to it. "It was like a deed
drawn but not executed." But when executed or ratified
it was then like a deed signed by the parties; and all the
written articles thereof became articles of agreement
between the parties.

Thus the Constitution not only resulted from the com-
pact of the nine States, but became itself the compact; or,
in other words, the written expression of the terms, the
conditions, and the articles of the compact. This is what
we mean by calling the Constitution a compact between the
States. And is not this the language of truth ?

The ISTatuee of a Compact

Now, on what conditions, or in what cases, does such
voluntary consent become a compact proper? Each of
the nine States, as it assented to and ratified the Constitu-
tion, agreed to all its terms and articles. It agreed to
forego the exercise of various powers, and to assume various
important liabilities, in consideration that eight other
States would do precisely the same thing. And it also
agreed that the powers thus delegated by the nine States,
or conferred on the general government to be erected for
the common good, should be distributed, exercised, limited,
and controlled, according to the terms and articles of the
Constitution. Is not this a compact proper ? Have we not
here mutual promises, each State parting with what it
possessed, and, in consideration thereof, seeking to derive
some benefit from the others? If so, then is not this a
compact in the proper sense of the word ?

The same idea is perfectly expressed by Mr. Webster
in the speech before us. "On entering into the Union,"

The Wae Between the States 35

says he, "the people of each State gave up a part of their
own power to make laws for themselves, in consideration
that, as to common objects, they should have a part in
making laws for other States." Here is the voluntary
relinquishment on the one part, and the valuable consider-
ation on the other. Is not this a contract proper ? If not,
then have Blackstone, and Kent, and Pothier, and Domat,
and Story written in vain on the nature and law of con-
tracts. If not, then indeed may we despair of ever arriving
at the meaning of any one word in any one language under
the sun.

It possesses every conceivable attribute of a valid con-
tract. 1. There were "the parties capable of contract-
ing"— the States. 2. It is admitted to have been "volun-
tary." 3. There was "the sufficient consideration" — the
powers surrendered, and the liabilities incurred. Thus it
fully answers to every condition laid down by Judge Story
hmiself,^ as the tests or criteria of a contract proper. It
bears no resemblance to those imaginary transactions which
certain European writers have invented to explain the
origin of their governments, and to give stability to their
political theories by fastening them, as with anchors, to
past ages. On the contrary, it is historical and real. The
time and the manner, the substance and the form, and
all the stipulations, are written down and known. It was
deliberately and solemnly entered into yesterday; and it is
as deliberately and solemnly denied to-day. Such is the
incurable sophistry of power !

The constitution of England is not a compact. There
is not, in all the history of England, the least intimation
of the people's having assembled, either by themselves or
by their representatives, to establish the institution of
King, or Lords, or Commons. Yet these three powers
constitute the main features in the government of Great
Britain. Each power holding the balance between the
other two, so as to prevent either from gaining the ascend-
ancy, is what forms the stable equilibrium of the constitu-
tion of England. But yet certain parts of the British con-
stitution are compacts, and are so called by writers who

1 '-Conflict of Laws," p. 307.

36 The AA^ae Between" the States

reject the theory of a compact as to the whole. According
to De Lolme, and other authors, Great Britain owes her
admirable constitution to the Korman Conquest rather than
to compact. "It is to the era of the conquest," says he,
"that we are to look for the real foundation of the English
constitution." Yet changes and improvements in that
constitution which, instead of growing, were made by
competent parties, he calls compacts. Thus, says he, in
reference to the accession of William III to the throne,
"care was taken to repair the breaches which had been
made in the constitution, as well as to prevent new ones,
and advantage was taken of the rare opportunity of enter-
ing into an original and express compact between king
and people."^

Then, after having specified some of the improvements
made in the constitution by this compact, he adds, "Lastly,
the keystone was put to the arch by the final establishment
of the liberty of the press. The Eevolution of 1689 is,
therefore, the third grand era in the history of the con-
stitution of England." Again, he says, "Without mention-
ing the compacts which were made with the first Kings of
the Norman line, let us only cast our eyes on Magna
Charta, which is still the foundation of English liberty,^
being the great compact by which the Kings, the barons,
and the people^ entered into certain mutual stipulations
respecting the prerogatives of the Crown and the rights of
the subject."

Thus the English revolution, like our own, was followed
by a compact; and the only difference was that the com-
pact of 1688 was in addition to an old constitution, whereas
the compact of 1788 was a constitution in toto coelo.

Locke, the great popular champion of the theory of the
social compact, was then in the ascendant in the United
States, as he was with the Whigs in England. That
theory, though exploded now, was then almost universally
received in America. That is to say, exploded by showing
that there is no historical evidence of any such compact at

^ "De Lolme on the Constitution," p. 48. " Ibid., p. 287.

2 1 say tlie people, because those who followed the barons at Runny-
mede demanded and obtained stipulations in favor of the people as well
as in favor of their leaders.

The Wae Between the States 37

the origin of the governments of the Old World, and that
the alleged transaction was fictitious.^ But the fiction,
which had been only partially realized at the end of revo-
lutions, and not at the beginning of societies, became a
fact in the hands of American legislators. In the language
of Gouverneur Morris, they came to the Convention of
1787 "to make a compact,^' and they made one.

But this draft of a compact, we are told, calls itself a
Constitution, and not a compact at all. Very well. Sup-
pose it had called itself a compact, even an "original,
explicit, and solemn compact," would it not have been just
as easy for Mr. Justice Story to affirm that this only meant
an "implied contract," as it was for him to do the same
thing in regard to the Constitution of Massachusetts?
But although the Convention of 1787 did not, on the very
face of the Constitution, call itself a compact, yet in the
letter which, by their "unanimous order," was dispatched
with that instrument to the President of Congress, they
use the same language in describing the nature of the
transaction that is employed by Sidney, and Locke, and
Eousseau to defuie "the social contract," as we shall here-
after see.

illthough Mr. Justice Story endeavors to bring discredit
on the "explicit and solemn" compacts of the ISTew World,
by identifying them with the vague and visionary theories
of the Old, yet he is perfectly aware of the difference
between the fact in the one case and the hypothesis in the
other, whenever it suits his purpose to use such knowledge.
Thus, he says, in relation to his own Pilgrim Fathers :
"Before their landing they drew up and signed a voluntary
compact of government, iforming, if not the first, at least

^ This is the ground taken, and unanswerably maintained by Hume,
in his essay on the "Original Contract," "Essays," vol. i, Essay 12.
The theory of Rousseau is rejected by M. Comte ("Theorie de Legis-
lation," liv. i, c. ii) on the same ground. Sir William Temple
("Works," vol. ii, pp. 37, 46) had previously rejected the doctrine of
the "Social Contract." Kant, the philosopher of Konigsberg, treats it
as a frivolous and impractical notion. Heeren ("On Political
Theories," p. 239) says that a social contract neither was, nor could
have been, actually concluded. Stahl ("Philosophy of Rights," vol. ii,
part ii, p. 142) rejects the doctrine as visionary. Godwin, likewise
("Political Justice," book iii. c. ii and iii), rejects it. The doctrine of
the social compact is subjected to an exhaustive analysis by Mr.
Austin ("Prov. of Jurisprudence," 331-71), and triumphantly refuted.
Jeremy Bentham, likewise, rejects the same hypothesis as visionary.

38 The Wae Between the States

the best authenticated case of an original social contract
for the establishment of a nation which is to be found in
the annals of the world. Philosophers and jurists have
perpetually resorted to the theory of such a compact by
which to measure the rights and duties of governments and
subjects; but for the most part it has been treated as an
effort of imagination^ unsustained by the history or practice
of nations, and furnishing little of solid instruction for
the actual concerns of life. It was little dreamed of that
America should furnish an example of it in primitive and
almost patriarchal simplicity."^ Thus Massachusetts has
taken the lead of all the States in the world in the making
of social compacts, and also in the breaking of them. This
last point will, hereafter, be most fully illustrated and
proved.

The original draft of the Constitution of Massachusetts
was drawn up by John Adams, the second President of
the United States, and he certainly entertained no doubt
that he was drawing up an "explicit and solemn compact,"
or reducing the theory of European writers to practice.
"It is," says he, "Locke, Sidney, Rousseau, and DeMably
reduced to practice."^ All these celebrated authors on the
"social contract" reduced to practice ! But it is all in vain.
Por if the iiction is reduced to fact it is only that the fact
may be again reduced to fiction. Massachusetts keep her
bargains ! Even her most gifted sons, her Storys and her
Websters, exert all their genius and exhaust the stores of
their erudition to explain away and reduce to a mere
nullity her most solemn social compacts, both State and
Federal ! The theory becomes a fact, and this fact calls
itself "an original, explicit, and solemn compact." But
then, as interest or power dictates, the fact is explained
away, and there ends all the solemn farce.

"Majorities, in a democracy, do not rely on Constitu-
tions, do not care for Constitutions. They rely on numbers
and the strong arm." They spurn, with more than im-
perial scorn, the limitations and restraints which written
Constitutions or judicial decisions would impose on their

^ "Story on the Constitution," book i, chap, iii, p. 37.
2 "John Adams' Works," vol. iv, p. 216.

The Wae Between the States 39

sovereign will and pleasure. They respect such paper
checks, such dictates of reason and justice, just about as
much as the raging billows of the ocean respected the line
which Canute drew upon its shores. In the strong lan-
guage of De Tocqueville, nothing can restrain them from
crushing whatever lies in their path.

CHAPTER YI

THE CONSTITUTIOX OF 1787 A COMPACT BETWEEJST THE
STATES — THE FACTS OF THE CASE

In discussing the question of the preceding chapters,
whether the Constitution was a compact, I introduced
much matter which incidentally showed that it was a
compact between the States. In like manner, I shall, in
proving that the States are the parties to the Constitution,
produce much additional evidence that it is a compact.
In order to show that the States are the parties to the
Constitutional compact, let us consider : ( 1 ) The facts of
the case; (2) The language of the Constitution itself;
and (3) The views of Hamilton, Madison, Morris, and
other framers of the Constitution; and (4) The absurdities
flowing from the doctrine that the Constitution is not a
compact between the States, but was ordained by the people
of America as one nation.

The Defects of the Confederation'

"It appears to me," says Mr. Webster, "that the plainest
account of the establishment of this government presents
the most just and philosophical view of its foundation."
True, very true. There is, indeed, no proposition in the
celebrated speech of Mr. Webster, nor in any other speech,
more true than this; and, besides, it goes directly to the
point. For the great question which Mr. Webster has
undertaken to discuss relates not so much to the super-
structure of the government as to "its foundation."

This is the question: How was the Constitution made
or ordained, and on what does it rest? Bearing this in
mind, let us proceed to consider, first, his plain account of
the establishment of the government of the United States,
and then the argmnents in favor of his position.

First, let us consider, item by item, his plain account.
"The people of the several States," says he, "had their
separate governments, and between the States there also

Tpie War Between the States 41

existed a Confederation." True. ''With this condition
of things the people were not satisfied, as the Confederation
had been found not to fulfill its intended objects. It was
proposed, therefore, to erect a new common government,
which should possess certain definite powers, such as
regarded the property of the people of all the States, and
to be formed upon the general model of American Consti-
tutions." This is not so plain. It seems partly true and
partly false. We are told that the people had discovered
the defects of the Confederation, and were consequently
not satisfied with it.

Alexander Hamilton, a contemporary witness, tells a
very different story. "Men of intelligence," says he, "dis-
covered the feebleness of the structure" of the Confedera-
tion ; "but the great body of the people, too much engrossed
with their distresses to contemplate any but the immediate
causes of them, were ignorant of the defects of their
Constitution."^ It was only "when the dangers of the
war were removed," and the "men of intelligence" could
be heard, that the people saw "what they had suffered, and
what they had yet to suffer from a feeble form of
government.""

"There was no need of discerning men," as Hamilton
truly said, "to convince the people of their unhappy con-
dition." But they did need to be instructed respecting
the causes of their misery. So far was the great body of
the people from having discerned for themselves the causes
of their troubles that Mr. Madison ascribes his ability to
make this discovery to his peculiar situation. "Having
served as a member of Congress," says he, "through the
period between March, 1780, and the arrival of peace, in
1783, I had become intimately acquainted with the public
distresses, and the causes of them." Thus enlightened,
and, under the dreadful aspect of affairs, "sympathizing
in the alarm of the friends of free government at the
threatened danger of an abortive result to the great, and
perhaps last, experiment in its favor," Mr. Madison could
not be "insensible to the obligation to aid as far as he
could in averting the calamity."^ Hence he acceded to

» "Works," vol. ii, p. 445. = Ibid. ^ "Madison Papers," p. 693.

42 The Wae Between the States

the desire of his fellow- citizens of the country, and became
a member of the Legislature of Virginia, "hoping," as he
declared, "that he might there best contribute to incul-
cate the critical posture to which the revolutionary cause
was reduced, and the merit of a leading agency of the State
in bringing about a rescue of the Union, and the blessings
of liberty staked on it, from an impending catastrophe."

The ISTature of the Proposed Change

It thus appears that the first step which, in the end, led
to a change of the Federal Government, was not a popular
movement ; it did not originate with the people ; it sprang
from the brain of James Madison, and manifested itself
in the action of the Legislature of Virginia. But what
was this action ? Was it to change the form of the Federal
Government ? Far from it. The resolution of the Virginia
Legislature, drawn up by Mr. Madison, and introduced by
Mr. Tyler,^ merely appoints commissioners to meet such
commissioners as may be appointed by the other States,
"to take into consideration the trade of the United States,"
and "to consider how far a uniform system in their com-
mercial regulations may be necessary to their common
interest and permanent harmony." It suggests no change
whatever in the Federal Government, except in so far as
this may be implied in a uniform system of commercial
regulations.

This resolution, as every one knows, led to the Annapolis
Convention, which took the next great step towards the
formation of the new Constitution. Nor was this a popular
movement. It originated in the brain of Alexander
Hamilton. In the address of that Convention, he says,
"That the express terms of the power to your commis-
sioners supposing a deputation from all the States, and
having for its object the trade and commerce of the United
States, your commissioners did not conceive it advisable to

1 The resolution was introduced by Mr. Tyler, rather than its
author, because, "having never served in Congress," he "had more the
ear of the house than those whose services there exposed them to an
imputable bias." "Madison Papers," p. 696. So great was the jealousy
of the Federal Congress in those days.

The Wae Between the States 43

proceed on the business of their mission under the circum-
stances of so partial and defective a representation/^ The
address then proceeds to recommend "a general meeting of
the States in a future Convention/' with powers extending
to "other objects than those of commerce." "They are the
more naturally led to this conclusion/' says the Convention,
"as in their reflections on the subject they have been in-
duced to think that the power of regulating trade is of
such comprehensive extent, and will enter so far into the
grand system of the Federal Government, that to give it
efficacy, and to obviate questions and doubts concerning its
precise nature and limits, may require a correspondent
adjustment in other parts of the Federal system."

"That there are important defects in the system of the
Federal Government," continues the address, "is acknowl-
edged by the acts of those States which have concurred
in the present meeting. That the defects, upon a closer
examination, may be found greater and more numerous
than even these acts imply, is at least so far probable, from
the embarrassment which characterizes the present state
of our national affairs, foreign and domestic, as may
reasonably be supposed to merit a deliberate and candid
discussion, in some mode which will unite the sentiments
and counsels of all the States."

Hamilton and Madison Originate the Change in
Federal Government

In compliance with this recommendation of "a general
meeting of the States in a future Convention/' twelve
States met at Philadelphia on the 14th of May, 1787, with
instructions to join "in devising and discussing all such
alterations and further provisions as may be necessary to
render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies
of the Union."^ "The recommendation was received by
the Legislature of Virginia," says Mr. Madison, "which
happened to be the first that acted on it, and the example
of her compliance was made as conciliatory and impressive

^ "Madison Papers," p. 706. These are the words of the resolution
of Virginia ; the instructions of the other States were equivalent to
these.

44 The War Between the States

as possible."^ Thus it was Alexander Hamilton, as the
master spirit of the Annapolis Convention, who first con-
ceived the idea of a general Convention to revise and
amend the Federal Government, and it was James Madison,
as the great ruling genius of the Legislature of Virginia,
who gave the first and most powerful impulse to that
conception. The great mass of the people had very little
to do with the movement.

"A resort to a general Convention," says Mr. Madison,
"to remodel the Confederacy [i. e., the Confederation. —
Ed.] was not a new idea."^ He then mentions five persons
by whom this idea had been entertained ; namely, Pelatiah
Webster, Colonel Hamilton, E. H. Lee, James Madison,
and Koah Webster. None of these, however, go beyond
the idea of Hamilton, "to strengthen the Federal Con-
stitution"; or of Madison, to supply its defects.^ But if
this had Iseen a popular movement, Mr. Madison could
easily have found, during the period of three years, more
than five candidates for the once hotly-contested honor of
having conceived the first idea of a Convention to remodel
the Confederation or to amend the Federal Constitution.

The plain truth is that it was Alexander Hamilton, and-
not the people, who, grappling with the vast and compli-
cated idea of a regular commercial system, saw the changes
which such a system must introduce into the Federal Gov-
ernment. Hence it was Alexander Hamilton, and not the
people, who became dissatisfied with the Confederation as
it was, and sought to have its Constitution remodeled.
"He was the first," as the historian of the Constitution
has truly said, "to perceive and develop the idea of a real
union of the people of the United States."'*

1 "Madison Papers." p. 703. - Ibid., p. 706.

3 Tlie two Websters, Pelatiah and Noah, do show some originality.
The one, in 1781, seeing that Congress had not sufficient authority
"for the performance of their duties" (though he does not tell us what
duties they had to perform, except to exercise the authority entrusted
to them),' suggests the plan of a Continental Convention, for the
express purpose, "among other things, of enlarging the duties of their
Constitution." The other, in 1784, wished for a government "which
should act, not on States, but directly on individuals." If this idea
really originated with Noah Webster, then there are many who will
think that his political pamphlet cancelled the obligations which his
spelling book conferred on the country. Mr. Webster was also original
in his orthography.

* "History of the Constitution of the United States," by Curtis,
Tol. 1, p. 413.

The Wak Between tpie States 45

, The Confederation a Government

It was not proposed then, as Mr. Webster alleges, and
no one ever proposed, to set aside the Confederation in
order to establish a government. The Confederation was
itself a government. This contrast between the Confed-
eration and a government, as things essentially different
in kind, which pervades the whole of Mr. Webster's speech,
and which is even interwoven with his ''plain account of
the establishment of the government''' of the United States,
is purely a hypothesis of his own.

Hamilton and the Convention of Annapolis repeatedly
speak, as we have seen, of "the Federal Constitution'' and
"the Federal Government." Madison and the Legislature
of Virginia use precisely the same language in reference to
the same objects. Even Pelatiah Webster, in this respect,
far less original than his great namesake, speaks of the
"Constitution" of the Federal Government. The Con-
vention of 1787 also call the old Confederation "the
Federal Government."^

Eacpi State Independent in Adopting the
Constitution

But we must proceed to the next item of Mr. Webster's
plain account. "This proposal," says he, "was assented
to, and an instrument was presented to the people of the
several States for their consideration. They approved it,
and agreed to adopt it, as a Constitution." True, as far as
it goes. But when Mr. Webster asks, "Is not this the
truth of the whole matter?" we are bound to answer that
this is either not the truth of the whole matter, or it is not
the whole truth of the matter. On the contrary, it omits
precisely those great truths which shed the most light on
the fomidation of the government of the United States.
One might well suppose, from the above statement, that
the people of the several States had jointly approved the
Constitution, and jointly ordained it as a Constitution.
But however essential this view may be to the theory of

^ "Madison Papers," pp. 730-35, etc.

46 The War Between the States

Mr. Webster — and his theory is as baseless as the fabric of
a vision without it — it has not the shadow of a foundation
in the facts of history.

The plain and unquestionable fact is that each State
adopted or rejected the Constitution for itself, and for itself
alone. No twelve States could by their united action lay
the bonds of a new Constitution on the thirteenth State.
This was universally conceded. The little State of Ehode
Island stood aloof ; and though her conduct was reprobated,
no one denied her right. Neither all the other States com-
bined, nor all the people of America, had the shadow of an
authority to constrain her action, or to control her own
free choice. No power on earth could touch the priceless
pearl of her sovereignty in the affair. No one presumed
to question her right to decide for herself. This right was
then as clear as the sun, and all eyes recognized it. And
this was true, not only in relation to Ehode Island, but
also to each State in the Confederation. For in the act of
reunion each State was perfectly free and independent,
uncontrolled and uncontrollable by any power upon earth.

But this fact, which is far too recent and too well
authenticated to be denied by any one, goes to the very
foundation of the government of the United States, and
shows that its Constitution rested on a federal, and not on
a national act. It shows that it was a union of States,
effected by the several acts of each State, and not the union
of all the individuals in America, acting as one political
community.

Eeply to Contrary Opinion of Motley

Mr. Webster's "plain account" is, in fact, a gross falsi-
fication of history. If possible, however, it is surpassed
by Mr. Motley. This most unscrupulous writer asserts :
"The Constitution was not drawn up by the States, it was
not promulgated in the name of the States, it was not
ratified by the States."^ Now each and every one of these
assertions is diametrically opposed to the truth. Strike
out the little syllable "not" from every clause of the above

^ "Rebellion Records," vol. 1, p. 211.

The Wak Between the States 47

sentence, and it will then express the exact truth. For,
in the first place, as the record shows, it is a plain and
incontrovertible fact that the Constitution was drawn up
or framed by the States.

It was drawn up or framed, as every one knows, by the
Convention of 1787; in which the States, and the States
alone, were represented. Every iota of the Constitution
was decided upon, and found a place in that written instru-
ment, by a vote of the States ; each State having one vote ;
the little State of Delaware, for example, having an equal
vote with New York, Pennsylvania, or Virginia. No fact
should be more perfectly notorious, or well known, than
this; for it stands out everywhere on the very face of the
proceedings of the Convention, which framed the Consti-
tution. Thus, for example, "On the question for a single
Executive; it was agreed to — Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye — 7 ; New York, Delaware, Maryland, no — 3."^

In like manner, every other item of the Constitution
was decided upon, and the whole instrument formed, by a
vote of the States; acting as separate, independent, and
equal bodies. How, in the face of such a fact, could Mr.
Motley so boldly assert that the Constitution was not
drawn up, or framed, by the States? By whom, then,
was it framed? Was it framed by "the people of the
United States in the aggregate"; acting as one nation?
Nothing is farther from the truth. There is not even the
shadow of a foundation for any such assertion or insinua-
tion. Will it be said that the Constitution was drawn up,
not by the States, but by those who proposed its various
articles? If so, such a subterfuge would be nothing to the
purpose, and very far from deserving a moment's notice.

The second assertion of Mr. Motley, that the Constitu-
tion "was not promulgated in the name of the States," is
equally unfortunate. For, as every one knows, it was
promulgated by the Congress of the Confederation in which
the States alone were represented, and in which all the
States were perfectly equal. The "Articles of Confedera-
tion" says : "In determining questions in the United

1 "The Madison Papers," p. 783.

48 The Wae Between the States

States, in Congress assembled, each State shall have one
vote/'^ It was thus as equals that the States voted in
determining to promulgate the new Constitution; and it
was in consequence of that action of the States that the
Constitution was promulgated and laid before the people
of the several States for their adoption.

Here, again, in direct opposition to the unblushing
assertion of Mr. Motley, the Constitution was promulgated
by the States in Congress assembled. If Mr. Motley had
only deigned to glance at the history of the transaction
about which he speaks so confidently, he could not have
failed to perceive that the Constitution was first submitted,
by the Convention of 1787, "to the United States in
Congress assembled" ;- and that it was afterwards, in con-
formity with the opinion of the Convention, promulgated
by the States "in Congress assembled." But Sir. Motley's
theory of the Constitution takes leave of history; and has
little to do with facts, except to contradict them.

"The Constitution was not ratified by the States," says
Motley. In the Resolutions just quoted, and which were
unanimously adopted by the Convention of 1787, we find
this clause : ''Resolved, That in the opinion of this Con-
vention that as soon as the Convention of nine States
shall have ratified this Constitution, the United States in
Congress assembled should fix a day on which electors
should be appointed by the States which shall have
ratified the same," etc. Not one of the fathers of the
Constitution ever imagined that it was not ratified by the
States. But in this instance, as well as in many others,
their most familiar idea is repudiated, and their most
explicit language is contradicted by Mr. Motley.

In the sentence next to the one above quoted from
Motley, he says : ''The States never acceded to it [the
Constitution], and possess no power to secede from it."^
This peremptory and flat contradiction of the language of
the fathers of the .Constitution deserves no further notice,
since it has already been sufficiently exposed.

' Art. V.

- Resolutions which, "by the unanimous order of the Convention"
of 1787, was forwarded with the Constitution to Congress.
^ Chapter iii.

A. T. Bledsoe

CHAPTEE VII

THE CONSTITUTION A COMPACT BETWEEN THE STATES

THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION

The Preamble Quoted. "We the people of the United
States, in order to form a more perfect union, . . .
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America." The first clause of this preamble to
the Constitution, wholly detached from its history and
from every other portion of the same instrument, as well
as from all the contemporary and subsequent expositions
of its authors, is made the very corner-stone of the
Northern theory of the general government of the United
States. That tremendous theory, or scheme of power, has
been erected on this naked, isolated, and, as we expect to
show, grossly misinterpreted clause.

From the bare words of this clause it is concluded, both
by Story and Webster, that the Constitution was estab-
lished or ratified, not by a federal but by a national act;
or, in other terms, that it was not ratified by the States,
but by a power superior to the States, that is, by the
sovereign will of "the whole people. of the United States
in the aggregate," acting as one nation or political com-
munity. With Puritanical zeal they stick to "the very
words of the Constitution," while the meaning of the
words is unheeded by them, either because it is unknown,
or because it does not suit their purpose. But words are
not the money, they are merely the counters, of wise men.
The meaning of the Constitution is the Constitution.

In arriving at the meaning of these words, of the very
clause in question, I shall not do the least violence to any
law of language, or to any rule of interpretation. I shall,
on the contrary, show that we are not "obliged to depart
from the words of the instrument,"^ as Mr. Justice Story
alleges, in order to sustain our interpretation of any por-
tion of it. I shall show that the Southern interpretation

^ "Commentaries on the Constitution," book iii, chap. ii.

52 The Wae Between the States

of the clause in question is, in reality, the only fair, legiti-
mate, and reasonable sense of the preamble itself. Nor
shall I, for this purpose, repeat the arguments which are
usually employed by the friends of the South in this
controversy.

Those arguments are amply sufficient to refute the
interpretation of Story and Webster. But they are so
well put by others — ^by John Taylor, of Caroline; by-
Judge Upshur, of Virginia; by John C. Calhoun, of South
Carolina ; and especially by Mr. Spence, of Liverpool, that
I need not repeat them here. Every one may find access
to them in the admirable work of Mr. Spence.^ Hence,
passing by those argmnents, I shall, by an appeal to the
records of the Convention of 1787, make my position good,
and annihilate the great corner-stone of the Northern
theory of the Constitution of the United States.

The Peeamble Discussed

"We, the people of the United States." The history
of these words is curious and instructive. Only a portion
of that history has, as yet, been laid before the public of
England or of the United States. In the light of that
history the great corner-stone in question will be found to
crumble into dust and ashes ; and the only wonder will be
that considerations so clear and so conclusive should have
been so long locked up, as a profound secret, in the records
of the very Convention that formed the Constitution of the
United States.

It is well known that in the original draft of the Con-
stitution its preamble, instead of saying, "We, the people
of the United States,'' specified each State by name, as
the previous Articles of Confederation had done. If it
had remained thus, then the States would have appeared,
on the very face of the preamble itself, as the parties to
the Constitution. But the preamble, as is well known, was
afterwards changed by omitting to mention the States by
name. There are, however, some most important facts

1 We have only said admirable ; but, all things considered, Mr.
Spence's work is truly a wonderful production.

The War Between tpie States 53

connected with the change and the origin of the words in
question, which seem to be wholly unknown on both sides
of the Atlantic. They have, certainly, attracted no notice
whatever from any of the writers on the great controversy
between the North and the South.

The first of these facts relates to the person by whom,
and the manner in which, the change in question was
effected; or, the words, "We, the people of the United
States," were substituted for an enmneration of the States
by name. During all the great discussions of the Con-
vention, the preamble to the Constitution retained its
original form; nor was there, from the beginning to the
end of their deliberations, a single whisper of dissatis-
faction with it in that form. Every member of the
Convention appeared perfectly satisfied that the States
should stand, on the very front of the Constitution, as the
parties to the compact into which they were about to enter.
It Avas only after the provisions of the Constitution were
agreed upon, and its language was referred to "a committee
on style,'"'' that the names of the States were silently
omitted,*' and the clause, "We, the people of the United
States," substituted in their place.

Now, it will not be denied that if this change had not
been made by the "committee on style," then the States
would have been the parties to the new Constitution just
as they had been, to the old Articles of Confederation.
Hence, if the interpretation of Story and Webster be the
true one, then it must be admitted that the "committee on
style," appointed merely to express the views of the Con-
vention, really transformed the nature of the Constitution
of the United States ! Then it must be admitted that the
"committee on style," by a single turn of its pen, changed*
the course of history and the meaning of its facts ; causing
the supreme power of the Federal Government to emanate,
not from the States, but from the people of America as
one political community ! Did the "committee on style"
do all this? And is it on legislation like this that a
sovereign State is to be deemed guilty of treason and
rebellion against the sublime authority of the people of
America, and visited with the utmost vengeance? The

54 The Wae Between the States

sublime authority of the people of America, the one grand
nation, erected and established solely by the pen of the
"committee on style !"

This clause, "We, the people of the United States,"
introduced by the "committee on style," and passed over
in perfect silence by the whole Convention, is the great
stronghold, if it has one, of the Northern theory of the
Constitution. The argument from these words appears in
every speech, book, pamphlet, and discussion by every
advocate of the JSTorth. It was wielded by Mr. Webster
in his great debate with Mr. Calhoun, in 1833, and still
more fully in his still more eloquent speech on Foot's
resolutions in 1830. "The Constitution itself," says he,
"in its very front, declares that it was ordained and estab-
lished by the people of the United States in the aggregate."
The fact is not so. The Constitution neither declares that
it was established by the people of the United States in
the aggregate, nor by the people of the United States in
the segregate. But if we look into the history of the
transaction we shall find that it was established by them
in the latter character, and not in the former. We shall
find that each State acted separately, and for itself alone;
and that no one pretended, or imagined, that the whole
aggregate vote of any twelve States could bind the thir-
teenth State, without its own individual consent and rati-
fication. In order to make out his interpretation, Mr.
Webster interpolates the legislation of the "committee on
style" with words of his own.

How THE Preamble Was Changed

The change in the preamble to the Constitution was
effected by the pen of Gouverneur Morris, one of the most
zealous advocates in the Convention of 1787 for a strong
national government. He certainly wished all power to
emanate from the people of America, and to have them
regarded as one great nation. But did he accomplish his
wish? In the Convention, says the record, "Gouverneur
Morris moved that the reference of the" plan [i. e., of the
Convention] be made to one General Convention, chosen

The Wak Between the States 55

and authorized by the people to consider, amend, and
establish the same."^ This motion, if adopted, would
indeed have caused the Constitution to be ratified by "the
people of the United States in the aggregate," or as one
nation.

This would, in fact, have made it a government emanat-
ing from the people of America in one General Convention
assembled, and not from the States. But how was this
motion received by the Convention ? Was it approved and
passed in the affirmative by that body? It did not even
find a second in the Convention of 1787. So says the
record,^ and this is a most significant fact. So completely
was such a mode oP ratification deemed out of the question
that it found not the symptom or shadow of support from
the authors of the Constitution of the United States.

Kow was the very object, which Gouverneur Morris so
signally failed to accomplish directly and openly by his
motion, indirectly and covertly eft'ected by his style ? And
if so, did he design to efi^ect such a change in the funda-
mental law of the United States of America? It is cer-
tain that precisely the same efi^ect is given to his words,
to his style, as would have resulted from the passage of
his motion by the Convention. Did Gouverneur Morris
then intend that his words should have such force and
effect? In supposing him capable of such a fraud on the
Convention of 1787, I certainly do him no injustice, since
we have his own confession that he actually perpetrated
several such frauds on that assembly of Constitution-
makers. "That instrument," says he, in reference to the
Constitution, "was written by the fingers which write
this letter. Having rejected redundant terms, I believed
it to be as clear as language would permit; excepting,
nevertheless, a part of what relates to the judiciary. On
that subject conflicting opinions had been maintained with
so much professional astuteness that it became necessary
to select phrases which, expressing my own notions, would
not alarm others, nor shock their self-love; and to the
best of my recollection this was the only part which passed
without cavil."^ How adroitly, then, how cunningly, he

' "The Madison Papers," p. 1184.

- "Life and Writings of Gouverneur Morris," vol. iii, p. 323.

56 . The Wae Between the States

cheats the Convention into the unconscious sanction of his
"own notions"; and this great legislator of the Korth
even in the purer clays of the infant republic, was proud
of the fraud !

Nor is this the only instance in which, according to his
own confession and boast, Gouverneur Morris tricked the
Convention into the adoption of his own private views.
"I always thought," says he, in another letter, "that when
we should acquire Canada and Louisiana, it would be
proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them no
voice in our councils. In wording the third section of the
fourth article I went as far as circumstances would permit
to establish the exclusion. Candor obliges me to add my
belief that, had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong
opposition would have been made."^ Thus, as the penman
of the "committee on style," he abused his high position,
not only to mould the judiciary system of the United States
to suit his "own notions," but also to determine the fate of
two vast empires ! Is not such legislation truly won-
derful ? Instead of weighing every word with the utmost
care, and then depositing it in the Constitution as under
the solemn sanction of an oath, the Convention trusts the
style of the instrument to a fine writer, who cunningly
gives expression to his own views in opposition to those of
the assembly! "In a play, or a moral," says Jeremy
Bentham, "an improper word is but a word; and the
impropriety, whether noted or not, is attended with no
consequences. In a body of laws — especially of laws given
as Constitutional ones — an improper word would be a
national calamity and civil war may be the consequences
of it. Out of one foolish word may start a thousand
daggers." How true, and how fearfully has this truth been
illustrated by the history of the United States !

But although Gouverneur Morris was capable of such a
fraud on the Convention, we have no good reason to believe
he intended one by the substitution of the words, ''We,
the people of the United States," for the enumeration of
all the States by name. He has nowhere confessed to any
such thing; and, besides, he did not understand his own
words as they are so confidently understood by Story and

^ "Life and Writings of Gouverneur Morris," vol. iii, p. 193.

The Wae Between the States 57

AVebster. Every rational inquirer after truth should, it
seems to me, be curious to know what sense Gouverneur
Morris attached to the words in question, since it. was by
his pen that they were introduced into the preamble of
the Constitution. Nor will such curiosity be diminished,
but rather increased, by the fact that he did, in some
cases, aim to foist his own private views into the Consti-
tution of his country. How, then, did Gouverneur Morris
understand the words, "We, the people of the United
States?" Did he infer from these words that the Consti-
tution was not a compact between States, or that it was
established by the people of America, and not by the
States ? I answer this question in the words of Gouverneur
Morris himself. "The Constitution," says he, "was a
compact, not between individuals, but between political
societies, the people, not of America, but of the United
States, each enjoying sovereign power and of course equal
rights."^ Language could not possibly be more explicit.
Nor could it be more evident than it is that Gouverneur
Morris, the very author of the words in question, enter-
tained precisely the same view of their meaning as that
maintained by Mr. Calhoun and his school.

This point was, indeed, made far too clear by the pro-
ceedings of the Convention of 1787 for any member of
that body to entertain the shadow of a doubt in relation
to it. Nor can any one read these proceedings, as they
deserve to be read, without agreeing with Gouverneur
Morris that the authors of the Constitution designed it to
be ratified, as in fact it was, by "the people of the United
States," not as individuals, but as "political societies, each
enjoying sovereign power, and of course equal rights."
Or, in other words, without seeing that "the Constitution
was a compact," not between individuals, '^'but between
political societies," between sovereign States. This, in the
next chapter, I hope and expect to make perfectly clear,
by bringing to view the origin of the words, "We, the
people," and by showing the sense in which they were
universally understood and used by the member of the
Convention of 1787 in the very act of framing the Con-
stitution of the United States.

^ "Life and Writings," vol. iii, p. 103.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONSTITUTIOlSr OF 1787 A COMPACT BETWEEN THE
STATES THE LANGUAGE OE THE CONSTITUTION

(Continued)
FuKTHEE Discussion of the Change in the Preamble

The Convention of 1787 did, as we have seen, refuse to
call the government a national one, and gave it the name
of "the government of the United States." Did they
then make it a national one by enacting that it should be
ordained by "the whole people of the United States in
the aggregate" as one political society? Again, when it
was proposed in the Convention to ordain the Constitution
by "the people of the United States in the aggregate,"
in one General Convention assembled, the motion failed,
as we have seen, to secure a second. Did Gouverneur
Morris, then, the author of that proposal, achieve by his
style what he failed to accomplish by his motion? If
so, what should we think of the incompetency of the
Convention ?

ISTor was this all. For Madison introduced a motion
which required "a concurrence of a majority of both the
States and the people"^ at large to establish the Constitu-
tion; and this proposition was rejected by the Convention.
All these motions, designed to connect the new government
with a national origin, were lost, and the decree went
forth that the Constitution should be established by the
accession of nine States, each acting for itself alone, and
to be bound only by its own voluntary act. Now, the
question is, was all this action of the Convention over-
ruled and defeated by the committee on style, or rather
by its penman, Gouverneur Morris? If he formed such
design, then it must be admitted that the Northern theory
of the Constitution was conceived in fraud and brought
forth in iniquity; and every honest man at the North
ought to be ashamed both of its origin and its existence.

1 "The Madison Papers," p. 1470.

The Wae Between the States 59

But, as we have already seen, Gouverneur Morris did not
understand his own words, "We, the people," as they
are understood by the more modern expounders of the
Constitution at the North. Hence we have no reason to
believe that he intended, in this case at least, a fraud on
the design and will of the Convention.

Was the whole thing done then, and the nature of the
Constitution transformed, by a slip of the pen, or by
accident? After all their opposition both to the name and
to the thing, did the Convention, by sheer oversight, blunder
into the construction of a purely national government, by
permitting it to be established by the people of America
as one grand political community? If Mr. Justice Story's
view of the words, "We, the people of the United States,"
be correct, how did it happen that the opponents of such
a mode of ratification said absolutely nothing ? The whole
instrument, as amended by the committee on style, was
read in the hearing of the Convention, beginning with the
preamble, and yet the words, "We, the people of the
United States," now deemed so formidable to the advocates
of State sovereignty, did not raise a single whisper of
opposition.

How could this have happened if the words in question
were supposed to mean the people of America, or the whole
people of the United States as one political society ? Were
Mason, and Martin, and Paterson, and Ellsworth all too
dull to perceive that meaning, which is so perfectly obvious
to Mr. Justice Story, and which he imagines that nothing
but the most purblind obstinacy can resist? Were all the
friends of the States, as independent sovereignties, asleep
on their posts while Gouverneur Morris thus transformed
the nature of the Constitution, without knowing it himself,
by causing it to emanate, not from the States, but from
the people of America as one nation? 'No. Not one of
these suppositions is the true one. The whole mystery is
explained in the proceedings of the Convention of 1787,
as exhibited in "The Madison Papers"; an explanation
which, however, has hitherto been most unaccountably
overlooked. We may there find the real meaning of the
words in question, and see why they gave no alarm to the
advocates of State sovereignty.

60 The Wak Between the States

The Mode of Eatification of the Constitution

If we cast our eyes all along the subject of "the mode
of ratification," ranging from page 735 to page 1632 of
"The Madison Papers," we shall perceive that the question,
whether the Constitution should be ratified by the people
of "the United States in the aggregate," or by the several
States, was not considered by the Convention at all. No
such question was before the Convention. It was neither
mooted nor considered by them. The error of Story and
Webster is, that they construe the first clause of the
Constitution as if it referred to one question; whereas,
in fact, it referred to quite another and a far different
question — that is, they construed this clause in profound
darkness as to the origin of its words, as well as to their
use and application in the Convention of 1787. If they
had understood them as actually and uniformly used or
applied by the framers of the Constitution, then they
could neither have deceived themselves nor the people of
the North. ■

If, indeed, they had been members of that Convention,
or had only examined its proceedings, they would have
seen why the staunch advocates of State sovereignty raised
not even the slightest whisper of opposition to the words,
"We, the people." Or, if Patrick Henry had been a
member of that assembly, then he could not have ex-
claimed, as he did, "Why say ^We, the people,' and not
We, the States?" — an exclamation so often quoted by
Story, Webster, and the whole Northern school of poli-
ticians as a conclusive authority — for then he would bave
seen that "We, the people," in the language of the framers
of the Constitution, meant precisely the same thing as
"We, the States," and neither more nor less.

The question before the Convention was, whether the
Constitution should be ratified by the legislatures or by
the sovereign peoples of the several States. No one
doubted that it was to be ratified by the States. This, as
we shall see, was on all hands regarded as a settled point.
The only question was, whether it should be ratified by
the States, acting through their legislatures, or through

The War Between the States 61

Conventions elected to represent the people for that special
purpose. In the discussion of this question, most of the
members insisted that the Constitution should be ratified
by the people, by the States in their sovereign capacity,
or by their Conventions. These several modes of expression
were, in the vocabulary of the Convention, used as
convertible terms, as perfectly synonymous with each other.
Hence the phrase, '"the people of the United States," as
used and understood by them, meant the people of the
several States as contradistinguished from their legisla-
tures, and not the people of America as contradistinguished
from the distinct and separate sovereign peoples of the
different States. This application of the words is the
invention of theorists merely. It was unlcnown to the
Convention of 1787, and has had no existence except in
the imaginations of those by whom their labors have been
systematically misconstrued and perverted from their
original design.

Some few members of the Convention were in favor of
leaving "the States to choose their own mode of ratifica-
tion"; but the great majority of them insisted that the
Constitution should be referred to the States for ratifi-
cation, either through their legislatures or through their
people in Conventions assembled. It was in regard to these
two methods that the Convention was divided. All agreed
that it should be done by "the States," and the only ques-
tion was as to how "the States" should do it. The idea
that it was designed to be done, or that it was done, by
the people of America as one nation, is the dream of a
later day, and, as we shall see, is nothing but a dream.

Some insisted that it should be ratified by the States in
their corporate capacity — this is, by their legislatures;
and others that it should be ratified by the States in their
sovereign political capacity — that is, by their Conventions
assembled for that express purpose. Or, in other words,
some contended that it ought to be ratified by their general
agents, the legislatures : and others that it ought to be
ratified by their special agents, the Conventions elected
and assembled to perform that high act of sovereign

62 The Wae Between the States

power. In both eases, it was to be ratified by the States,
but the opposite parties preferred different modes of
ratification by them.

The Debate on Eatification

In debating this question, as to the mode of ratification
by the States (the only one before the Convention), some
of the most inflexible advocates of State sovereignty
insisted that it should be ratified by "the people of the
United States." But then they understood this language,
and every member of the Convention understood it to
mean the peoples of the several States, as distinguished
from their legislatures. If, for one moment, they had
imagined that their language could have been construed
to mean a ratification of the Constitution by the collective
will of the whole people of America, they would have
shrunk from its use with horror ! for they dreaded nothing
more than the idea of such an immense consolidated-
democracy. On the contrary, they clung to the States,
and to their rights, as the only sheet-anchor of safety
against the overwhelming and all-devouring floods of
such a national union of mere numbers or individuals.
George Mason, no less than Patrick Henry, would have
exclaimed against the words, "We, the people," if, as a
member of the Convention of 1787, he had not learned
that they only meant "We, the States."

In discussing the question as to the mode of ratification
by "the States," Mr. Mason said "Tie considered a reference
of the plan to the authority of the people as one of the
most important and essential of the resolutions. The
legislatures have no power to ratify it. . . . Another
strong reason, said he, was that admitting the legisla-
tures to have a competent authority it would be wrong to
refer the plan to them, because succeeding legislatures,
having equal authority, could undo the acts of their prede-
cessors."^ This argument was repeatedly urged by other
members, and it was insisted that if the Constitution
should be ratified by the legislatures of the States, instead

^ "Madison Papers," p. 1177.

The War Between the States 63

of by the people of the States, it would rest upon a weak
and tottering foundation, since the legislatures which had
established might claim the power to repeal.

In like manner Mr. Madison said, "For these reasons, as
well as for others, he thought it indispensable that the
new Constitution should be ratified in the unexceptionable
form, and by the supreme authority of the people them-
selves^—that is, as the context shows, by the supreme
authority of the people of the several States in opposition
to their "legislative sanction only." Not one word was
ever said during the whole of the debate about referring
the Constitution to the people of the whole country in the
aggregate for ratification. This idea had not then risen
above the horizon of the political world, though it after-
wards became the great political sun of the l^orthern
section of the Union.

Those who advocated the mode of ratification by the
people, or by the Conventions of the States elected for that
purpose, prevailed over those who urged the ratification
by the legislatures. The majority favored the mode of
ratification by the people or the Conventions. Accord-
ingly, when the committee of detail reported a draft of
the Constitution, we find these words : "Article XXI. The

ratifications of the Conventions of States shall be

sufficient for the organization of this Constitution."^ Thus
it came to be perfectly understood that it should be ratified
by the Conventions or the peoples of the several States,
and not by their legislatures.

But here the question arose, if the blank for the number
of States should be filled with "seven," "eight," or "nine."
The Constitution, as it stood, might, in the opinion of
Mr. Madison, be put in force over "the whole body of the
people, though less than a majority of them should ratify
it." But, in the opinion of Mr. Wilson, "As the Constitu-
tion stands, the States only which ratify can be bound."^
In order to remove this difficulty, and settle the question,
Mr. King moved to add, at the end of Article XXI, the
words "between the said States, so as to confine the opera-

1 "Madison Papers," p. 796. - Ibid., p. 1241. => Ibid., p. 1469.

64 The Wae Between the States

tion of the government to the States ratifying the same."^
Thus it was Euftis King, at first one of the most strenuous
advocates in the Convention of 1787 for a strong national
government, who introduced the words by which the
Constitution was made binding "between the States so
ratifying the same." These words proved acceptable to
Madison and Wilson, though both Avere among the most
zealous advocates of a strong general government in the
Convention of 1787, and they became a part of the new
Constitution.

Thus it was universally understood by the Convention,
and so expressed, that the new Constitution was to be
established "by the ratification of the Conventions of

States,'*' and to be binding only "between the

States so ratifying the same."

During all this time the name of each State still retained
its place in the preamble to the Constitution, in which the
committee of detail made no change; and if the party,
with Gerry and Hamilton at their head, who wished to fill
the blank with the whole thirteen States, had prevailed, we
have no reason to believe that any alteration would in this
respect have been made in the preamble to the Constitution.
But when, after debate, the blank was filled with "nine," it
became impossible to specify the States between whom the
new Constitution might be established or the new govern-
ment organized. Hence it became proper, if not necessary,
to drop the specification of the States by name — a change
which, as we have seen, was first introduced by the
committee on style, and read to the Convention without
raising the slightest objection or murmur.

A¥e are now prepared to see, as in the clear light of
noonday, why the words, "We, the people of the United
States," which have since made so much noise in the
political world, did not make any whatever in the Con-
vention of 1787. Why should George Mason, or any other
adherent of State sovereignty, object to the words intro-
duced by the committee on style? They merely expressed
the very thing for which he had contended, and which had
been fully expressed in the seventh Article of the new

^ "Madison Papers," p. 1470.

The ^YAR Betaveen the States 65

C'onstitiition. For when it was determined that the Con-
-stitntion shonld be ratified by "the Conventions of the
States," and not by the legislatures, this was exactly
equivalent, in the uniform language of the Convention of
1T8T, to saying that it shall be ratified by "the people of
the States.'' Hence, the most ardent friend of State rights,
or State sovereignty, saw no reason why he should object
to the words, "We, the people of the United States,"
because he knew they were only intended to express the
mode of ratification by the States for which he had con-
tended— that is, by the States in their sovereign capacity,
as so many political societies or peoples, as distinguished
from their legislatures.

CHAPTER IX

the constitution of 1787 a compact between the

states — the views of certain of the framers

of the constitution

Webster's Statement

This subject has already been anticipated, but by no
means exhausted. Considering tlie unparalleled boldness
of Northern assertion, it is necessary to lay bare a few
more of its hidden mysteries. "Indeed," says Mr. Webster,
"if we look into all contemporary history ; to the numbers
of Tlie Federalist; to the debates in the Convention; to
the publication of friends and foes, they all agree that a
change had been made from a confederacy of States to a
different system; they all agree that the Convention had
formed a Constitution for a national government. With
this result some w^ere satisfied, and some were dissatisfied;
but all admitted that the thing had been done. In none
of the various productions and publications did any one
intimate that the new Constitution was but another
compact between States in their sovereign capacity. I do
not find such an opinion advanced in a single instance."^

Now this is certainly as bold and sweeping an assertion
as could well be made in human language. It is certainly
as full, round, and complete an untruth as was ever
uttered. It will, upon examination, be found that, to use
the mildest possible terms, it is fitly characterized by the
two words — liigli-sounding and hollow. It would, perhaps,
be difficult for any man, except Mr. Webster and his
successor in the Senate of the United States, to produce as
bold and sweeping an assertion, which, like the. above, is
at every point diametrically opposed to the truth. I shall
proceed to prove, and to establish beyond the shadow of a
doubt, this heavy accusation against "the great expounder,"
by extracts from the records and publications to which he
so solemnly appeals.

' Speech in Senate. Feb. 16. 1833.

The Wae Between the States 67

I shall begin with the C'Onventioii that formed the Con-
stitution itself. It will not be necessary to reproduce the
language of Gouverneur Morris.

Madison's Opinion

James Madison himself, "the father of the C^onstitution/'
and the most laborious member of the Convention of 1787,
called it, as we have seen, "a pact" between the States in
that Convention ; and from that day to the end of his life,
Mr. Madison continued to pronounce the new Constitution
"a compact to which the States are the parties." In the
Virginia ratifying Convention of 1788, in "the numbers
of The Federalist," in the Virginia Eesolutions of '98 and
'99, in the Virginia Eeport of 1800, in his celebrated letter
to Mr. Everett of 1830 ; in one and all of these well-Ioiown
public documents, as well as in others from his pen, this
illustrious architect of the Constitution most emphatically
pronounced it "a compact to which the States are the
parties." In the A^irginia Eesolutions, a political formula
which the American people, of all parties and all sections,
liad sworn by for more than thirty years, Mr. Madison
wrote for the legislature of his State: "This Assembly
doth explicitly and peremptorily declare ihat it views the
poivers of the Federal Government, as resulting from the
compact, to ivhich the States are parties." How com-
pletely, then, was the very existence of Mr. Madison, and
of all the great transactions in which he had borne so
conspicuous a part, ignored by Mr. Webster in the bold
and astounding assertion that neither friend nor foe had
ever considered the new Constitution as a "compact
between the States." The venerable old man must, indeed,
have felt, as he read the speech of Mr. "Webster, that he
was fast sinking into oblivion, and that all the great
transactions of his life were fast being forgotten amid the
blaze of new ideas.

x\ccordingly, in a letter to Mf. Webster, called forth by
the very speech in question, Mr. Madison once more raised
his voice in favor of the otie invariable doctrine of his life.

68 The Wak Between the States

"It is fortunate," says he in the letter referred to, "when
disputed theories can be decided by undisputed facts; and
here the undisputed fact is tliat the Constitution was made
by the people, but as embodied into the several States,
tvho were parties to it." Again, in the same letter, he says:
"The Constitution of the IJnited States, being established
by a competent authority^ by tliat of the sovereign people
of the several States, who were parties to it." Most
fortunate is it, indeed, when disputed theories may be
tested \)j undisputed facts ; but how infinitely unfortunate
is it, when new and disputed theories begin to pass for
everything, and indisputable facts for nothing!

Wilson's Position

All agree, says Mr. Webster, ''The Federalist," "the
debates in the Conventions," "'the pul)lications of friends
and foes" — all agree, "that a change ha'd been made from
a confederacy of States to a different system." N'ow, there
is James Wilson, inferior only to Madison and Hamilton in
the influence he exerted in favor of the new Constitution,
who declares that the only object aimed at by the Con-
vention of 1787 was to enable the States "to confederate
anew on better principles" ; and, if no more could be
effected, he would agree to "a partial union of the States,
with a door left open for the accession of the rest."
Accordingly, it was finally agreed by the Convention that
nine States might form the new Union, with a door left
open for the accession of the other four. In fact, eleven
States confederated on the new principles ; and it was more
than a year before the remaining two States acceded to the
compact of the Constitution, and became members of the
ITnion.

Hamilton's Views

Even Alexander Hamilton in that great authority. The
Federalist, to which Mr. Webster so confidently appeals,
is directly and flatly opposed to the bold assertion of "the
great expounder." If the new Constitution should be
adopted, says he, the Union would "still be, in fact and in

The War Betweex the States Gi)

theory, an association of States, or a confederacy."'
Again, in the eightieth number of the work, Haniilton
calls the new Union ''the Confederacy" ; putting the
word in capital letters in order that it may not be over-
looked by the most superficial reader. If necessary, it
might be shown by various other extracts, that Alexander
Hamilton, while insisting on the adoption of the new
Constitution in The Federalist, speaks of the new Union
as a confederacy of States. How, then, could Mr. Webster
avouch Tlie Federalist to support the assertion that "a
change had been made from a confederacy to a different
system ?'' Was this in his character of "the great ex-
pounder,'' or of the great deceiver?

This appeal to The Federalist appears, if possible, still
more Avonderful, when viewed in connection with other
numbers of the same work. Indeed, it was objected to
the new Constitution by its enemies, that "it would make
a change from a confederacy to a different system" ; and
this very objection is met and repelled in the pages of
The Federalist. "AVill it be said," demands The Federalist,
"that the fundamental principles of the confederation were
not within the purview of the Convention, and ought not
to have been varied? I ask, what are these principles?
Do they require that in the establishment of the Constitu-
tion the States should be regarded as distinct and inde-
pendent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the Con-
stitution proposed."^

N"or is this all. In the preceding number of The
Federalist, it is said : "Each State, in ratifying the Con-
stitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of
all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act."
Thus, according to The Federalist, the Constitution was
ratified by "each State, as a. sovereign body, independent
of all others." jSTo such thing, says Mr. Webster; it was
not ratified by the States at all, it was ordained by a power
superior to the States, by the sovereign will of the whole
people of the United States; and yet he boldly and
unblushingly appeals to The Federalist in support of his

' The Federalist. No. ix. - No. xl.

70 The Wae Between the States

assertion! Why did he not quote The Federalist? Nay,
why did he not read The Federalist before he ventured on
such a position?

Webster and The Fedeealist

Mr. Webster has, indeed, quoted one expression from
The Federalist. "The fabric of American empire," says
Hamilton, in the twenty-second number of The Federalist,
"ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the
PEOPLE." After quoting these words, Mr. Webster adds,
with his usual confidence, "Such is the language, sir,
addressed to the people while they yet had the Constitution
under consideration. The powers conferred on the new
government were perfectly well understood to be conferred,
not by any State, or the people of any State, but by the
people of the United States."

Eead the context, and this will be perfectly plain. "It
has not a little contributed," says the context, "to the
infirmities of the existing federal system, that it never
had a ratification of the people. Eesting on no better
foundation than the consent of the several Legislatures,
it has been exposed to frequent and ' intricate questions
concerning the validity of its powers; and has, in some
instances, given rise to the enormous doctrine of legislative
repeal." , Such is the context of Mr. Webster's very partial
and one-sided extract. It shows that Hamilton was
arguing the advantage of the new system over the old,
just as it had been argued in the Convention of 1787;
because the old confederation rested on the consent of the
Legislatures of the several States, whereas the new con-
federacy was to rest on the consent of the people of the
several States. Hence it would be free from all doubts
with respect to the power of "legislative repeal."

If, instead of perverting the high authority of The
Federalist by wresting one particular passage from its
context, Mr. Webster had only read a little further, he
would have discovered what was then "perfectly well
understood" respecting the nature of the Constitution.
He would h^ve discovered that it was, according to The

The War Between the States 71

Federalist, established, not by "the people of the United
States in the aggregate,'' or as one nation, but by each of
the States acting for itself alone. "'The Constitution is to
be founded," says The Federalist,^ "on the assent and rati-
fication of the people of America, given by deputies elected
for the special purpose." This, too, is the language
"addressed to the people, while they yet had the Consti-
tution under consideration."

Why, then, is not this language seized upon, and held
up as proof positive that the Constitution rested on the
assent, "not of any State, or the people of any State," but
on that of "the people of America?" The reason is plain.
Though these words, taken by themselves, would have
answered Mr. Webster's purpose better than his extract
from The Federalist; yet are they immediately followed,
in the same sentence, by an explanation, which shows their
meaning when used in The Federalist. "The Constitution
is to be founded," says that highest of all authorities, "on
the assent and ratification of the people of America, given
by deputies elected for the special purpose; but," it is
added, "this assent and ratification is to be given by the
people, not as individuals comprising one entire nation,
hut as composing the distinct and independent States to
which they respectively belong. It is to he the assent and
ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme
authority in each State — the authority of the people them-
selves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution
will not be a national, but a federal act."- Not so, says
Mr. Webster, the Constitution was established not by a
federal, but a national act; not by any State, or the people
of any State, but by the whole people of the United States
as one sovereign body; and yet he appeals to The Federalist
in support of his doctrine !

"That it will be a federal, and not a national act," con-
tinues The Federalist, "as these terms are understood l)y
objectors, the act of the people, as forming so many inde-
pendent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is
obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result
neither from the decision of a; majority of the people of

' No. xxxix. - Riid.

72 . The AVar Betweex the States

the Union, nor from that of a majority of the States. It
must result from the unanimous assent of the several States
that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their
ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the
legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves.
Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming
one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people
of the United States would bind the minority; in the
same manner as the majority in each State must bind the
minority ; and the will of the majority must be determined
either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by con-
sidering the will of the majority of the States, as evidences
of the will of the majority of the people of the United
States. Neither of these had been adopted. Each State,
in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign
body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by
its ovm voluntary act." Could language be more perfectly
explicit? Yet, directly in the face of all this, or else in
profound ignorance of all this, Mr. Webster appeals to
the authority of The Federalist in favor of the very
l^osition AA^hich, as we have seen, it so pointedly condemns.
jSTay, in spite of the clear, explicit, and unanswerable
Avords of The Federalist, Mr. Webster appeals to that work
to show, as a fact then "perfectly well understood," that
the powers of the new goA^ernment were to be conferred,
or its Constitution established, not by the States, nor by
the people of the States, considered as sovereign bodies,
and each acting for itself, but by the whole people of the
United States as one sovereign body or nation ! To show,
in one word, that the Union was formed, not by an
accession of the States, but by the one people of the
United States acting as a unit! "The great expounder"
does not follow, he flatly contradicts, the very work he
appeals to as the highest of authorities; and that, too, in
regard to the greatest of all the political questions that
have agitated the people of America !

Opposition to Eatification

There were those, it is true, AA-^ho regarded the new Con-
stitution as the fundamental, or organic laAv, of one great

The War Between the States 73

consolidated government. But these were its enemies.
They represented it as such because they wished it to be
rejected, and because they knew no other objection would
render it so obnoxious to the people of the States. It is
well known, indeed, that the greatest difficulty in the way
of the new Union was the jealousy of the central power,
which the several States had long entertained. This
jealousy was so great in the States of New York and of
Virginia that when their Conventions met to ratify or to
reject the Constitution it is well understood, and admitted,
that they were both opposed to the new grant of powers.
The State-Eights men in both Conventions, who, at first,
were in favor of rejecting the Constitution, were in a
majority, as is well known and fully conceded.

It was only by the herculean labors of Alexander
Hamilton that the Conventions of ISTew York were, at last,
induced to ratify it by a majority of three votes. In like
manner, the labors, the management, and the eloquence of
Mr. Madison succeeded, finally, after a long and desperate
struggle, in carrying it in the Convention of A^irginia by
the small majority of ten votes. The result was long
doubtful in both Conventions.

Patrick Henry, in the ratifying Convention of Virginia,
put forth all his powers to cause the new Constitution to
be rejected. His appeals to the jealousy of the States with
respect to the power of the central government were
tremendous. He dwelt, particularly, on the words of the
preamble, "We, the people of the United States," to show
that his most fatal objection to the new Constitution was
well founded ; and he added, "States are the characteristic
and soul of a confederacy. If the States be not the agents
of this compact, it must be one great consolidated govern-
ment of the people of the United States." He insisted
that it would be so. But Patrick Henry, it should l^e
remembered, was not a member of the Convention of 1T87,
and he was an enemy of the new Constitution. His mind
was fertile and overflowing with objections. If he had
known the history of the words, "We, the people of the
United States," as it appears in the debates of the Con-
vention, which had not theii ))een pul^lished, he would

74 The Wae Between the States

have seen that "We, the people," really meant "We, the
States; or, We, the Convention," actmg in the name and
by the authority of the sovereign people of the several
States.^ Or, if he had compared the words in question
with the seventh Article of the Constitution he would
have seen that the new Constitution was to be established
by the States, and was to be binding only "between the
States so ratifying the same." But as the enemy, and not
the advocate, of the new Constitution, he labored to enforce
his objection to it, rather than to consider and weigh its
words, or explain its real meaning to the Convention.

His objection would, no doubt, have proved fatal to the
new Constitution, but for the presence and the power of
James Madison, who met the great objection of Patrick
Henry, and silenced much of the apprehension which his
eloquence had created. He was known to have been the
most diligent and active member of the Convention that
formed the Constitution; and was supposed, therefore, to
understand its real import better than any man in the
ratifying Convention of Virginia. His position, and his
means of information, certainly gave him a great advan-
tage over his eloquent rival, Patrick Henry. In his reply
to Mr. Henry, he explained the words, "We, the people,"
precisely as he had before explained them in The Fed-
eralist. He said : "The parties to it were the people, but
not the people as composing one great society, but the
people as composing thirteen sovereignties." Again : "If
it were a consolidated government," said he, "the assent of
a majority of the people would be sufficient to establish
it. But it was to be binding on the people of a State only
hij thei/r own separate consent." This argument, founded
on a well-known fact, was absolutely unanswerable.

Yet Mr. Justice Story has, two or three times, quoted
the words of Patrick Henry in the Virginia Convention,
as if they were a most valuable authority, without a single,
solitary word in relation to the unanswerable reply of Mr.
Madison ! On this point he is profoundly silent ! That is
to say, he construes the Constitution, not as it was under-
stood by its framers and friends, but as it was misrepre-

^ See chap. viii.

The War Between the States 75

sentecl by its enemies, in order to cause its rejection I
He holds up the words of the one as a great authority,
and he does not let the reader of his most learned Com-
mentaries know the language of the other in reply ! Was
that honest?

4

Misinterpretations by Story and Others

I object to the Massachusetts interpretation of the first
clause of the preamble to the Constitution. 1. Because
it falsifies the facts of history respecting the mode of its
ratification, which was by the several States in Convention
assembled, each acting for itself alone, "as a sovereign
body, independent of all others, and to be bound only by
its own voluntary act," and not by the people of America
as one nation. 2. Because it makes these words, "We,
the people,'' contradict the seventh Article of the Consti-
tution; an Article which, historically considered, has pre-
cisely the same origin and the same sense with those words
themselves. 3. Because it attaches to these words a differ-
ent sense from that attached to them by the Convention
of 1787, as seen in the debates which gave rise to them.
4. Because it contradicts the sense given to these words by
Gouverneur Morris, by James Madison, and by other
framers of the Constitution of the United States. 5. Be-
cause, not satisfied with making this clause contradict
everything else, it makes it contradict itself, or at least the
very next clause in the same sentence with itself.

Webster and The Federalist Again

But there is another thing which Mr. Webster could
not find in "all contemporary history," nor in "the
numbers of The Federalist," nor in "the publications of
friends or foes." In none of these various productions
or publications, according to Webster, did any one intunate
that the new Constitution was l)ut another compact between
the States in their sovereign capacity. Yet, with no very
great research, I have found, and exhijjited in the preceding
pages, a multitude of instances in which "such an opinion

76 The War Between the States

is advanced." Nor was it at all necessary to ransack "all
contemporary history" for this purpose. The Federalist
itself, the great political classic of America, has already
furnished several such instances. It teaches us, as we have
seen, that "each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is
considered as a sovereign hody, independent of all otliers" ;^
and also that, in the establisliment of the Constitution, the
States are "regarded as distinct and independent sover-
eigns.^'-

But this, it may be said, does not use the term compact.
Yery well. The same number of The Federalist, which
says that the Constitution was to be established by each
State, as a sovereign body, independent of all others, calls
that Constitution "the compact." Thus, according to
The Federalist, the Constitution, the compact, was
established by "distinct and independent sovereigns."

But numbers XXXIX and XL were written by Mr.
Madison. Every one knows that he always regarded the
Constitution as a compact between "distinct and inde-
pendent sovereigns." That is, every one at all acquainted
with the political history of the United States, except
Mr. Justice Story and Mr. Webster, during the great
struggle of 1833. It must be conceded, then, in spite of
the sweeping assertion of Mr. Webster, that Madison held
the Constitution to be "a compact between the States in
their sovereign capacity," and that, too, in the pages of.
The Federalist as well as elsewhere. A rather conspicuous
instance to be overlooked by one whose search had been so
very careful and so very conscientious ! Xor does this
instance stand alone. Alexander Hamilton is the great
writer of The Federalist. Out of its existing eighty-five
numbers, no less than fifty proceeded from his pen : five
from the pen of Jay, and thirty from that of Madison ;
and, in the opinion of the North, the numbers of Hamilton
surpass those of Madison far more in quality than in
quantity.

In the estimation of the North, indeed, Hamilton is the
one sublime architect of the Constitution to whom it owes
"every element of its durability and beauty." What, then,

^ No. xxxix. - iNo. xl.

The Wat? Betavep:x the States 77

'Joes Hamilton say about the nature of the Constitution?
Does he call it a compact betweeji States, or does he allege
that it was ordained by the people of the United States as
one sovereign nation? I do not wish to shock any one. I
am aware it will be regarded, by many of the followers
of Story, as akin to sacrilege to charge Alexander Hamilton
with having entertained the treasonable opinion that the
Constitution was a compact between the States. But as
we have, at the South, no grand manufactory of opinions
to supply "^all contemporary history," so we must take
the sentiments of Alexander Hamilton just as we find
them, not in the traditions of the North, but in his own
published productions. The simple truth is, then, that he
calls the provisions of the Constitution of 1787, "'The
compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States,
in a common bond of amity and Union" ; and adds, these
compacts must "necessarily be compromises of as many
dissimilar interests and inclinations."^ Thus, according
to Hamilton, the "thirteen distinct States" made compro-
mises with each other, and adopted them as "the compacts"
of the new Union !

Xor is this all. On the following page, he says : "The
moment an alteration is made in the present plan it
becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must
undergo a new decision of each State/'- Indeed, even
Hamilton, the great consolidationist of his day, never
dreamed of any other mode of adopting the new Constitu-
tion than by "a decision of each State." Hence, he con-
tinues, "To its complete establishment throughout the
Union it will, therefore, require the concurrence of thirteen
States." Again, he says, "Every Constitution for the
United States must inevitably consist of a great variety of
particulars, in which thirteen Independent States are to
be accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest.^
. . . Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging
all the particulars, which are to compose the whole, in such
a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact."
That is, in such a manner as to satisfy the thirteen
Independent States, who are "the parties to the

" The Fedevdlist, No. Ixxxv. - Ujid. ^ n^j^

78 The Wak Between the States

Compact."^ The 'whole Federalist is in perfect harmouy
with this keynote of the system it recommended to the
people.

I might easily produce a hundred other proofs of the
same fact from "The Federalist/' from "publications of
friends and foes/' from the "debates of the Convention,"
without the aid of "all contemporary history."

1 The Federalist, No. Ixxxv.

C H A P T E E X

the constitution of 1787 a compact between the
states mr. webster again

The Letter of the Convention on the Constitution

The Convention of 1787, in their letter describing the
formation of the new Constitution, use precisely the polit-
ical formula employed by Sidney, Locke, and other cele-
brated authors, to define a social compact. Hobbes was
the first to reduce this theory to a scientific form; and it
is nowhere more accurately defined than by himself.
'"Each citizen," says he, "compacting with his fellow, says
thus: I convey my right on this party, upon condition
that you pass yours to the same; by which means that right,
which every man had before to use his faculties to his
own advantage, is now wholly translated on some certain
man or council for the common benefit."^ Precisely the
same idea is conveyed by the formula of 1787 : "Indi-
viduals entering into society must give up a share of
liberty to preserve the rest : and the great difficulty is, as
to what right should be delegated to the governing agents
for the common benefit, and what right should be retained
by the individual." This is the social compact as defined
by Hobbes himself ; and, although it was an imaginary
transaction in regard to the governments of the Old
World, it became a reality in relation to the solemnly
enacted Constitutions of America.

But, in the letter of the Convention of 1787, it comes
before us in a new relation. In Hobbes, "each citizen
compacts with his fellow," as in the formation of our
State Constitutions ; whereas, in the letter before us, each
State compacts with her sister States. "It is obviously
impracticable," says the Convention,- "in the Federal
Government of these States to secure all rights of inde-
pendent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the

^ "Hobbes" Works." vol. ii. p. 01. - See their l^etter.

80 The Wak Between the States

honor and safety of all. Individuals entering into society
must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest.
. . . It is at all times difficult to draw with precision
the line between those rights which must be surrendered.,
and those which may be reserved; and on the present
occasion this difficulty was increased by a difference among
the several States [the parties about to enter into a new
Union] as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular
interests.^'

Yet, in the face of all this, the whole school of Massa-
chusetts politicians, with Story and Webster at their head,
assert that the Federal Government is a union, not of
States, but only of individual citizens ! Who, before or
beside these perverters of the most palpable truth, ever
applied the term "Union" to a government of individuals ?
Who ever heard of the Union of Massachusetts, or of
New York, or of Virginia? The truth is that this word
is only applicable to a confederation of States ; and hence,
even Alexander Hamilton, after he had failed to establish
a consolidated national government, familiarly called the
new Union "a, confederacy."^ It was reserved for a later
day, and for a bolder period in the progress of triumphant
error, to scout this as an unconstitutional idea ; and to
declare, by way of proof, that "there is no language in the
Constitution applicable to a confederation of States."- Is
not the term "Union" applicable to a confederation of
States, or is it only applicable to a social combination of
individuals? Does not the Constitution speak of "the
United States," or the States united? Nay, does it not
expressly declare that it shall be binding "between the
States so ratifying the same?" Or, if the Constitution
itself has been silent, does not the letter of 1787, which
was struck in the same mint with that solemn compact,
•declare that each State, on entering into the new Union,
gives up a share of its "rights of independent sovereignty,"
in order to secure the rest?

1 shall now take leave of the proposition that the Consti-
tution was a compact between the States of the Union ; a

^ The Federalist, No. Ixxx.

2 "Webster's Works," vol. ili, p. 47Q. Great speech of 1833.

The War Betweex the States 81

proposition far too plain for argument, if the clearest facts
of history had only been permitted to speak for them-
selves. "I remember/"' says Mr. Webster, "to have heard
Chief Justice Marshall ask counsel, who was insisting
upon the authority of an act of legislation, if he thouglit
an act of legislation could create or destroy a fact, or
change the truth of history?" "Would it alter the fact,"
said he, "if a legislature should solemnly enact that Mr.
Hume never wrote the History of England?"^ "A legis-
lature may alter the law," continues Mr. Webster, "but no
power can reverse a fact."- Hence, if the Convention of
1787 had expressly declared that the Constitution was
ordained by "the people of the United States in the aggre-
gate/^ or by the people of America as one nation, this
would not have destroyed the fact that it was ratified by
each State for itself, and that each State was bound only
by "its own .voluntary act." If the Convention had been
lost to all decency it might indeed have stamped such a
falsehood on the face of the Constitution; but this would
not have "changed the truth of history."

Story and Webster lay great stress, as we have seen,-
on the fact that the first resolution passed by the Con-
vention of 1787, declared that a National Government
ought to be established. But, by a suppressio veri, they
conceal the fact that this resolution was afterward taken
up, and the term national deliberately dropped by the
unanimous decision of the Convention.

They also conceal the fact that, after the Constitution
was actually formed, the Convention called the work of
their hands, not "a National Government," but "The
Federal Goverxment of these States." This name was
given, not before,. Imt after, the Convention was full ; not
before the first article of the Constitution was adopted,
but after the whole instrument had been completely
finished; and.it was given, too, by "the unanimous order
of the Convention. "■'• Yet, in contempt of all this, Storv
and Webster say that the Convention made, not a "Federal
Government of States," but a "Xational Govei'nment" for

' "Works," vol. ii. p. .".34.

- Chap. iv.

■■ See their Letter to f'ongress.

83 The War Between the States

the one people of America, and they prove this by the
exploded resolution passed by ihem ! That is, they still
insist on the name expressly rejected by the Convention,
as if it had received the sanction of their high authority;
and that, too, in direct opposition to the name actually
given by them ! Could any style of reasoning, if reasoning-
it may be called, be more utterly contemptible?

Mr. Webster versus Mr. Webster

In the preceding pages Mr. AYebster has been con-
fronted with reason and authority ; showing that "the
greatest intellectual effort of his life" is merely a thing
of words. In this, he shall be confronted with himself
for, in truth, he is at war wath himself, as well as with
all the great founders of the Constitution of the United
States. He is, in fact, too much for himself; and the
great speech which, in 1833, he reared with so much pains
and consummate skill as a rhetorician, he has literally torn
to tatters.

"If the States be parties [to the Constitution]," asks
Mr. Webster in that speech, with an air of great confi-
dence, "where are their covenants and stipulations? And
where are their rights, covenants, and stipulations ex-
pressed? The States engage for nothing, they promise
nothing." On reading this passage, one is naturally
inclined to ask, did Mr. Webster never hear of "the grand
compromises of the Constitution" about which so much
has been written? But what is a compromise, if it is not
a mutual agreement, founded on the mutual concessions
of the parties to some conflict of opinions or interests?
Does not the very term compromise mean mutual promises
or pledges? Look at the large and small States in the
Convention of 1787. We see, in that memorable struggle
for power, the large States insisting on a large or pro-
portionate representation of themselves in both branches
of the federal legislature ; and we see the small States,
with equal pertinacity, clinging to the idea of an equal
representation in both. The struggle is fierce and obsti-
nate. The Convention is on the point of dissolution, and

The War Between the States 83

its hopes are almost extinguished. But a compromise is
suggested, considered, argued, and finally adopted ; accord-
ing to which there is to be a proportionate representation
of each State in one branch of the federal legislature, and
an equal representation in the other. These are the terms,
"^'the co^'enants,"' "the stipulations" on which the two classes
of States agree to unite; these are their mutual promises.

The same thing is true in regard to all the other '"grand
comjjromises of the Constitution." It seems, indeed, that
I\Ir. AVebster could not well speak of these compromises
without using some such word as terms, or covenants, or
promises, or stipulations. Accordingly, if we turn to the
general index to his work, in order to see how he would
speak of the compromises of the Constitution, we shall
be led to make a very curious discovery, and one which
is intimately connected with an interesting passage of his
political life. It will conduct us to a scene in which "the
beautiful vase," then "well known throughout the country
as the Webster Vase," was presented to that celebrated
statesman. Several thousand persons "had assembled at
the Odeon, in Boston," in order to witness the presentation
of that costly memorial, and to hear the reply of the great
orator. "The Vase," we are told, "was placed on a pedestal
covered with the American flag, and contained on its side
the following inscription :

•'PRESENTED TO

DANIEL WEBSTER,
The Defender of the Constitution,

BY THE CITIZENS OF BOSTON.

October 12, 1835."

ISTow this beautiful vase, so rich in its material and so
exquisite in its workmanship, was presented to Mr. Webster
in honor of his great speech of 1833 ; in which he
demonstrated to the entire satisfaction of the New England
universe that it is absurd to call the Constitution "a
compact," or to speak of its "stipulations." N"ow I shall
produce one extract from this speech at the Odeon, not

84 The Wae Between the States

only on account of the striking contrast it presents to the
doctrine of the speech of 1833, whose glorious thousands
were there assembled to celebrate, but also on account of
the simple, solid, and important truth it contains.

"■'The Constitution/' sa^^s Mr. Webster, in that speech,
"is founded on compromises, and the most perfect and
absolute good faith ix regard to every stipulation of

THIS KIND CONTAINED IN IT IS INDISPENSABLE TO ITS

PRESERVATION. Every attempt to accomplish even the best
purpose, every attempt to grasp that which is regarded as
an immediate good, in violation of these stipulations, is

FULL OF DANGER TO THE WHOLE CONSTITUTION."^ Such

glaring inconsistencies, and there are many of them in the
writings of the great orator, will be flaws and cracks in the
vase of his reputation as long as his name is known.

ISTor is this the only instance in which Mr. Webster has
spoken of the stipulations of the Constitution. "All the
stipulations/' says he, "contained in the Constitution in
favor of the slave States ought to be fulfilled."^ Here,
then, are stipulations in favor of States, and made by
States. "Slavery," says he, "as it exists in the States, is
beyond the reach of Congress. It is a concern of the States
themselves; they have never submitted it to Congress, and
Congress has no rightful poioer over it."^ IS^or has the
Federal Government the rightful power over anything in
relation to the States; miless this power was granted by
the States, and so became one of the stipulations in the
new "Articles of Union," as the Constitution is called
throughout the debates in the Convention of 1787.*

The power of the Federal Government over commerce
has been very justly called "the corner-stone of the whole
system." The Constitution originated, as we have seen,
in the desire to establish a uniform and j)ermanent system
of commercial regulations, by which the hostile legislation
of Europe might be resisted, and the havoc of the inter-
national legislation of the States repaired. Whence did
this great power, or rather this great system of powers,
emanate? "The States," says Mr. Webster, "delegated their

1 "Works." vol. 1. p. .3.31. - "Works," vol. v, p. 347. ^ ibi<j.

* "Madison Papers," pp. 7-32, 7.34, 761, 861, 1118, 1221, 122.o.

The "VYar Between the States 85

■irliole Huilwriiy over imports fo the general government.'"^
In like manner, every other power of tlie vast super-
.stnicture reared upon that' corner-stone was delegated or
conferred on the Federal Government by the States in the
"■Articles of Vnion."'

Mr. Welister and Mr. Justice Story say the Constitution
speaks the language of authority to the States, saying you
shall do this, or you shall not do that, and eschews the
verbal forms of a compact. Very great stress is laid on
this point. The Constitution, say they, is not "a compact
between States,'" it is '"'the supreme law," as if the two
things were utterly incompatible. But it is a rather un-
fortunate circumstance for this argmuent that precisely
the same language of authority is used in the old Articles
of C*onfederation, which is universally admitted to have
been a compact. "Xo State shall," is the style of the old
'"Articles of Union,"'- as well as of the new ; in this respect
they are perfectly parallel.

But here, again, we may appeal from Philip drunk to
Philip sober, from "Webster intoxicated with the fumes of
a false theory of power to AVebster under the influence of
a simple view of truth. After having read the terms on
which Texas was admitted into the Union, Mr. Webster
asks, ''Xow what is here stipulated, enacted, secured?" thus
admitting that the stipulations were enactments, or that
the contract was a law. Xor is this all. For, having speci-
fied the stipulations in this case, he proceeds to say, "I
know no form of legislation which can strengthen this. I
know no mode of recognition that can add a tittle to tlie
weight of it. I listened respectfully to the resolutions of
my friend from Tennessee. He proposed to recognize that
stipulation with Texas. But any additional recognition
would weaken the force of it ; because it stands here on the
(/round of a contract, a thing done for a consideration.
It is a law founded ox a coxtract with Texas." There
is. then, after all, no incompatibility between a contract
and a law I On the contrary, the very highest form of

^ "Works." vol. ii. p. .S18. These words are quoted by Mr. Webster,
with his expressed approbation.
- See Articles v and vi.

86 The Wae Betaveen'the States^

legislation may be that of a compact l^etween sovereign
States. It was thus that Texas came into the Union ;
and, in consideration of certain things promised to her,
agreed to accept the Constitution of the United States as
the supreme law of the land.

It was thus also that the original thirteen States, in view
of certain advantages expected by them, and held out to
them, conferred various ^DOwers on the Federal Govern-
ment to be exercised for the common good. Each State,
as it adopted the Constitution, virtually said to every
other, I will aljstain from the exercise of certain powers,
and grant or delegate certain powers, according to all the
stipulations of this instrument, provided you will do the
same thing. I will neither coin money, nor emit bills of
credit, nor enact laws impairing the obligations of con-
tracts, nor do any other thing which, in the view of the
authors of the Constitution, has proved so injurious to the
best interests of the country, provided you will abstain
from the exercise of the same powers. And I will, on the
other hand, consent that the general government may
regulate commerce, levy taxes, borrow money on the
common cre(]it, wage war, conclude peace, and do all acts
and things as stipulated in the new "Articles of Union,"
provided you will delegate the same powers. Such was
"the contract, the thing done for a consideration." The
great stipulation of all was that the Constitution should be
the supreme law of the land, for that became the supreme
law only by the mutual agreement of the States. But
why argue a point so plain? How any man can look the
Constitution in the face, or read its history, and then ask,
where are its stipulations? is more than I can conceive.
It does seem to me that he might almost as well look into
the broad blaze of noon, and then ask. If the sun really
shines, where are its rays?

But if the Constitution is not a compact for. the ]S[orth,
it is at least held to be binding, as such, on the South.
The free States, said Mr. Webster in 18.50, "complain
that, instead of slavery being regarded as an evil, as it
was then, it is now regarded by the South as an insti-
tution to be cherished, and preserved, and extended."^

^ "Works," vol. V. p. -3.59.

The War Between the States 87

"Tlie Xorth fimls itself," he continues, "in regard to the
relative influence of the South and the Xorth, of the
free States and the slave States, where it did not expect
to find itself when they agreed to the compact of the Con-
stitution.""^ Thus, after all, the States agreed to
the compact of the Constitution, Mr. Webster him-
self being the judge.

Again, in 1851, Mr. Webster says: "When the Consti-
tution was framed, its framers, and the people who adopted
it, came to a clear, express, unquestionable stipulation and
compact."- In the same speech, he says : "These States
passed acts defeating the law of Congress, as far as it was
in their power to defeat it. Those of them to whom I
refer, not all, but several, nulliiied the law of 1793. They
said, in effect, 'we will not execute it. jS'o runaway slave
shall be restored.' Thus the law became a dead letter.
But here was the Constitution and compact still binding;
here was the stipulation, as solemn as words could form
it, and which every member of Congress, every officer
of the general government, every officer of the State
government, from governors down to constables, is sworn
to support.'"'^ Thus, in 1850 and 1851, it appears that
Mr. Webster had as completely forgotten "the greatest
intellectual effort of his life," as in 1833 he had forgotten
all the great intellectual efforts of Mr. Madison's life.

The truth is, that Mr. Webster had become alarmed at
the condition of the country ; because the ^N'orth, which he
had taught to deny that the Constitution is a compact,
seemed resolved to reduce his theory to practice and give
all its stipulations to the winds, proyided they only stood
in the way of their passions. Many of his former friends
had, indeed, deserted and denounced him, because he
would not go all lengths with them in disregarding the
most solemn compact of the Constitution, which all had
sworn to support. Hence, he wished to retrace his steps;
but he could not lay the mighty spirit of insubordination
and rebellion which he had helped to arouse in the N'orth.
He could only plead, expostulate, and denounce in return.

^ "Webster's Works," vol. v. p. 3-59. - Ibid., vol. 11, p. 574.

^ Ibid., p. 57.J.

88 The War Between the States

Accordingly, in the speech just quoted, he says : ''It
has been said in the States of New York, Massachusetts,
and Ohio, over and over again, that the law shall not be
executed. That was the language of the Conventions in
Worcester, Massachusetts; in Syracuse, Xew York; and
elsewhere. And for this they pledged their lives, their
fortunes, and their sacred honors. ISTow, gentlemen, these
proceedings, I say it upon my professional reputation, are
distinctly treasonable. Eesolutions passed in Ohio, certain
resolutions in ISTew York, and in Conventions held in
Boston are distinctly treasonable. And the act of taking
away Shadrick from the public authorities in Boston, and
sending him olf, was an act of clear treason."^

The spirit of the resolutions which are here^so emphatic-
ally denounced by Mr. Webster, afterward seized whole
States, and controlled their legislation. In fourteen of
the Korthern States, indeed, laws were enacted to prevent
the execution of the law of Congress. These laws, as
Mr. Webster himself, if living, would have said, were
"distinctly treasonable." They came directly into conflict
with the law of Congress, and nullified the compact of the
Constitution relative to fugitive slaves. What shall we
say then? Was secession, under such circumstances,
treason? Was it rebellion? Mr. Webster has, in one of
his speeches, laid down a principle which never has been,
and never can be, controverted.

He says : "I do not hesitate to say and repeat, that if the
Northern States refuse wilfully and deliberately to carry
into effect that part of the Constitution which respects the
restoration of fugitive slaves, the South would be no longer
bound to keep the compact. A bargain broken on one
side is broken on all sides." I have said that this is a
j)rinciple of truth and justice which never has been, and
never can be, denied. It was, indeed, precisely the prin-
ciple which governed the Convention of 1T87 in with-
drawing from the first compact between the States. I do
not mean to say, however, that this great principle of
truth and justice may not be practically denied. In fact,
the Northern power has not only claimed, but exercised,

1 "Webster's Works." vol. ii, p. 577.

The AVae Between the States 89

the right to trample the compact of the Constitution
under foot; and, at the same time, to visit with fire,
sword, desolation, and ruin those who merely wished to
withdraw from the broken thing, and let it alone.

According to the doctrine laid down by Story and
Webster, if a compact between States assign no term for its
continuance, then the States have a right to secede from
it at pleasure.^ This doctrine is, no doubt, perfectly true.
But precisely such was the compact from which the
Southern States wished to withdraw; no period was
prescribed for its continuance. Yet the I^orth, who had
trampled it under foot, punished the South with the most
terrible of all wars, because she was pleased to regard
secession as a violation of that "most sacred compact."

Xo man, as we have seen, could well be more inconsistent
on any subject than '"'the great expounder" was in relation
to the most important of all questions respecting the
Constitution. It was, with him, either a compact between
the States, or not a compact between the States, according
to the exigencies of the occasion. He could be equally
eloquent on both sides of the question. He complained,
in 1850, that the South had changed her opinions on the
subject of slavery. Might not the South complain that
he had no opinions, or at least no convictions, to change?
The man who really seeks the truth, and, when found,
clings to it as the choicest treasure of his soul, may well
leave his consistency to take care of itself. But the man
who seeks place, or power, or popularity more than the
truth, should indeed have a good memory. The one may,
and indeed will, sometimes change his opinions, but then,
in the midst of all his changes, he will be ever true, like
the needle, which only turns until it finds the pole.
Whereas the other, in his variations, is like the weather-
cock, which shifts with the breeze of the passing hour, and
never finds a point of permanent rest. Even the intellect
of a Webster, where the moral man is defieient, can fur-
nish no exemption from this law of retributive justice.

Mr. Webster's real opinion, however, seems to have
been that the Constitution was a compact between the

' Sf-e chap. ii.

90 The War Between the States

Sfates. His great speech of 1833 may have convinced
others; it certainly did not convince himself, for, during
the remainder of his life, he habitually and constantly
spoke of the Constitution as the compact formed by the
States. Especially after his race was nearly run, and,
instead of the dazzling prize of the Presidency, he saw
before him the darkness of the grave, and the still greater
darkness that threatened his native land with ruin, he
raised the last solemn utterances of his mighty voice in
behalf of "the compact of the Constitution" ; declaring
that as it had been "deliberately entered into by the
States," so the States should religiously observe "all its
stipulations."

CHAPTER XI

the absurdities flowixg from the doctrine that the

constitution is not a compact between the

states, but was made by the people

of america as one nation

The ''Sovereignty" of the People

When I come to consider "the sovereignty of the
people," about which so much has been said, we shall see
the fallacy of the position, which is everywhere assumed by
Mr. AYebster and his school, that "the aggregate com-
munity, the collected will of the people, is sovereign.'"^
We shall then see that this doctrine is utterly without
foundation in history, and without support from reason.
On the contrary, it will then be rendered manifest that the
people of America have never existed as one nation,
clothed irifli sovereign authority: an idea which has no
foundation in fact, and which has grown out of the popular
use of language and the passing of politicians. But, at
present, I merely wish to point out a few of the absurdities
flowing from this doctrine, that the Constitution was
ordained by "the aggregate community, the collected will
of the people" of America, acting as one sovereign political
society. This argument alone, this reductio ad ahsurdum,
is amply sufficient, unless I am greatly mistaken, to shatter
that already shattered hypothesis.

Mr. Justice Story, quoting the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, says: "It is the right of the people [plainly
intending the majority of the people] , to alter, or to abolish
it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation
on such principles, and organizing its powers in such forms,
as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
liappiness.''- Xow this is what is meant by the sovereignty
of the people of America. But will any one contend tbat
the people of the United States, that is, a majority of

^ '"Works," vol. vi, p. 222. - Vol. i, book iii. chap. iii.

92 The Wae Between the States

them, may alter, or amend, the government of the Union ?
If they are, mdeed, one people m the political sense of the
word, then are they sovereign ; and if as such they made
the Constitution of the United States, then, according to
all our American ideas and doctrines, they have the right
to alter or amend that Constitution at their pleasure.
Nay, more; they have the right to pull down the existing
government, and to set up a new one in its place. But who
will accept such a consequence ? This right of sovereignty,
if it exist, or if the one people exist to whom it naturally
belongs, is, according to the universally received doctrine
of this continent, iuherent and inalienable. Xo laws or
Constitutions can take it away, or abridge and limit its
exercise.

Who will sa}^, then, that the people of the United States, '
"plainly meaning the majority of them," have such a right
or authority? jSTo one. Plainly and inevitalily as this
consequence flows from the fundamental position of Story
and Webster, that the sovereign people of America or-
dained the Constitution, it will be avowed by no one, who
has any reputation to lose, and who has the least respect
for the reputation he possesses. Mr. Lincoln has avowed
this consequence. But in this instance, as in man}' others,
his logic has taken advantage of his want of information.

This consequence flows so naturally and so necessarily
from the premises that Mr. Justice Story has, in one place,
inadvertently drawn it, or rather it has incidentally ctrawn
itself. "The people of the United States," says he, "have
a right to abolish, or alter, the Constitution of the
United States."^ True, if they made it ; but they did not
make it, and therefore they have the right neither to alter
nor to abolish it. The power that made is the power to
unmake. Mr. Justice Story did not mean, that is, he
did not deliberately mean, that the people of the United
States, or the majority of them, could alter or abolish the
Constitution ; for he was too well informed to l)e capable
of such a blunder. But in this instance, as in many others,
his logic, speaking the language of nature and of truth,
got the better of his artificial and false hypothesis.

^ "Works," vol. i, book iii, chap. iii.

I'hk War Betwkkn the States 1)8

If the ]>eo])le of the United States are, in reality, one
sovereign political community, and, as such, ordained the
Constitution, then they have the most absolute control
over all the parts : and the States bear the same relation
to this one grand and overshadowing sovereignty that
counties sustain to a State. They may be divided, or
moulded, or abolished, at the pleasure of the whole people.
But everybody knows better than this. Mr. Lincoln did,
it is true, endorse this conclusion, in the first speech he
ever made to the American public. When the long silence
was broken, and. as President-elect, he addressed his
first word to an anxious country, he likened the relation
between the States and the Union to that of counties to a
State. Until then, there were many intelligent and well-
informed persons who did not believe that there was one
individual in the United States capable of taking such a
view of the Constitution, except among political preachers
or parsons.^ But however absurd, it is only the necessary
consequence of the premises laid down by Mr. Justice
Story and Mr. Webster. It will, however, be regarded -by
every student of the Constitution in the light of a reductio
ad ahsurdum, which, instead of establishing the conclusion
to which it leads, only shatters and demolishes the position
from which it fiows.

'■ Indeed, this doctrine, and tlie very illustration of it, was borrowed
by Mr. Lincoln from the celebrated Preacher of Princeton, N. .T.
Compare Mr. Lincoln's speech with Dr. Hodge on "The State of the
Country. "

CHAPTEEXII

the hypothesis that the people of america form
one nation

Introductory

We have seen, in the precedmg chapter, some of the
absurdities flowing from the assumption that the people
of America form one nation, or constitute one political
community. But as this is the first and all-comprehending
falsehood of the Northern theory of the Constitution, by
which its history has been so sadly blurred, if not obliter-
ated, and by which its most solemn provisions have been
repealed, so we shall go beyond the foregoing reductio ad
ahsurdum, and show that it has no foundation whatever
in the facts of history. I was about to say that it has
not the shadow of such a foundation ; but, in reality, it
has precisely such a shadow in the vague, popular use of
language, to which the passions of interested partisans
have given the appearance of substance. And it is out of
this substance, thus created from a shadow, that have been
manufactured those tremendous rights of national power,
by which the clearly reserved rights of the States have
been crushed, and the most unjust war of the modern world
justified.

I purpose, therefore, to pursue this monstrous abortion
of night and darkness into the secret recesses of its history,
and leave neither its substance nor its shadow in existence.
Fortunately, in the prosecution of this design, it is only
necessary to cross-examine those willing witnesses by whom
this fiction has been created, and compare their testimony
with itself, in order to show that they are utterly unworthy
of credit as historians of the American Union. I shall
l)egin with Mr. Justice Story.

The War Betwkhx thk States 95

The x4ttempt of Mr. Justice Story to Show that the
People of America Forjied One Nation or State

This celebrated commentator strains all the powers of
language, and avails himself of every possible appearance,
to make the colonies of America "one people," even before
they severed their dependence on the British crown. Thus,
he says : "The colonies were fellow-subjects, and for many
purposes one people. Every colonist had a right to inhabit,
if he pleased, in any other colony ; and, as a British sub-
ject, he was capable of inheriting lands by descent in every
other colony. The commercial intercourse of the colonies,
too, was regulated by the laws of the British empire, and
could not be restrained, or obstructed, by colonial legis-
lation. The remarks of Mr. Chief Justice Jay on this
subject are equally just and striking : 'AH the people of
this country were then subjects of the king of Great
Britain, and owed allegiance to him ; and all the civil
authority then existing, or exercised here, flowed from the
head -of the British empire. They were, in a strict sense,
/e//o«'-subjects, and. in a variety of respects, one people'."'^

NoAv all this signifies just exactly nothing as to the
purpose which the author has in view. For, no matter in
what respects the colonies were "one people," if they
were not one in the political sense of the words ; or if they
had no political power as one people, then the germ of the
national oneness did not exist among them. But this is
conceded by Mr. Justice Story himself. "The colonies,"
says he, "were independent of each other in respect to
their domestic concerns."- Each was independent of the
legislation of another, and of all the others combined, if
they had pleased to combine.

In many respects, indeed, the whole human race may be
said to be one. They had a common origin, a common
psychology, a common physiology, and they are all subjects
of the same great Euler of the world. But this does not
make all men "one people" in the political sense of the
words. In like manner, those things which the colonists
had in common, and which are so carefully enumerated

' "Story on the Constitution." vol. i. p. 164. - Ibid.

96 The Wak Bet\yeen the States

by Mr. Justice Story, do not make tliem one political
community; the only sense in which their oneness could
have any logical connection with his design.

Kay, so palpably is this the case that he fails to make
the impression on his own mind which he seems so desirous
to make on that of his readers; and the hypothesis that
the colonies were "one people," is utterly dispelled by his
own explicit admission. For, says he, "Though the
colonies had a common origin, and owed a common .
allegiance, and the inhabitants of each Avere British sub-
jects, tliey had no direct political connexion with each
other. Each was independent of all the others; each, in
a limited sense, was sovereign within its own territory.
There Avas neither allegiance nor confederacy betAveen
them. The Assembly of one province could not make laws
for another, nor confer privileges which were to be enjoyed
or exercised in another, farther than they could be in any
independent foreign state. As colonies, they Avere also
excluded from all connexion Avith foreign states. "They
were known only as dependencies, and they followed the
fate of the parent country, both in peace and war, Avithout
having assigned to them, in the intercourse of diplomacy
of nations, any distinct or independent existence. They
did not possess the poAver of forming any league or treaty
among themselves, AAdiich AA^ould acquire an obligatory
force, without the assent of the parent State. And though
their mutual wants and necessities often induced them to
associate for common purposes of defence, these confed-
eracies were of a casual and temporary nature, and were
alloAved as an indulgence, rather than as a right. They
made several efforts to procure the establishment of some
general superintending government over them all; but
their own differences of opinion, as well as the jealousy of
the croAvn, made these efforts abortive."^

It is impossible for language to be more precise and
explicit. Hence, in AAdiatever other respects the colonies
may have formed "one people," Ave are here authorized,
by the undisputed and the indisputable facts of history, to

' "Story on the Constitution." -vol. i. pp. 163-164.

The Wae Between the States 97

consider them as separate and independent of each other,
in the political sense of the terms. And this is all our
argument needs.

Mr. Justice Story, not satisfied with the oneness of the
people of the colonies before their separation from Great
Britain, which he has been at so much pains to establish,
next endeaA^ors to show that they were certainly moulded
into one nation by the Declaration of Independence. If
they were "one people" before, it is difficult to conceive
how they were made so by that Declaration. To that act,
says he, "union was as vital as freedom or independence."^
But what sort of union? Did the people unite and
become one nation, in the sense that it was a sovereign
political community, so that the whole could make a Con-
stitution and laws for the parts ? If not, then the assertion
misses the mark aimed at, and must go for nothing. But
no one pretends, for a single moment, that they became
one people in any such sense of the words.

Mr. Justice Story himself admits that such union was
temporary, and designed to perish with the common danger
which had called it into existence. "The union thus
formed," says he, "grew out of the exigencies of the times ;
and from its nature and objects might be deemed
temporary, extending only* to the maintenance of the
common liberties and independence of the States, and to
terminate with the return of peace with Great Britain,
and the accomplishment of the ends of the revolutionary
contest.'"'- Thus it is conceded that they became "one
people," not to ordain a Constitution or to enact laws,
but only to resist a common enemy, and to continiie united
only during the presence of the common danger.

Hence, this union was, according to Judge Story's own
admission, more imperfect and fragile than that which,
from the operation of a similar cause, had sprung up
among the States of Greece, the SavIss Cantons, the United
Netherlands, or the members of the German Diet. Yet no
one has ever considered any one of these unions as form-
ing one nation, or people, as contradistinguished from a

' Vol. i, book xi, chap. 1. p. 200. Note.
- Vol. i, book ii. chap, ii, p. 209.

98 The Wae Between the States

federation of sovereign and independent States. Such
attempts, indeed, to prove that the colonies, or the States
of America, were one nation, or political community, are
simply desperate. They are scarcely made before they are
overthrown by the hand that reared them.

But let us admit, for the sake of argument, that the
colonies formed one people before their separation from
Great Britain, and that they were again made one people
by the Declaration of Independence. Then no one colony
could lawfully act without the concurrence of the others,
as the parts would not be independent of the whole. Ac-
cordingly, Mr. Justice Story declares that "the colonies
did not severally act for themselves, and proclaim their own
independence."^ But it is well known that Virginia did
so. "Virginia," says Judge Story, "on the 39th of June,
1776 (five days before the Declaration of Independence),
declared the government of the country as formerly exer-
cised under the crown of Great Britain, totally dissolved,
and proceeded to form a new Constitution."- Nay, she
had already formed a new Constitution, in pursuance of
her resolution of the 15th of the preceding month, and she
adopted it on the 29th of June, 1776. Yet Virginia has
never been regarded as tainted with treason, or rebellion,
against the people of America, because she thus proclaimed
her own separate independence, and established her own
Constitution. On the contrary, she has ever been honored
by her sister colonies and States for this bold and inde-
pendent act.

This is not the only insuperable difficulty in the way of
the hypothesis that the colonies were made one people
by the Declaration of Independence. For, if this hypothe-
sis be adopted, we must believe that this one people
were afterwards broken up into separate and independent
States by an act of Confederation ! In the case of Gibbons
and Ogden,^ the Supreme Court of the United States, says
(and the words are quoted with approbation by Mr. Justice
Story),* "As preliminary to the very able discussion of
the Constitution which we have heard from the bar. and

^ Vol. i, book ii, chap. i. p. 197. - Ibid.

3 6. Wheaton, p. 187. * Vol. i, p. 823.

The Wae Between the States 99

as having some influence on its construction, reference
has been made to the situation of these States, anterior
to its formation. It has been said that they were sovereign,
were completely independent, and were connected loith
each other only by a league. This is true."^

Now, if this be true, as the Supreme Court of the United
States affirms, and as Mr. Justice Story admits, how were
this one people broken up into so many separate,
"sovereign," and "completely independent States? This
must have been done by the Articles of Confederation,
since it is only in the presence of these Articles that this
fine theory about the oneness of the American people dis-
appears, and the States once more shine out as free and
independent sovereignties. No other cause can be assigned
for the change.

It is perfectly certain, indeed, that if the people of
America were one nation, or political community, prior to
the adoption of those Articles, they then became divided
into separate, distinct, and independent States. For,
according to those Articles, "Each State retains its sover-
eignty, freedom, and independence." Each State retains !
This language implies, indeed, that each State was free,
sovereign and independent before those Articles were
adopted. But then this is only one of the difficulties in
the way of the theory of Judge Story.

If they were not free and sovereign States before ; if, on
the contrary, they were one people, or nation, or political
community, then it were absurd to speak of their union
as an act of confederation. For it would, indeed, have
been an act of separation, and not of confederation. It
would have been the dividing of one nation into separate
and sovereign States, and not the uniting of such States
into one Confederacy. This is another of the difficulties
which stand in the way of the theory of Judge Story, and
of the Northern school of politicians.

Again, if one people were thus divided into free, sover-
eign and independent States, by the Articles of Confedera-
tion; then it is very inaccurate in Judge Story to say, as
he always does, that the States granted the powers by

1 Vol. i, book ii, chap, iii, p. 323.

100 The Wak Between the States

which the Confederacy was formed. He should, on the
contrary, have spoken only of powers resumed by the
States, or restored to them by the American people.

But we may now take leave of his theory and all its
insuperable difficulties. It is sufficient for my purpose
that, after the Articles of Confederation were agreed upon
as the supreme law, the States were then free, sovereign,
and independent. It is asserted by the Supreme Court of
the United States, as well as by Judge Story himself, that
anterior to the adoption of the Constitution the States
"were sovereign, were completely independent, and ivere
connected only by a league/' It was in this capacity, it was
as free, sovereign, and completely independent States, that
they laid aside the old, and entered into the new, "Articles
of Union," as the Constitution is everywhere called in
the proceedings of the Convention of 1787. This is
conceded. Hence, the situation of the colonies before their
separation from the mother country, or of the States
before the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, has
nothing to do with our present inquiry; which relates to
the character in which the people, or the peoples of
America, ordained the Constitution of the United States.
If any one has a mind to amuse himself by binding up or
pulling down speculations or hypothesis on this subject
he may do so to his heart's content. It is sufficient for
every practical purpose that, when they came to adopt
the new form of government, each State was a completely
free, sovereign, and independent political community, and
in that capacity acceded to the compact of the Constitution.

The Attempt of Mr. Curtis to Shov^ That the People

OF America Formed One Nation, or Political

Community

Mr. Curtis, in his extended and elaborate History of the
Constitution of the United States, seems to view with the
introductory sketch of Judge Story, in the establishment
of the foregone conclusion, that it was created by and
rests on "the political union of the people of the United
States, as distinguished from the States of which they are

The War Between the States 101

the citizens.''^ For this purpose, it is necessary to show,
in the first place, that such a political union of the whole
people of the country had an existence. Accordingly, the
facts of history are recast and moulded in order to suit
this hypothesis. If possible, the conflict between fact and
theory is, in his work, even more glaring than it is in that
of Mr. Justice Story.

"The people of the different colonies were," says he,
"^'in several important senses, one people:'- This is true.
But it is not even pretended, by ]\Ir. Curtis, that this was
a political union ; he only says that it enabled them to
effect such a miion. He admits, on the contrary, in the
most explicit terms, "that the colonies had no direct
political connexion with each other before the Revolution
commenced, but that each was a distinct community, with
its own separate political organization, and without any
power of legislation for any but its own inhabitants ; that,
as political communities, and upon the principles of their
organizations, they possessed no power of forming any
union among themselves, for any purposes whatever, with-
out the sanction of the Crown or Parliament of England.""^

"It is apparent," says he, "that previous to the Decla-
ration of Independence the people of the several colonies
had established a national government of a revolutionary
character, which undertook to act, and did act, in the
name and with the general consent of the inhabitants of
the country."* Thus, e^'en previous to the Declaration of
Independence, the people of the colonies formed one
nation, and establishecl "a national government." A
nation, with a national government, and yet dependent
colonies !

"This government," says he, "was established by the
ITnion in one body of delegates representing the people of
each colony." That is, each colony, acknowledged to be
perfectly and wholly independent of every other, sends
delegates to one body; and this body, whose duty it is to
advise and recommend measures to the several colonies, is
"a national government!" Surely, if such an advisory
council may be called a government at all, it is anything

1 Vol. i. p. 122. - Vol. i, p. 9. = Ibid. * Vol. i, p. 39.

102 The Wak Between the States

rather than national in its character. It is, in fact, merely
the shadow of a Federal Government.

Mr. Curtis himself is evidently not satisfied with the
"one nation" in this stage of its development, or purely
verbal existence. Hence, he insists, with Mr. Justice
Story, that the colonies were really made one nation by
the Declaration of Independence. "The body by which
this step was taken," says he, "constituted the actual gov-
ernment of the nation, at the time" ;^ that is, while' they
were yet dependent colonies ! "It severed the political
connexion between the people of this country and the
people of England, and at once erected the different
colonies into free and independent States."- Thus, the
colonies formed "one nation" before their separation from
Great Britain, and afterwards became "free and inde-
pendent States." Or, in other words, the nation preceded
the States; an opinion for which Mr. Lincoln has been
most unconsciously laughed at.

This opinion is still more explicitly advanced by Mr.
Curtis in another portion of his history. "The fact," says
he, "that these local or State governments were not formed
until a Union of the people of the different colonies for
national purposes had already taken place, and until the
national power had authorized and recommended their
establishment, is of great importance in the Constitutional
history of our country ; for it shows that no colony, acting
separately for itself, dissolved its own allegiance to the
British crown, but that this allegiance was dissolved by
the supreme authority of the people of all the colonies,"
etc.^ This fact, which is deemed of so much importance
in the Constitutional history of this country, happens, as
we have seen, to be fiction; and a fiction, too, in direct
conflict with the well-known fact that Virginia declared
her o^vn separate independence.

But if, by the Declaration of Independence, the colonies
became "free and independent States," how could that act
have moulded them into one sovereign political community
or nation ? This is one of the mysteries which I am glad
it is not incumbent on me to solve. Was the Declaration

1 Vol. 1, p. 51. - Ibid. 3 Vol. i, pp. 39, 40.

The War Between the States 103

of Independence itself necessarily, or ex vi termini, a decla-
ration of independence, and, at the same time, one of
subjection to a higher authority? If we may adopt
Mr. Curtis as a guide, we must answer this question in
the affirmative. For, says he, although the colonies were
thereby "^erected into free and independent States," "the
people of the country became henceforth the rightful
sovereign of the country ; they became united in a national
corporate capacity as one people; they could thereafter
enter into treaties and contract alliances with foreign
nations; could levy war and conclude peace, and do all
other acts pertaining to the exercise of a national sover-
eignty."'^ If so, then, of course, they could ordain Consti-
tutions and enact laws; they could set up, or pull down,
or modify the parts called States, as if they were counties,
or mere districts of people. For such is the power of one
sovereign State, or nation, over its various members.

But, unfortunately, for this bold assertion, Mr. Curtis
himself tells us, on the very next page of his work, that
"on the same day on which the committee for preparing
the Declaration of Independence was appointed, another
committee, consisting of a member from each colony, was
directed to prepare and digest the form of a confederation
to he entered into between these colonies," that is, after
they should become free and independent States. "This
committeej" he continues, "reported a draft of Articles of
Confederation on the 12th of July, etc." These Articles
were discussed, postponed, resumed, amended, and, finally,
adopted.

Now whence resulted the powers conferred by these
Articles of Confederation ? Were they not granted by
the "free and independent States?" Most assuredly they
were; no one has ever had the hardihood to deny so plain
a fact, except by implication. But if all the powers of
the new "national government," as it is called by Mr.
Curtis, were granted by "free and . independent States,"
each acting for itself, as every one acknowledges it to have
done; then for what conceivable purpose has he conjured

> Vol. i, p. 52.

104 The Wae Between the States

up the phantom of a preexisting national sovereignty of
the whole people of the country?

It is certain that this phantom has been completely
laid by Mr. Curtis himself. The whole elaborate illusion^
which it has cost him so much pains to get up^ is thus
dispelled by a plain, simple, and unpremeditated state-
ment of unquestionable facts by the author himself. "The
parties to this instrument," says he, referring to the
Articles of Confederation, "were free, sovereign, and inde-
pendent political communities, — each possessing within it-
self all the powers of legislation and government over its
own citizens, tvliich any political society can possess. But,
by this instrument, these several States became united for
certain purposes."^ Surely, all this must have been absent
from the mind of Mr. Curtis, when he spoke of the
people of the several States as having been previously
merged into one absolutely sovereign political community.
But it seems to be requiring too much to expect a Massa-
chusetts politician to remember anything he may have said
on any preceding page of his work.

ISTor is this all. For it is also conceded that the States,
which were "free, sovereign, and independent political
communities" before they adopted the Articles of Confed-
eration, retained the same prerogatives, or attributes,
after that event. "The Article," says he, "declared, — as
would indeed he implied, in such circumstances, without
any express declaration, — that each State retained its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence.'"- It was, then,
in this condition of "free, sovereign, and independent
political communities/' that the States passed from the
old to the new Articles of union, or severally agreed to the
comjDact of the Constitution. Why, then, conjure up
shadows and phantoms of a national unity only to dispel
them? The cause of secession only demands the fact that
the States, as "free, sovereign, and independent political
communities," formed and entered into the new "Articles
of Union"; and this fact is conceded both by Story and
Curtis.

1 Vol. i, p. 143. = Ibid.

The War Between the States 105

The Use of the Term People

Much of the inconsistency and contradiction in the
views above examined is due to the ambiguities of the
word people, and the utter confusion of its loose, floating
significations, with its technical or scientific sense. We
sometimes pronounce a people one, because they have a
common origin, or a common language, or a common
religion, or even because they inhabit the same portion
of the globe. Thus, we speak of "the people of Europe,"
or "the people of America," without intending to convey
the idea that they are a people in the political sense of the
term. When we say, however, that "the people are sover-
eign," we use the word in a more restricted* sense. We then
speak of the people in the political or technical sense of
the term. This includes only the qualified voters of the
community, or those by whom the Constitutions may be
ordained and remodeled. For no other persons participate
in the exercise of the sovereign power. Women and minors
are excluded, as well as some other classes, even in our
American States. It is in this limited sense of the word
that the people are said to make compacts, or Constitutions
and laws, either by themselves or by their agents.

If Mr. Justice Story had borne this in mind he might
have saved himself from all his criticisms on the doctrine
of a social contract based on the ground that "infants,
minors, married women, persons insane, and many others,"^
take no part in the formation of civil societies, or in the
creation of constitutions and governments. ISTo one in-
cludes such persons in the idea of a people, when these
are said to be sovereign. Hence, his "limitations and
qualifications" of the doctrine in question have exclusively
arisen from his own misapprehension. Something more
than a mere natural person is necessary to constitute one
of "the people," one of the multitudinous sovereignty of
an American State. "The idea of a people," says Burke,
evidently using the term in its restricted or political sense,
"is the idea of a corporation; it is wholly artificial, and
made, like all other legal fictions, by common agreement."^

1 Vol. 1, book iii. chap, iii, p. 296.

- "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs."

106 The Wae Between the States

That is, says he, "in a rude state of nature there is no
such thing as one people. A number of men in themselves
can have no collective capacity" Or, in other words,
something more than a number of men is necessary to make
a people, or State. It must be agreed and settled as to
who shall take part in the exercise of political power, ere
Constitutions and laws may be ordained or remodeled by
them.

But in vain did Burke, and Hobbes, and other writers
on the philosophy of politics, endeavor to "fix, with some
degree of distinctness, an idea of what we mean when we
say, the People."^ Their labors seem to have been lost
upon the politicians of the Massachusetts school; and, in
some instances, at least, they appear to have only cast
their pearls before swine. For one of the great lights of
that school kindles into a blaze of fiery indignation against
Mr. Burke, for simply advancing the incontestable truth
that what we call a People is, in the political sense of the
word, the result of an agreement or mutual understanding
of a community of persons. " '0, that mine enemy had
said it !' the admirers of Mr. Burke may well exclaim,"
cries this great light of Massachusetts. "0, that some
scoffing Voltaire, some impious Eousseau had uttered it!
Had uttered it ? Eousseau did utter the same thing, etc."^
This is true. For, widely as Edmund Burke and Eousseau
differed on most points, they agreed in this, that it is not
nature, but art, which determines the question as to who
shall participate in the exercise of political power, or con-
stitute a People, in the political sense of the word. Even
"the" impious Eousseau" is sometimes right, and nearly, if
not quite, always so when he agrees with Edmund Burke.

In his attempt to show that the Constitution was
adopted by the people, and not by the States, Mr. Justice
Story deceives himself by means of the ambiguities of the
term people, and repeatedly contradicts his own positions.
"The States never, in fact," says he, "did, in their political
capacity, as contradistinguished from the people thereof,
ratify the Constitution."^

^ "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs."

2 Everett's "Orations and Speeches," vol. i, p. 122.

3 Vol. i, p. 330.

The War Between" the States 107

This is very true, if b}^ States in their political capacity
he means, as he seems to do, the State governments. But
this is not to the purpose. Every one admits that the
Constitution was ratified, not by the governments, but by
the people of the States. Nor does any one deny that the
term State is sometimes used to signify the government of
a State. Thus we often say that the States does so and so,
when the thing is done by its government. But the ques-
tion is, may we not say that the Constitution was ratified
by the States, as well as by the people of the States? Or,
in other words, are not the terms State and People properly
used as equivalent expressions? These words were, as we
have already most abundantly seen, habitually used as
convertible terms by the Convention of 1787.

We may truly say, indeed, with Judge Story, that the
Constitution was not ratified by the States, as contradis-
tinguished from the people, because it is not very easy to
distinguish a thing from itself. In assuming this position,
Mr. Justice Story forgets what he had said in the preced-
ing Book of his Commentaries, namely, "the State and
the people of the State are equivalent expressions."^
"Nay, the State," he again says, "by which we mean the
people composing the State, may divide its sovereign
powers among various functionaries, etc."- Here the tenn
people is clearly used to include only the qualified voters,
or those who share the sovereign power; and, in this
sense, they are called "the State." It is precisely in this
sense that the Constitution was ratified by the people,
or the States. We may, and indeed should, distinguish
between the meanings of the term State, when it is figura-
tively used to signify the government of a State, and
when it is used to signify the State itself. But we shall
never distinguish the people of a State from the State
itself, until we can find a State which is not composed of
people.

But the attempt is made to show that, in adopting the
Constitution, the States acted as mere districts of people,
and not in their sovereign political capacity.^ But if this

' Everett's "Orations and Speeches," vol. i. book ii, p. 198.

= Ibid., p. 194.

^Story's "Commentaries on the Constitution," vol. 1, p. 330.

108 The A¥ae Between the States

were so, then the different districts would have been con-
sidered together in making up the final result, and the
majority of the one grand, national whole would have
ordained the Constitution. The fact, however, the un-
denied and the undeniable fact, is quite otherwise. Each
State, with all its own laws, and institutions, and govern-
ment, either went in, or remained out, at its own sovereign
will and jjleasure. In the words of The Federalist, it was
"only to be bound by its own voluntary act.'^ No other
State, nor all other States combined, nor the whole people
of America, had the leas't authority to control its decision.
This was an absolutely free, sovereign, and independent
act of each State.

It may be doubted, indeed, if there Avas ever a more
suiDerficial gloss, or a more pitiful subterfuge, than the
assertion of Judge Story, that the States adopted the
Constitution, not as States, but only "as districts of
people" composing one great State or nation. It is at
war with facts ; it is at war with his own repeated admis-
sions ; and it is at war with the plainest dictates of truth,
as well as with the unanswerable arguments of The
Federalist. Sad, indeed, must have been the condition to
which the great sophist was reduced, when he could stoop
to so palpable a gloss on one of the plainest facts in the
history of the Constitution !

The Use of "Shall" in Compacts

Mr. Justice Story has, I am aware, as well as Mr. Web-
ster, laid great stress on the fact that the Constitution ad-
dresses the language of authority to the States. "The lan-
guage of a compact is," says he, "I will, or will not do this ;
that of a law is, thou shalt, or shalt not do it."^ This is
what the act of entering into a compact signifies, but it
is not usually the language of the instrument itself. On
the contrary, the Articles of Confederation, which are
universally admitted to form a compact, use precisely the
same style as the Constitution. Both say what shall, and
what shall not, be done by the States. Precisely the same

^ story's "Commentaries on the Constitution," vol. i, p. 308.

The Wak Between the States 109

style is also employed in the formation of compacts or
treaties between wholly separate and independent powers.
Nay, in the most ordinary articles of co-partnership, it is
usual to say, in the same manner, what sliall, and what
shall not, be done by the parties thereto. Yet all such
instruments rest upon the agreement of the parties, and
derive their binding force from their voluntary act.

There is a very simple law of language, which seems to
have escaped the attention of these great expounders of
the Constitution. The language of written contracts
usually speaks of the parties in the third person, and not
for them in the first person. Hence, they necessarily
assume the imperative style; laying down Avhat sliall, and
not saying what luill, be clone by them. It would have been
ridiculous, indeed, if the Constitution had said, No State
icill emit bills of credit, or coin money, and so forth,
instead of saying, as it does, that no State shall do such
acts. Like other written contracts, it says shall, of course,
because it speaks of the parties in the third person, and
lays down the obligations imposed upon them by their
own consent. This is a very simple law of language.
But that is no reason why it should be overlooked by the
great lights of jurisprudence.

"In compacts," says Judge Story, "we ourselves deter-
mine and promise, what shall be done, before we are
obliged to do it." No words could more admirably suit
our purpose, or the facts of the case. For each State
agreed to the compact of the Constitution, which pre-
scribes "what shall be done," before it was bound by it.
That "no State shall emit bills of credit," and so forth, is
precisely the style which, according to Judge Story him-
self, as well as according to all usage, would be employed
in articles of agreement between the States ; and, hence, to
argue for the use of shall, instead of will, that the Consti-
tution addresses the language of authority from the people
of America to the States, is simply ridiculous. "In com-
pacts," says Story, "we ourselves determine and promise
what shall be done, before we are obliged to do it." And
yet, in the face of this obvious fact, he argues from the use
of shall in the Constitution, that it is not what the States

110 The Wae Between the States

"determined and promised," but what they were com-
manded to do ! that it is not, and can not be a compact
between the States at all !

A and B enter into articles of agreement. These articles,
according to good usage, say what A shall do, and what B
shall do. What shall we say, then, of these articles?
Shall we say that they do not form an agreement, or
contract at all? Shall we say that A commands B, or
"addresses to him the language of authority,'^ as a law-
giver speaks to a subject? If so, then B also commands A,
and each is evidently the master of the other ! Precisely
such is the profound logic of Mr. Justice Story !

CHAPTEE XIII

arguments in favor of the right of secession
Introductory

In the preceding chapters it has, I think, been clearly
demonstrated that the Constitution of the United States
was a compact to which the several States were the parties.
This, as we have seen, was most explicitly the doctrine
maintained by the fathers of the Constitution, and was
unequivocally set forth by The Federalist in submitting
that instrument to the people, and is confirmed by all the
historical records of the country. If any proposition,
indeed, respecting the Constitution can be considered as
unanswerably established, it is the doctrine of Tlie
Federalist that the act by which it was ordained was "not
a national, but a federal act," having been ratified "by
the people of America, not as individuals composing one
nation, hut as composing the distinct and independent
States to which they belong'"; ^ that the Constitution, "the
compact," was established by "the States regarded as
distinct and independent sovereigns."- It is, then, on this
clear, broad, immutable foundation that the argument in
favor of secession rests.

Argument in Favor of Secession From the Doctrine
OF Eeserved Eights

It is frequently asked, by the opponents of secession,,
where is the right of a State to withdraw from the Union
set forth or contained in the Constitution? But this
question betrays a gross ignorance with respect to the
origin of State rights. These rights are not derived from
the Constitution at all; on the contrary, all the rights,
powers, or authorities of the Constitution are derived
from the States. And all the rights not delegated to the
Federal Government by the States are reserved to the

1 The FcOeralist, No. xxxix. - Ibid., No. xl.

112 The War Betaveen the States

States themselves, — the original fountains of all the powers
of "the Constitution of the United States." This is the
doctrine set forth by The Federalist in submitting that
instrument or Constitution to the people.

"The principles established in a former paper," says The
Federalist, "teach us that the States will retain all pre-
existing authorities which may not be exclusively dele-
gated to the federal head."^ In the former paper here
referred to, it is said : "All authorities, of which the
States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union,
remain with them in full vigor."- In the ratifying Con-
vention of Virginia the same doctrine is set forth, as well
known to every one at that day, by John Marshall, who
was afterwards the illustrious Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States. "The State governments,"
says he, "did not derive their powers from the general
government. But each government derived its powers
from the people, and each was to act according to the
powers given it." Would any gentleman deny this? He
demanded if powers not given were retained by implica-
tion ? Could any man say no ? Could any man say that
this power was not retained by the States, since it was not
given away ? "For," says he, "does not a power remain till
it is given away?"^

ISTeither Marshall nor Hamilton, the author of the num-
bers of The Federalist just quoted, was ever suspected of a
desire to lessen the authority of the Federal Union, or to
magnify that of the States. Yet, as we have seen, both
of them assume, as an undeniable principle, that every
power which is not delegated by the S'tates to the Federal
Union is retained by them in full vigor. This principle
results, indeed, from the fact that all the powers of the
Federal Government emanate from the people of the sev-
eral States. The question of Marshall, "Does not a power
remain till it is given away?" admits of but one answer.
For if a principal delegates power to an agent of any
kind, or for any purpose, the agent only possesses the
delegated powers, and all others remain with the principal.

' The Federalist, No. Ixxxii. - Ibid., No. xxxii.

3 "Binott's Debates," vol. iii, p. 389.

The "War Between the States 113

Thus, according to the very nature of things, as well as
according to the high authority of Hamilton and Marshall,
the States retained all the powers which they had not
delegated to the Federal Union.

But however plain this principle, or however fully ad-
mitted by the advocates of federal authority, the States
still insisted that it should be expressly incorporated in
the written language of the Constitution. Hence, Massa-
chusetts, having ratified the Constitution, used the follow-
ing language: "As it is the opinion of this Convention
that certain amendments and alterations in said Constitu-
tion would remove the fears and quiet the apprehensions
of many of the good people of the commouAvealth, and
more effectually guard against an undue administration
of the Federal Government, the Convention does therefore
recommend that the following alterations and provisions
be introduced into said Constitution:

"First, That it be explicitly declared that all powers,
not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution, are
reserved to the several States, to be by them exercised.^'^

In like manner, and for a like reason, Virginia recom-
mended the following "Amendment to the Constitution.
1st. That each State in the Union shall, respectively,
retain every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not
by this Constitution delegated to the Congress of the
United States, or to the departments of the Federal Gov-
ernment."^ North Carolina urged the same amendment
to the Constitution, and in precisely the same words as
those employed by Virginia.^ In the first amendment,
proposed by Pennsylvania, we find the following words :
"All the rights of sovereignty, which are not by the said
Constitution expressly and plainly vested in the Congress,
shall he deemed to remain with, and shall be exercised by,
the several States in the Union."'*

These recommendations, and others to the same effect,
secured the tenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, which is in these words : "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor

1 "EUiott's Debates." vol. ii.'p- 180. = Ibid., vol. iii. p. 594.

^ Ibid., vol. iv, p. 240. * Ibid., vol. ii. p. .503.

114 The Wae Between the States

prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States,
or to the people/^ If reason, if authority, history, if the
words of the Constitution itself can establish anything,
then may we regard " it as definitely and forever settled
that every power, right, or authority, which is not delegated
to the Federal Union, is reserved to the States, or to the
people of the States.

I ask, then, where is this great, inherent right of a
State to resume the powers it has delegated, surrendered
to the Federal Union? Where has this peerless right of
sovereignty been ceded, surrendered, or given away? The
people may rage, and the politicians imagine a vain thing,
but I appeal to the great charter of American rights and
liberties. Where, then, in the 'Constitution of the United
States, is the sacred and inviolable right of a sovereign
State to resume the powers it has delegated to its agents,
given away or surrendered? When the States entered
into "the compact of the Constitution," they did so, as
it is conceded both by Story and Curtis, at the moment
they were "free, sovereign, and independent States."
Where, then, in that compact, did they delegate, surrender,
or give away the sacred right to resume the powers which
they delegated to their agent, the Federal Government;
or, in other words, the right to secede from the Union?
Let the place in which this right, this greatest of all the
rights of sovereignty, has been given away to the Federal
Union be pointed out in the Constitution; or it must be
conceded that it remained with the States. Let it be shown
where "the States are explicitly divested" of this right "in
favor of the Union" ; or it must be admitted that it
"remained with them in full vigor. "^

Ignorance, or passion, or patriotism may "veil this,
right" ; but, nevertheless, the question is, where is this
right given away in the compact of the Constitution? If
it be not given away there, it still exists with the States in
all the plenitude of its power. The stars do not cease to
shine, or to exist, because they are concealed from view by
exhalations from the earth, or by the blaze of noon.

'■ The Federalist, No. xxxii.

The War Between the States 115

Argument From the Sovereignty of the States

Perhaps no subject lias ever been considered with less
steadiness of mind, or clearness of analysis, than "the
sovereignty of the States," except "the sovereignty of the
United States." The powers of the Federal Government
are enumerated by one party, in order to show that it is
sovereign or supreme; while the opposite party attempts
to prove the sovereignty of the States by dwelling on the
powers which belong to their governments. But all this
is nothing whatever to the purpose. It merely deals with
the branches, not with the roots, of the great subject
under discussion; and, how long soever these branches
may be beaten, it will only make confusion the ^ worse
confounded. In the contest about the significance of the
particular powers of the Federal and of the State govern-
ments, the real principle on which the whole controversy
hinges is overlooked, and the subject in dispute is darkened
by words without knowledge, and buried far under floods
of logomachy.

Mr. Webster, for example, thus demolishes the doctrine
of State sovereignty : " "However men may think this ought
to be, the fact is that the people of the United States
have chosen to impose control on State sovereignties.
There are those, doubtless, who wish they had been left
without restraint, but the Constitution has ordered the
matter differently. To make war, for instance, is an
exercise of sovereignty, but the Constitution declares that
no State shall declare war. To coin money is another act
of sovereign power, but no State is at liberty to coin
money.

"Again, the Constitution says that no sovereign State
shall be so sovereign as to niake a treaty. These pro-
hibitions, it must be confessed, are a control on the State
sovereignty of South Carolina, as well as of the other
States, which does not arise 'from her feelings of honorable
justice.' The opinion referred to, therefore, is in defiance
of the plainest provisions of the Constitution.'"^ Why,
then, did he not wind up his unanswerable logic with a
quod erat demonstrandum?

' '"Webster's Works." vol. iil. p. 322.

116 The Wae Between the States

The truth is that the Avhole thing, from beginning to
end, is a miserable sophism. His premises are false, and
his conclusion, therefore, falls to the ground. The fact
is that the people of the United States imposed no control
whatever on the States, and had no power to do so. On
the contrary, each State, for the sake of union, agreed
that it would abstain from the exercise of the right to
wage war, to coin money, and to make treaties. She dele-
gated these high powers to the government of the Federal
Union. She entered into the compact of the Constitution,
as we have seen, in her character of "a distinct and
independent sovereign," and was, therefore, "bound only
by her own voluntary act."^ All the powers of the Con-
stitution were delegated, and all its obligations assumed,
by the free act of each sovereign State. All the control
to which she was liable in the Union was self-imposed;
and not one particle of it was laid upon her by any
authority but her own. The act, indeed, by which she
entered into the compact of the Constitution, was an
exercise, not an abridgment, of her sovereign power. If
she could not enter into such a compact, she would be less
than sovereign.

It is supposed by some, certainly by none who have
reflected on the subject, that if a State delegates a portion
of her powers, or agrees to abstain from the exercise of
them, her sovereignty is thereby limited, or abridged. To
all such I would commend the words of Vattel: "Several
sovereign and independent States," says he, "may unite
themselves together by a perpetual confederacy, without
ceasing to be, each individually, a perfect State. They
will together constitute a federal republic : theii' joint
deliberations will not impair the sovereignty of each
member, though they may, in certain respects, put some
restraint on the exercise of it, in virtue of voluntary
engagements/'^

Every one should be perfectly familiar with this-
principle of law. It has been clearly recognized and em-
bodied in the legislation of this country. In the thirteenth
Article of the old Confederation, for example, it is ex-

^ The Federalist. - Vattel's "Law of Nations," p. 3.

The Wae Between the States 117

pressly declared that "the Union shall be perpetual" ; and
yet, in the second Article, it is said that "each State retains
its sovereignty, freedom, and independence." Thus,
although the States, in and by those Articles, delegated
many sovereign powers to the Federal G-overnment; this,
in conformity with the principle laid down by Vattel, did
"not impair the sovereignty of each member." But since
the new Constitution, or Articles of Union, contained no
clause declaring it perpetual, or assigning any period for
its duration, how much more clearly did each State in the
"more perfect Union" retain its sovereignty unimpaired!
For, in such case, it is conceded, as we have repeatedly
seen, by the great lights of American jurisprudence, that
a State may secede at pleasure, or resume the powers she
may have delegated to the Federal Government.

Indeed, if a State could not thus delegate her sovereign
powers, she would cease to be sovereign. She would
resemble a minor, who is incapable of entering into con-
tracts. The State, or the people themselves, can not exer-
cise sovereign powers in person; and, hence, if she could
not delegate them to her agents, representatives, substi-
tutes, or servants, her sovereignt}^ would be a useless
burden to her. Thus the very circumstance which is
supposed, by superficial thinkers, to limit and control the
sovereignty of a State, is indispensably necessary to the
perfection of that sovereignty. The people are not the
less sovereign, because they institute governments, and
ap23oint them as agents to transact their business ; although
they necessarily delegate a portion of their sovereign
powers to these agents, or governments. On the contrary,
this is the very highest exercise of sovereignty, and implies
the right to alter, amend, or remodel their governments.
Nay, it implies the right of a people to set their govern-
ment entirely aside, and to substitute another in its room.

What, then, has all this talk about the powers dele-
gated to the State Governments, or to the Federal Gov-
ernment, to do with the great question of sovereignty?
Those governments are not sovereign. They are subordi-
nate to the will of the people, by whom they were created;
and a subordinate sovereignty is a contradiction in terms.

118 The Wae Between the States

The only real sovereignty is that which makes, and un-
makes, Constitutions and governments. Or, if any one
is pleased to call any government, whether State or
Federal, sovereign ; he should not forget that it is merely a
delegated sovereignty. It is not original ; it is derived. It
is not inherent; it comes from without; and, instead of
being supreme, it depends on a power greater than itself.
It is divisible, and may be divided among different govern-
ments, or agents of the supreme power. On the contrary,
the sovereign power of a state, or, in other words, the
power of the people of a State, is inherent, original,
supreme, indivisible, and inalienable. This, at least, is the
American doctrine; and it is to be deeply lamented that
Americans should, in the ardor and struggle of debate, so
frequently forget, or overlook, the very first lessons they
have ever learned, and which they certainly do not mean
to repudiate or discard.

I have nothing to say, then, about the delegated powers
of this or that government. They have nothing to do
with the question. " Others may wrangle about those
powers, if they please, and beat their brains over them;
all I want to know is, where resides the one power from
which all such delegated powers proceed. The difference
between this one power and the powers of the government
it creates is the difference between the sun and its rays,
or the creator and its manifold creations. Where, then,
does this one sovereign power reside? It resides, as we
have seen, in each State, and not in the people of the
United States. The people of the United States, indeed,
were not one people, or nation, in the political sense of the
word, and were never clothed with any sovereign power
whatever. The late war was, it is true, carried on "to
preserve the life of the nation." But there was no such
nation. Its substance was a sham, and its life was a lie.^

As the one sovereign power, which makes, and therefore
unmakes, Constitutions and governments, resides in each
State, so each State had the right to secede from the
Federal Government. As each State, however, only made
or adopted that government for itself, so she could un-

^ See cliap. xii.

The War Between the States IID

make it as to herself only. That is, she had no power to
destroy the Federal Union, but only to withdraw from it,
and let it move on in its own sphere. In the exercise of
her original, inherent, indivisible, inalienable sovereignty
she merely seceded from the Union to which she had
acceded, and asked to be let alone. But she could not
escape the despotic, all-devouring Lie by which her sover-
eignty had been denied, and her rights denounced as "a
pestilential heresy.'^ Nay, by which she had been stripped
of her character as a State, and relegated to the rank of a
county. Was that the purpose for which, as a sovereign
State, she entered into "the more perfect Union?"

"No man," says Mr. Webster, "makes a question that
the people are the source of all political power.
There is no other doctrine of government here."^ This
is conceded. The people make, and the people unmake,
Constitutions. This is the universally received doctrine
in America. It is asserted by Calhoun as strenuously as
by Webster. But the Constitution was made by the people
of the several States, each acting for itself, and bound by
no action but its own. Hence, as each State acceded to the
compact of the Constitution, so each State may, if it
chose, secede from that compact. If the premise is true,
the conclusion is conceded; and the premise has been
demonstrated. In acceding to the compact of the Consti-
tution, each State made the Union as to itself; and, in
seceding therefrom, it unmakes the Union only as to itself.
And it does so by virtue of its own inherent, and inalien-
able sovereignty.

If it should be said that the people of the several States-
made, but can not unmake, the compact of the Constitution,
as to themselves, it would follow that the people of 1788
alone were sovereign. But the people of this generation
are sovereign as well as the people of that generation. The
attribute of sovereignty is, according to the American
doctrine, inherent, and inalienable. The people of Vir-
ginia, then, in the year 1788, did not, and could not, absorb
and monopolize the sovereignty of all subsequent genera-
tions, so as to deprive them of its exercise. If this could

'■ "Webster's Works," vol. vi, p. 221.

120 The War Between the States

be so, then the sovereign people of one age, or generation,
might deprive the sovereign people of all ages and genera-
tions of their power and freedom. But this can not be.
The living, as well as the dead, are sovereign. As the
people of Virginia in 1788 acceded to the Union, because
they believed it would be for their good; so the people of
Virginia in 1861 had a right to secede from the Union,
because they believed it had been made to work their in-
sufferable harm. Deny this, and you assert the sovereignty
of the people of Virginia of 1788, at the expense of the
sovereignty of the people of Virginia for all future ages.
Or, in other words, 5^ou take all power and sovereignty,
and freedom from all other ages and generations, in order
to concentrate and bury them with a part, departed, in-
experienced, and perhaps fatally deluded generation. The
whole American doctrine of the sovereignty of the people
is false, or else it must be asserted for the living as well as
for the dead ; and, even if it is false, it is nevertheless the
doctrine by which the right of secession should be tried.

At the time the Constitution was adopted, or "the more
perfect Union" formed, the "people of New England took
the lead of all others in their devotion to State sovereignty
and State rights. Thus, in her Constitution of 1780,
Massachusetts declared : "The people of this common-
wealth have the sole and exclusive right of governing them-
selves as a free, sovereign, and independent State ; and do,
and forever hereafter shall, exercise and enjoy every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not, or may not hereafter
be, by them expressly delegated to the United States of
America, in Congress assembled." Precisely the same
language, word for word, is contained in the Constitution
of New Hampshire, which was made twelve years after
that of Massachusetts. Thus, after the new Union was
formed. New Hampshire, in the words of Massachusetts,
declared herself a "free, sovereign, and independent
State." "Paris," it has been said, "is France." It is more
certain that "Massachusetts is New England."

How did it happen, then, that Massachusetts, in 1780,
and consequently New England, took the lead of all the
members of the Union in her devotion to the doctrine

The Wae Between tpie States 121

of State sovereignty; and yet, in 1861, more fiercely
denounced that very doctrine as "a pestilential heresy"
than any other State in existence? The answer is plain.
The mystery is easily solved. Or rather, it is no mysteiy
at all to any one acquainted with the character, or the
history, of Massachusetts. Never has she been in the
ascendancy, as in 1861, or with the majority working the
Union for her benefit, that it did not appear to her eyes,
like the full moon, a great world of light full of inexpress-
ible beneficence and beauty. 'Not has she ever been in
the minority, feeling the pressure of the Union, or its
demands upon her purse, that it did not rapidly wane, and
appear to her emptied of all its glory. Hence, in 1861, so
great was the glory of the Union to her enravished eyes,
that it blotted out the States; just as the meridian sun
blots out the stars. She forgets her primitive creed; or,
if she remembers it at all, it is only to denounce it as the
creed of "rebels and traitors."

On the other hand, when, in 1815, Massachusetts felt
the Union in her pockets, all its glory vanished, and the
Eights of the States, and the Sovereignty of the States,
came out to her keen vision like stars after the setting of
the sun. This has been the great misfortime of the South,
that the world did not turn around quite as fast at her end
of the Union as it did in New England, and that it did
not turn exactly in the same direction. The creed of the
fathers, the creed of all sections in 1787, the creed of all
the States for more than thirty years after the formation
of the "more perfect Union," was substantially the creed
of the South in 1861. There she stood. But, in the
meantime, Massachusetts, and consequently all New
England, having made one entire revolution, denounced
her primitive creed — still the creed of the South, — that the
States are "free, sovereign, and independent," as the in-
vention of rebels and traitors, designing to put the glorious
Union out of joint. True, the South did dislocate the
Union, and breed fiery discord ; but, then, this was simply
by standing still, and refusing to follow the rapid revolu-
tion of New Eno;land.

122 The War Between" the States

Argument From the Silence op the Constitution

It is a remarkable fact that, in the Constitution of the
United States, there is not a word relating to the perpe-
tuity or continuance of the government established by it.
This momentous question is passed over in profound
silence. Nor was this omission an act of forgetfulness.
It was, on the contrary, the result of deliberate design.
The existing Articles of Confederation expressly provided
that the government established by them should be
"perpetual," and should never be changed without the
unanimous consent of all the States of the Union. This
provision was deliberately struck out, or not permitted to
appear in the new Constitution. In the act of receding
from the compact of the Union, which had expressly
pronounced itself "perpetual," the fathers had not the face
to declare that the new compact should last forever. Time
had demonstrated the futility of such a provision. The
Convention of 1787 had been most sadly hampered by
it in their design to erect a new form of government, as
appears from the "Madison Papers," and other accounts
of its proceedings. Hence they wisely determined to leave
no such obstacle in the way of the free action of future
generations, in case they should wish to new-model their
government. It is certain that no such obstacle is found
in the Constitution framed by them.

Now what is the inference from this fact, from this
omission? If the framers of the Constitution designed to
make it perpetually binding, why did they not say so?
Nay, why did they depart from the plan before them, and
refuse to say so? Only one answer can be given to this
question. They did not intend to repeat the folly of seek-
ing to render perpetual, by mere dint of words, those
Articles of Union between Sovereign States, whose bind-
ing force and perpetuity must necessarily depend on the
justice with which they should be observed by the parties
to them, or on their adaptation to the great ends for which
they were enacted. The perpetuity, or continuance, of
the new Union was frequently alluded to and considered

The War Between the States 123

in the Convention of 1787 ; and yet there is not one syllable
on the subject in the Constitution made by them. This
speaks volumes.

It is argued, in The Federalist,'^ that as the old Articles
of Confederation had utterly failed in consequence of
defects which no one had foreseen; so the real objections
to the new Constitution, whatever they might be, would
in all probability remxain to be disclosed by time and ex-
perience. Eeasoning from the past, it was concluded that
no one could foresee what its real defects were, or how
great they might prove in practice. Would it not, then,
have been infinitely absurd to pronounce it perpetual, or
seek to stamp it with the attribute of immortality?

The truth is that the new Constitution was designed by
its authors to last just as long as it should be faithfully
observed by the parties to it, or as it should answer the
great ends of its creation, and no longer. On the failure
of either of these conditions, then, in their view, the
power by which it was ordained possessed the inherent and
indefeasible right to withdraw from it. Otherwise there
would be no remedy, not even in the sovereign power
itself, for the greatest of all political evils or abuses.
Otherwise we should have to repudiate and I'eject the great
principle of American freedom, which has never been
called in question by any statesman of the JSTew World, or
over which the least cloud of suspicion has ever been cast
by any American citizen.

What, then, is the position assumed by those who deny
the right of secession? In asserting that a State has no
right to withdraw from the Union they declare that the
Constitution, or Articles of Union, is perpetually binding.
That is to say, by a forced construction, they introduce
into the Constitution the very provision which its framers
most deliberately refused to insert therein ! They refused
to say that the new compact should be perpetual, and yet
these interpreters declare that they designed to make it
perpetual !

' No. xxxviii.

124 The War Between the States

Reference.

Both Story and Webster admit, as we have repeatedly
seen, that if sovereign States enter into a compact or Con-
federation, without expressly prescribing any period for
the continuance of the Union; then any State has the
right to secede at pleasure. This is the true inference to
be drawn from the silence of the Constitution as to the
continuance of the Union; an inference too clear and un-
questionable to be denied by either a Story or a Webster.
If they have sought to evade its force, or obscure the
right of secession, this is by assuming the ground, so fully
exploded in the preceding pages, that the' Constitution was
not a compact between the States of the Union.

"It is sometimes asked," says Mr. Motley, "why the
Constitution did not make a special provision against the
right of secession. How could it do so?"^ Why, simply,
by transferring the words of the old Constitution to the
new, and saying, "the Union shall be perpetual." There is
no impossibility in the case. The thing had been done
once, and it might easily have been done again, if the
framers of the Constitution had desired to do it. Many
words, phrases, and provisions of the old Constitution
were transferred by them to the new; and, if they had
wished to do so, they might just as easily transferred
those words, "the Union shall be perpetual," or last till
all the parties consent to a separation. "How could they
do so?" asks Mr. Motley; and I reply, how could he ask
so silly a question?

"It would have been puerile," says he, for the Consti-
tution to say formally to each State, thou shalt not secede."
There was no necessity, perhaps, that the Convention
should have been very formal in the language it addressed
to the States. But would it have been puerile, or ridicu-
lous, if the Convention had said, "the Union shall be
perpetual." Who can doubt that if these words had been
inserted in the new Constitution that Mr. Motley would
have wielded them as an unanswerable argument against
the right of secession? Indeed, these words answer that

^ "Rebellion Records," vol. i, p. 214.

The AVae Betweex the States 135

purpose so well that Dr. Hodge borrows them from the
old Articles of Confederation, and passes them off as "the
very words" of the Constitution, in order to demonstrate
the palpable absurdity of secession; in order to show
that secession is in direct and open defiance of "the avowed
design of the compact'" of 1787. These words were,
indeed, the very ones he needed to demolish the right of
secession; and his need was so great that he came at them
in no very legitimate way. Could anything be more feeble,
or puerile, than Mr. Motley's attempt to account for the
silence of the Convention on the momentous subject of
secession? or more clearl}^ illustrate the difficulty of get-
ting rid of the argument from that silence in favor of
secession ?

The truth is that the Convention, in its desire to secede
from the old compact, was so greatly embarrassed by the
clause declaring that "the Union shall be perpetual," that
it deliberately removed that obstacle from the path of
future legislation; and, whether it was intended by the
Convention or not, the legal effect of this was to establish
the right of secession under the new compact between the
same parties.

Argument From the FuNDAME^^TAL Prixciple of the

Union

"To render a Federation desirable," says ]Mr. John
Stuart Mill, "several conditions are necessary. The 'first
of these is that there should be a sufficient amount of
mutual sympathy among the populations/^^ This senti-
ment recommends itself to the good sense of every man in
the world ; nay, to every man who is not insane from the
influence of passion. Even Mr. Greeley, before the war,
could say: "We hope never to live in a Eepublic whereof
one section is pinned to another by bayonets." Such is
indeed the desire of every good man, nay, of every rational
being ; for, as Mr. Mill says, no union of States is desirable,
unless it be held together by the cement of good feeling,
as well as of interest.

' 'Representative Government." chap. xvii.

126 The Wae Between the States

In like manner, John Qnincy Adams says : "The ui dis-
soluble link of union between the people of the several
States of this confederated nation is, after all, not in the
rigJit, but in the heart. If the day should ever come (may
Heaven avert it !) when the affections of the people of these
States shall be alienated from each other; when the
fraternal spirit shall give way to cold indifference, or
collision of interest shall fester into hatred, the bands of
political associations will not long hold together parties no
longer attracted by the magnetism of conciliated interests
and kindly sympathies; and far bettee v\'ill it be foe

THE PEOPLE OF THE DISUNITED STATES TO PAET IN FRIEND-
SHIP FROM EApH OTHER, THAN TO BE HELD TOGETHER BY

CONSTRAINT. Then will be the time for reverting to the
precedents which occurred at the formation and adoption
of the Constitution, to form again a more perfect Union,
by dissolving that which could no longer bind, and to leave
the separated parts to be reunited by the law of political
gravitation to the center.'^

"Better," says Mr. Adams, "to part in friendship, than
to be held together by restraint." History, it is said
repeats itself. Some of the Greek States, wishing to part
in peace from their confederates, were held together by
force of arms. This, says Freeman, in his learned work
on Federal Government, ultimately proved injurious to
those who drew the sword of coercion.

Argument From the Eight of Self-Government

The thirteen Colonies, in the Declaration of Independ-
ence, justified their separation on the distinct ground that
all "governments" derive "their just powers from the con-
sent of the governed." It was in obedience to this great
principle that the American Union became a free and
voluntary association of States. This, by its very nature,
excludes the idea of coercion. For, if States are compelled
to remain in the Union against their will, this is sub-
jugation, and not a copartnership in honor, interest, free-
dom, and glory. It destroys the autonomy, annihilates the
freedom, and extinguishes the glory of the subjugated

The War Between the States 127

States. The system is transformed. It is no longer a
sisterhood of free States, but the vassalage of some, and the
dominion of others.

This is so obvious that it was declared, at first, even by
the most zealous advocates of President Lincoln, that no
one intended to coerce a State. What tlren? Did they
mean to let it go in peace? Ko, they neither intended to
coerce a seceding State, nor let it depart ! But how was
such a thing possible? Why, these admirable casuists, by
a most refined and subtle distinction, determined that they
would not coerce a State, but only the people of whom it is
composed! The State secedes. The citizens acknowledge
their allegiance to the State, and determine to obey the
ordinance of secession. And thereupon the Federal Gov-
ernment resolves to wage war, not upon the State itself,
but only upon the people of the State ! Happy State !
Miserable people ! The one may depart ; but the other
must come back ! But if the Federal Government had
only waged war upon the State, how would it have pro-
ceeded otherwise than it did?

The authors of this very nice distinction were evidently
driven to assume such a position by the horror which
Madison, Ellsworth, Mason, Hamilton, and other fathers
of the Constitution, were known to have expressed at the
idea of the coercion of a State. Ko ! they would not
coerce a State; they would not be guilty of the horrid
thing so eloquently denounced by the fathers ; they would
only wage war on the men, women, and children of whom
the State is composed! How admirable the acuteness!
How wonderful the logic !

In 1848, Mr. Lincoln had not forgotten his very first,
and nearly his very last, lesson in the science of govern-
ment. He had read it in the Declaration of Independence ;
he had heard it recited in school; he had heard it most
eloquently spouted every Fourth of July. How, then,
could he forget it, without some very powerful motive?
No humble rail-splitter, no honest citizen could forget
such a lesson. It requires a great politician, or a President,
to forget, despise, and trample such things underfoot.
Hence, in 1848. the humble citizen, Abraham Lincoln, like

128 The Wae Between the States

every other American citizen, publicly declared that "any
peoj)le whateA'er ha^'e a right to abolish the existing govern-
men, and form a new one that suits them better. This is
a most valuable, a most sacred right/^ Yes, any people
whatever: the thirteen British Colonies; the G-reeks; the
States of South America ; Poland ; Hungary ; any and
every people under the wide expanse of heaven exce|)t the
people of the South. But why except the South? The
reason is jDlain. It was, indeed, most perfectly and fully
explained by Mr. Lincoln himself. When asked, as Presi-
dent of the United States, "why not let the South go ?" his
simple, direct, and honest answer revealed one secret of the
wise policy of the Washington Cabinet. "Let the South
go !^' said he. ''Where, then, shall we get our revenue?"
There lies the secret. The Declaration of Independence is
great ; the voice of all the fathers is mighty ; but then they
yield us no revenue. The right of self-government is "a
most valuable, a most sacred right" ; but in this particular
ease it gives us no revenue. Hence, this "most valuable,
this most sacred right," may and should shine upon every
other land under heaven; but here it must "pale its in-
effectual fires," and sink into utter insignificance and con-
tempt in the august presence of the "Almighty Dollar."

As the object of the Eepublican leaders, in wishing to
retain the South, was not to lose revenue, so now [i. e.,
1866] that they have the South the only use they have for
her is to lay taxes and other burdens of government upon
her. In open and shameless violation of the great principle
of 1776, the South is united to the JN'orth by the tie of
"taxation Avithout representation." Is this "the sacred'
right" of self-government? The Union waged a seven
years' war to establish that right, and a four years' war to
demolish it.

Every American citizen has taken in the idea of self-
government with his mother's milk; has heard it from all
his most venerated guides, teachers, and oracles; has pro-
claimed it himself, perhaps, all his life as "a most valuable,
and a most sacred right." Hence, he should not be re-
quired, all on a sudden, to proclaim the diametrically
opposite doctrine. He should be allowed some little time,

The War Between the States 129

at least, to clear his throat for the opposite utterance. Is
it not quite natural, then, that his early anrl lifelong
prejudice in favor of the right of self-government should
have clung to the editor of the Tribune, the great organ of
the Eepublican party, even while that party was preparing
the way for its subversion? True, it was but an organ:
yet had it so long, and so earnestly, proclaimed the great
right of self-government that some little time, at least,
should have been allowed for it to come right around to
the diametrically opposite position. Accordingly, on the
9th of November, three days after Mr. Lincoln's election,
that organ uttered the sentiments: "If the cotton States
shall become satisfied that they can do better out of the
Union than in it, we insist on letting them go in peace.
. . . We must ever resist the right of any State to
remain in the Union and nullify or defy the laws thereof.

To AVITHDRAW FROM THE UnION IS QUITE ANOTHER

MATTER ; and, whenever any considerable section of our
Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, ave shall resist

ALL COERCIVE MEASURES DESIGNED TO KEEP IT IN. We

hope never to live in a Eepublic whereof one section is
pinned to another by bayonets."

Again, on the 17th of December, just l)efore the secession
of South Carolina, the same organ said: '"If it [the Decla-
ration of Independence] justifies the secession from the
British Empire of three millions of colonists in 17T6, we

DO NOT SEE AVHY IT WOULD NOT JUSTIFY THE SECESSION OF
FIVE BULLIONS OF SOUTHERNERS FROM THE FEDERAL

Union in 1861. If we are mistaken on this point, why
does not some one show us wherein and why? For our own
part, while ire deny the right of slaveholders to hold slaves
against the wiU of the latter, we can not see how twenty
millions of people can hold ten, or even five, in a detested
Union with them by military force. ... If seven or
eight contiguous States should present themselves authori-
tatively at Washington, saying, 'We hate the Federal
I'^nion ; we have withdrawn from it ; we give you the
choice between acquiescing in our secession and arranging
amicably all incidental questions on the one hand and
attempting to subdue us on the other; we could not

130 The Wae Between the States

stand up foe coercion, for subjugation, for we do not

THINK IT WOULD BE JUST. We HOLD THE RIGHT OF SELF-
GOVERNMENT EVEN WHEN INVOKED IN BEHALF OF THOSE
WHO DENY IT TO OTHERS. So MUCH FOR THE QUESTION

OP principle'. . . . Any attempt to compel them by-
force to remain would be contrary to the principles
enunciated in the immortal Declaration of Independence,
contrary to the fundamental idea on which human liberty
is based."

On the 23d of February, 1861, after the cotton States
had formed their confederacy, the Tribune used this
language: "We have repeatedly said, and we once more
insist, that the great principle embodied by Jefferson in the
Declaration of American Independence, that governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,
is sound and just; and that if the slave States, the cotton
States, or the gulf States only, choose to form an inde-
pendent nation they have a clear moral right to do so.
Whenever it shall he clear that the great body of Southern
people have become conclusively alienated from the Union,
and anxious to escape from, it, we will do our best to

FORWARD their VIEWS."

President Buchanan, from whose interesting book the
above extracts have been taken, adds : ''In a similar spirit,
leading Eepublicans everywhere scornfully exclaimed, 'Let
them go' ; 'We can do better without them' ; 'Let the
Union slide,' and other language of the same import."

Before the war, it was indignantly denied that the
abolitionists constituted more than a small minority of
the Eepublicans. How is it since the war? Does not
almost every man of them now claim that he has always
been an abolitionist, and, as such, come in for his share
of glory in the formed emancipation of the slaves? It is
certain that, of all the men in the Union, the abolitionists
of the Bepublican party were the most active asserters,
and the most powerful promoters, of secession and dis-
union. They everywhere proclaimed, not only the right,
but the sacred duty of secession. William Lloyd Garrison
led the way. "In the expressive and pertinent language
of Scripture," said he, "the Constitution 'was a covenant

The War Between the States 131

with death, and an agreement with hell/ null and void
before God from the first moment of its inception — the
f ramers of which were recreant to duty, and the supporters
of which are equally guilty."^ Yet, how strange ! the
men of this school enlisted in the ranks, and fought under
the banner of Mr. Lincoln, who was bound by his oath to
support that "covenant with death and agreement with
hell !'" Did they fight for the Constitution ? Did they
heartily join in the cry for the Union ?

Again, he said "the motto inscribed on the banner of
Freedom is, no Union with slaveholders.^ . . . Our
motto is, no Union with slaveholders either religious or
political.^ In withdrawing from the American Union, we
have the God of justice with us."* Did this man, then, or
his followers, fight for the Union? "Circulate," he cried,
"a declaration of disunion^ from slaveholders through-
out THE COUNTRY. Hold mass meetings — assemble in
Conventions — nail your banners to the mast."^ Did these
men, then, take down their banners, trample its motto in
the dust, and join the loud war-cry for the Union of the
fathers?. If so, then it was not because they hated that
Union the less, but because they hated Southerners the
more.

jSTow this man AAllliam Lloyd Garrison was an honest
fanatic. He just came right down with a direct sledge-
hammer force on all slaveholders, and on all the poor,
pitiful, puling hypocrites, who pretended to desire to pre-
serve the Constitution and the Union; and who, to that
end. labored to explain away the provisions of that "sacred
compact,'" as they delighted to call the Constitution.
"Those provisions," said they, "were meant to cover
slavery," yet "as they may be fairly interpreted to mean
something exactly tlie reverse, it is allowable to give them
such an interpretation, especially as the cause of Freedom
will he thereby promoted."^ In thus stating this hypo-
critical position, Mr. Garrison must have had Mr. Sumner
in his mind's eye. But with honest scorn and contempt
he tears the mean fabric to tatters, and scatters it to the

' "Anti-Slaverv Examiner." vol. xi, p. 101. - Ibid., p. 101.

Mbid.. p. lis. Mbid., p. llfi. ■■Ibid., p. 119. "Ibid., p. 104.

132 The Wae Between the States

winds ! "This," says he, "is to advocate fraud and violence
to one of tlie contracting parties, whose cooperation was
secured only hy an express agreement and undertaking
hetiveen them both, in regard to the clauses alluded to;
and that such a construction, if enforced by laws and
penalties, would unquestionably lead to civil war, and the
aggrieved party would justly claim to have been betrayed,
and robbed of their Constitutional rights."^

"'No honest use can be made of it," says he, "in opposi-
tion to the plain intention of its framers, except to declare
the contract at an end, and to refuse to serve under it."-
It is of no use to lie, said he, the Constitution is "a con-
tract" between the States; an "express agreement and
undertaking" between the North and the South. He will
not have this "express agreement" explained away. "Tt
is objected," says he, "that slaves are held as property,
and, therefore, as the clause refers to persons, it can not
mean slaves. Slaves are recognized not merely as property,
but also as persons — as having a mixed character — as
combining the human with the brute. This is paradoxical,
we admit; but slavery is a paradox — the American Con-
stitution is a paradox — the American Union is a paradox —
the American Government is a paradox — and, if any one
of these is to be repudiated on that ground, they all are.
That it is the duty of the friends of freedom to deny the
binding authority of them all, and to secede from all, we
distinctly affirm/'^'

Such were the sentiments of Mr. Lloyd Garrison, in
1844, delivered in their annual address to the Anti-Slavery
Society of America, as its president. Precisely the same
sentiments were entertained by the two learned secretaries
of that society, namely, Wendell Phillips and Maria Weston
Chapman, as well as by all its leading members. They
proclaimed the duty of secession from the Constitution,
from the Union, and from the Government of America.
They wished to have nothing to do with slaveholders.
In the mild and conciliatory language of their president,

' "Anti-Slaverv Examiner," vol. xi, p. 104.

= Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 114.

The War Between the States 133

they longed to get away and to live apart from those
"incorrigible men-siealers, merciless tyrants, and blood-
thirsty assassins."'^

Such was the gentle and persuasive language, and such
were the loyal sentiments, of the abolitionists from 1844
to 1861. The following resolutions were passed at a meet-
ing of the American Anti-Slavery Society :

'^Resolved, That secession from the United States Government
"is the duty of every Abolitionist, since no one can take office or
"deposit his vote under the Constitution without violating his
"anti-slavery principles, and rendering himself an abettor to the
"slaveholder in his sin."

"Resolved, That years of warfare against the slave power has
"convinced us that every act done in support of the Ajnerican
"Union rivets the chain of the slave — that the only exodus of the
"slave to freedom, imless it be one of blood, must be over the
"remains of the present American Church and the grave of the
"present Union."

"Resolved, That the Abolitionists of this country should make
"it one of the primary objects of this agitation to dissolve the
"American Union."

Yet of all the war-spirits in the country, these very
men were the loudest and fiercest in their cries for a war
of coercion to put down secession, as rebellion and treason.
In its burning hate of the Union, the Tribune had become
poetical, and addressed The American Flag as follows:

Tear down that flaunting lie!

Half-mast the starry flag!
Insult on sunny sky

With hate's polluted rag!

But, all on a sudden, that "polluted rag" became the most
sacred ensign of freedom that ever floated between heaven
and earth! The cry has gone forth: "This Union is a
lie ! The American Union is an imposition. ... I
am for its overthrow. . . . Up with the flag of dis-
union, that we may have a glorious Eepublic of our own."
But anon, and from the same person, the opposite cry is
heard : "Down with the flag of disunion, and up with the

' "Anti-Slavery Examiner," vol. xi. pp. 111-112.

134 The War Between the States

flag of the Union, that we may 'preserve the life of the
nation/ the glorious Eepublic of the fathers." Even the
despised Constitution, "the antiquated parchment" of
Henry A¥ard Beecher, becomes all at once youngs and fresh,
and beautiful again ! and that Reverend gentleman stands
before the world at Exeter Hall as the graild representative
of the "constitutional union" party of this country!

Is there, in the history of the world, another instance
of a change so sudden, so complete, and so wonderful in
the avowed sentiments of any great body of men, as that
which took place among the abolitionists of the country
in 1861? Now whence all this intense love of the Union,
where recently there had been such deadly hate ? Whence
this newborn desire to be forever associated with "the
merciless tyrants, the bloodthirsty assassins" of the South?
The truth is they did not love the Union then, and they
do not want the Union now (i. e., 1866). They raised
the cry of "the Union" ; because, as one of their leaders
said, they believed they could "win on the Union." And
having ridden into power on "the Union," and consolidated
their power in the name of "the Union," they now resist
the persistent efforts of President Johnson to restore the
Union.

But Mr. Greeley has, in his "American Conflict," made a
most awkward and unsatisfactory attempt to explain the
course of the Union-hating and the Union-loving Tribune.
It was, perhaps, a little difficult for him to speak out all
that was in him on this delicate subject. The truth seems
to be : 1. That the word which went forth from President
Lincoln, "If we let the South go, where shall we get our
revenue?" is one of the causes of the great change in
question. Several books had, in 1860, been published to
illustrate the subject of "Southern Wealth and Northern
Profits," and, upon reflection, the North concluded that,
after all, she had some use for the South. She was natu-
rally indignant at the thought of losing the bird which
had so long laid for her the golden egg. 2. Secession
offered a splendid opportunity, or occasion, on which to
Avreak a little wrath on the slaveholders of the South, on
those "incorrigible men-stealers, merciless tyrants, and

The War Between the States 135

bloodthirsty assassins/'' who so richly deserved to die.
But it would, of course, be much more respectable to kill
them as "rebels and traitors," than merely as slaveholders.
Hence,, the very men who had been foremost and fiercest
in preaching the duty of secession and disunion, became,
all on a sudden, the most clamorous for the blood of
secessionists as traitors to "the glorious Union."

As the cynic, Diogenes, trampled on the robe of Plato's
pride with a still greater pride, so the abolitionists panted
for the blood of "bloodthirsty assassins" with a still
greater thirst. Hence, more than any other class of men,
they insisted that Mr. Lincoln, however reluctant, should
"cry havoc, and let slip the dogs of war." 3. Secession
furnished a fine pretext, a glorious occasion, for the forced
emancipation of the slaves at the South. Hence, just l)e-
fore Mr. Lincoln publicly declared that he had neither the
wish, nor the power, to interfere with slavery in the
States, the word privately went forth from a member of
his Cabinet, that secession should be punished with the
emancipation of the blacks, and with the utter devastation
of the South by fire and sword.^ This word was, of course,
intended for "the faithful." For if, at that early day,
such a design had been publicly avowed, it would have
filled the North with amazement, horror, and disgust.
But has it not been accomplished to the very letter?

Such Avere the causes, especially the last two, by which,
it seems to me, so wonderful a revolution was produced in
the political views and aspirations of the Northern
abolitionists. The change appeared like magic. "The
antiquated parchment" was renovated; the "polluted rag"
was purified; and the Union became not only habitable,
but the only fit habitation for free men. But, then, the
Union was not to be "the most perfect Union" of the
fathers; the Constitution was not to be the compact of
1787 ; and "hate's polluted rag" was to be consecrated
and glorified by hate. On the contrary^ the Union was
to be cast into the furnace of war, seven times heated, and
to come forth free from the sin of slavery, and cemented.

' I'ei'haps that member of his Cabinet knew the design of Mr.
Lincoln's administration better than it was then known to Mr. Lincoln
himself.

136 The Wae Between the States

not by "the mutual sympathy of its populations." but by
their blood. It was to be a new Union; a bright and
beautiful emanation ; not from the consent of the governed,
but from the sovereign, the supreme, the sublime .will of
the JSTorthern abolitionists. How lustily soever they joined
in the war-cry for the Union, this was in order that they
might the more effectually overthrow it, and ordain one
of their own in its place. Is not this the true secret of
their newborn love for "the glorious Union ?"

Previous to the war, it was frequently alleged that the
abolitionists constituted only a small minority in the
Eepublican party. It is certain that they controlled the
policy of Mr. Lincoln's administration. "The higher
law," "the law written on the hearts and consciences of
freemen," was the rule of their conduct. For the Consti-
tution, for the compact of 1787, for that "covenant with
death and agreement with hell," they cared less than
nothing; except when it agreed with their own will, or
could be made a pretext for their designs. The fact that
there was not the shadow of an authority for coercion in
the Constitution had not the least weight with them.
Nay, if the power to coerce had been expressly denied to
the Federal Government in the Constitution, this provision
would have been easily explained away, or overruled by
"the law written on the hearts and consciences of freemen."
It would have been but a "straw to the fire i' the blood."

President Buchanan could not find the power to coerce
a State in the Constitution he had sworn to support. In
like manner, Professor Bernard, of Oxford, England,
finding no authority for the coercion of a State in the
Constitution of 1787, pronounces it wrong. The same
ground is taken by Mr. Freeman, of the same university, in
his learned work on Federal Government. But if coercion
is a wrong under the Constitution, then, surely, secession
is a Constitutional right. Every man has the legal right
to do anything which is not forbidden by the law of the
land. He may Jiot have the moral, but he has the legal,
right to do it. A miserly act, for example, especially in
a rich man, is morally and socially wrong. But if there
is no law against it, then, however rich the man may be,

The Wae Between the States 137

he has the legal right to do it. We may despise the act;
we may abhor it; and we may denounce it as bitterly as
any one ever denomiced secession. But still, in the case
supposed, the act is done in the exercise of a legal right
which every one is bound to recognize and respect. This
ambiguity in the term riglit has, indeed, been the source
of no little darkness and confusion in the discussion of
moral and political questions. Mr. Buchanan seems to
have been confused by this ambiguity, when he denied
both the right of coercion and the right of secession.
Surely, both positions can not be true, in the legal sense
of the term right. For, if we say that coercion is a
Constitutional wrong, or usurpation, is not this saying that
the Constitution permits secession, or, in other words, that
it is a Constitutional right?

This appears so clear to my mind that when ^Ir.
Buchanan denied the right of secession, I suppose he
merely intended to condemn secession as a moral or social
wrong. This is the way in which he must be understood,
if we would not make him contradict himself. He may
have dreaded, he may have abhorred the act of secession;
and he may, therefore, have pronounced it wrong in the
forum of conscience. But if the Constitution does not
authorize coercion, then it permits secession; or, in other
words, secession is a Constitutional right, which every
power on earth is bound to respect as existing under the
supreme law of the land ; a Constitutional right which the
Federal Government could deny only by an act of usurpa-
tion. Coercion is unconstitutional. Coercion is wrong.
Coercion strikes down and demolishes the great funda-
mental principle of the Declaration of Independence —
the sacred right of self-government itself. Coercion wages
war on the autonomy of free States. Secession, on the
other hand, asserts the right of self-government for every
tree, sovereign, and independent State in existence.

Virginia did not favor secession. But when the hour
of trial came she stood in the imminent, deadly breach
between the secession of South Carolina and the coercion
of Massachusetts : receivino- into her own broad bosom the

138 The Wak Between the States

fatal shafts of war till she fell crushed, bleeding, and
exhausted to the earth. I appeal to the universe, then, if
her course was not noble, heroic, sublime.

Massachusetts has, on the contrary, favored both seces-
sion and coercion by turns. The pilgrim fathers of Massa-
chvisetts delighted in two things: first, in the freedom
from persecution for themselves; and, secondly, in the
sweet privilege and power to persecute others. In like
manner, their sons have rejoiced in two things: first, in
the right of self-government for themselves ; and, secondly,
in the denial of that right to others.

Argument From the Opinion of Well-Informed and

Intelligent Foreigners

The position that secession is a Constitutional right,
flowing from the idea that the Constitution is a compact
between sovereign States, is adopted by many impartial
foreigners, who have been at the pains to examine our
institutions for themselves. Thus says M. De Tocqueville,
in his celebrated works on "Democracy in America" :
''The Union was formed by the voluntary agreement of the
States; and in uniting together they have not forfeited
their nationality, nor have they been reduced to the condi-
tion of one and the same people. If one of the States
chose to withdraw from the compact, it would he difficult
to disprove its right of doing so, and the Federal Govern-
ment ivould have no means of ynaintaining its claims
directly either hy force or right. "^ In like manner. Dr.
Mackay says : "The Federal Government exists on sufl^er-
ance only. Any State may, at any time. Constitutionally
withdraw from the Union, and thus virtually dissolve it.
It was not certainly created with the idea that the States,
or several of them, would desire a separation; but, when-
ever they choose to do it, they have no obstacle in the
Constitution." Mr. Spence also, to whom we owe this
extract from Dr. Mackay, comes to the conclusion, in his

^ Vol. i, chap, xviii, p. 413.

The War Between" the States 139

able work on "The American Union/' that secession is a
Constitutional right. ISTay, he unanswerably establishes
this conclusion by facts which lie on the very surface of
American history, and which, however they may be con-
cealed or obscured by the influence of party passions at
home, can not escape the scrutiny of impartial foreigners,
who may simply desire to ascertain the truth in regard to
such questions. After referring to the opinions of M. De
Tocqueville and Dr. Mackay, Mr. Spence very justly re-
marks : "^Here, secession is plainly declared a Constitutional
right, not by excited Southerners, hut hy impartial men of
unquestionable ability/''^

An intelligent foreigner, as De Lolme, in his admirable
treatise on the Constitution of England, observes, possesses
some very decided advantages in the study of the funda-
mental institutions of a country. This is especially true
in regard to all questions which have been drawn into
the vortex of party politics, and mixed up with the
struggle for power and the emoluments of office. Never
has its justness been more forcibly illustrated than in
regard to the conflicting theories of the Constitution of
the United States. Though Lord Brougham, to select
only one example, most profoundly sympathized with the
abolitionists of the North; yet, in spite of all his natural
affinities, the simple facts of history constrained him to
adopt the Southern view of the Constitution. Hence, in
his work on Political Philosophy, he says : "It is plainly
impossible to consider the Constitution which professes to
govern this whole Union, this Federacy of States, as axy-
thing other than a treaty."" Accordingly, he speaks
of the American Union of States, as "the Great League."

It required no great research, or profound logic, to reach
this conclusion. On the contrary, it requires, as we have
seen, the utmost effort to keep facts in the background,
and all the resources of the most perverse ingenuity to
come to any other conclusion. It is, indeed, only neces-
sary to know a few facts, with which every student of our

1 "The American Union," p. 201.
- Vol. iii. cliap. xxx, p. 3.36.

140 The Wae Between the States

history is perfectlj^ familiar, and which are well stated by
Lord Brougham, in order to recognize the fundamental
principle of the "Great League." "The affairs of the
colonies," says he, "having during the revolutionary war
been conducted by a Congress of delegates for each, on
the restoration of peace, and the final establishment of
their independence, they formed this Federal Constitution,
ivhich was only gradually adopted hy the different menihers
of the Great League. Nine States having ratified it, the
new form of government went into operation on the 4th of
March, 1798. Before the end of 1790 it had received the
assent of the remaining States." These facts alone, it is
believed, are absolutely decisive in favor of the position
that the American Union was a voluntary association of
States, or a compact to which the States were the parties.
Hence it is that foreigners, whether impartial or prejudiced
against the South, adopt the Southern vieAv of the Con-
stitution, when they examine the subject with the least
care.

It is natural, indeed, that foreigners, before they
examine the subject, should look upon the American people
as one consolidated nation ; for that is the external
appearance which they present to those who view the affairs
of this continent from a distance. But like a multiple
star, which in the distance seems to be a single luminary
to the naked eye, the American Union is no sooner ap-
proached, or more closely examined, than it is resolved
into a constellation of sister States. jSTothing but party
passion, it is believed, can resist so plain a conclusion;
just as the clearest revelations of the telescope were
vehemently denied by man)^ of the most learned contempo-
raries of Gallileo. Hence it is that De Tocqueville, and
Mackay, and Spence, and Brougham, and Cantu,^ and
Heeren,^ as well as other philosophers, jurists, and his-
torians among the most enlightened portions of Europe,
so readily adopt the Southern view of the Constitution, and
pronounce the American Union a confederation of States.

^ "Historic Universelle," originaUy written in Italian, vol. xvii,
p. 371.

- "European States and Colonies," pp. 350-351.

CONFEDEEATK ChIEFTAINS

The War Between the States l-tS

Argument Fkom the Virginia Ordinance of
Ratification

A great many unfounded objections were urged against
the Constitution by its enemies. ]\Ir. Madison lias, in the
thirty-eighth number of The Federalist, drawn a powerful
picture of "the incoherence of the objections to the plan
proposecF ; that is, to the Constitution of 1787. Now this
chaos of conflicting objections, which were raised by the
enemies of the Constitution in order to defeat its adoption,
could not truly reflect the nature and design of that plan
for the government of the Union. Yet, however strange
it may seem, Mr. Justice Story and Mr. "Webster have, as
we have seen,^ selected one of these objections to show
what the Constitution is; though this very objection had
been most trimnphantly refuted by Mr. Madison, l)oth in
The Federalist and in the ratifying Convention of Virginia.
By the same sort of logic, if logic it may be called, they
might have fastened almost any other absurd interpreta-
tion on the Constitution, as well as the construction that
it was ordained by the people of America as one nation,
and not by the several States. By appealing to the
objections of Patrick Henry alone, as an authority, they
might have proved that there was "not one federal feature"
in the Constitution of 1787, as well as a dozen other glaring
absurdities; and that the fathers of the Constitution did
not know what they were about when they called the work
of their own hands, "The Federcd Government of these
States:''

In the ratifying Convention of Virginia, Patrick Henry
frequently dwelt, with great earnestness, on the danger of
entering into a new and untried Union, from which there
inight be no escape. Virginia is now free, said he, and the
mistress of her own destiny. But once in the new Union,
the power of the general government may be wielded for
her injury and oppression. This result was, in fact, elo-
quently predicted by Patrick Henry, George ]\Iason,
William Grayson, and other members of the same Con-
vention. This argument proceeded on the supposition,

' Chap, ix, pp. 74-.5.

144 The Wak Between the States

either that Virginia would not have the right to secede
from the Union, or else that this right would be denied by
her oppressors. The debates in the Virginia Convention
of 1788 are, indeed, replete with passages of burning
eloquence, which predict the calamities that would fall on
that noble State, as well as on other Southern States, from
the oppressions of "the Northern majority." Hence, the
people of Virginia, in their ordinance of ratification, took
the precaution to guard against this danger by expressly
reserving the right to resume the powers delegated to the
Federal Government "whensoever the same shall be per-
verted by their injury or oppression." The view which
Virginia has taken of her own ordinance is disputed. The
words of this ordinance are as follows : "We, the delegates
of the people of Virginia, duly elected, etc., ... do
in the name, and in behalf of the |)eople of Virginia,
declare and make known, that the pov:ers granted under
the Constitution, being derived from the people of the
United States, he resumed hy them whensoever the same
shall he perverted to their injury or oppression."

Mr. AYebster understood these words, "the people of the
United States," precisely as he understood them in the
preamble to the Constitution. Hence, he quotes the Vir-
ginia ordinance of ratification, in order to show that the
Constitution was established, not by the States, nor by
the people of the States, but by "the people of the United
States in the aggregate," or as one nation. But, as we
have repeatedly seen, this is a false view of the words in
question. They were not so understood by the Virginia
Convention of 1788.

In that Convention, Mr. Madison most clearly and fully
explained these words, precisely as he had previously done
in The Federalist. The powers of the new government are
derived, said he, from the people of the United States,
"but not the people as composing one great society, hut the
people as composing thirteen sovereignties." Such was
the meaning of the words in question, as explained by
James Madison, to whom the Convention looked for in-
formation on the subject, and by whom they were led to
adopt and ratify the Constitution. Yet these words are

The War Betaveex the States 145

quoted by Webster, Everett, and other politicians of
Massachusetts, in order to show that, in the opinion of
the Virginia Convention of 1788, the Constitution of the
United States was ordained by the people of America as
one nation ; and that the people of America as one nation
may, therefore, resume the delegated powers "whensoever
they shall be perverted to their injury or oppression." To
this interpretation and inference there are several insuper-
able objections.

In the first place, the Constitution was not to he estab-
lished by the people of America as one nation, or by "the
people of the United States as one great society" ; and
this fact was perfectly well known to the Virginia Con-
vention of 1788. It has already been sufficiently demon-
strated that the Constitution was ordained, not by the
people of America as one great society, but by each People
acting for itself alone, and to be bound exclusively by
its own voluntary act. It wonld be a gross solecism in
language, as well as in logic, to say that the people of the
United States as- one great society might resume powers
which were not delegated by them. The sovereignty which
delegates is the sovereignty which resumes, and it is
absurd to speak of a resumption of powers by any other
authority, whether real or imaginary.

In the second place, the evil intended to be remedied
shows the true meaning of the words in question. The
Virginia people did not fear that the people of the United
States might pervert the powers of the Federal Govern-
ment for their oAvn oppression. Their fears were for the
weak, not for the strong ; not for the people of the United
States in the aggregate, but for the Southern States in
the minority; and especially for the State of Virginia.
They feared, as the burning eloquence of Henry, and
]\Iason, and Monroe, and Grayson evinced, that the new
government would "operate as a faction of seven States
to oppress six" ; that the Xortliern majority would, sooner
or later, trample on the Southern minority. They feared,
in the language of Grayson, that the new Union would
l)e made "to exchange the poverty of the North for the
riches of the South." In the words of Henrv. "This

146 The Wae Between the States

Government subjects everything to the Xorthern majority.
Is there not, then, a settled purpose to check the
Southern interest? We thus put unbounded power over
our property in hands not having a common interest with
us. How can the Southern members prevent the adoption
of the most oppressive mode of taxation in the Southern
States, as there is a majority in favor of the Northern
States? Sir, this is a picture so horrid, so wretched, so
dreadful that I need no longer dwell upon it."^ Did the
Convention of Virginia, then, seek to quiet these dreadful
apprehensions, by declaring that the people of the United
States, "as one great society," might resume the powers
of the Federal Government whensoever they should be
perverted to their oppression? By declaring that this
one great society, or rather the majority of this society,
might resume the powers of the Federal Government
whensoever they should be pleased to use them for the
oppression of the minority? Could any possible interpre-
tation render any legislation more absolutely ridiculous?
It puts the remedy in the hands of those from whom the
evil is expected to proceed ! It gives the shield of defence
to the very power which holds the terrible sword of
destruction !

The Convention of Virginia spoke "in behalf of the
people of Virginia," and not in behalf of the overbearing
majority, by whom it was feared these people might be
crushed. They sought to protect, not the people of
America, who needed no protection, but the peo]3le of
Virginia. Hence, as the people of Virginia had delegated
power to the Federal Government, they reserved "in
behalf of the people of Virginia," the right to resume those
powers whensoever they should be perverted to their injury
or oppression.

Isow this reservation enures to the benefit of all the
parties to the Constitutional compact ; for as all such com-
pacts are mutual, so no one party can be under any
greater obligation than another. Hence, a condition in
favor of one is a condition in favor of all. This well-
kiiown principle was asserted by 'Sir. Calhoun in the great

• "Elliott's Debates," vol. ill, p. 312.

The War Between the States 147

debate of 1833, with the reniark that he presumed it
would not be denied by Mr. Webster; and it was not
denied by him. Hence any State, as well as Virginia, had
the express right to resume the powers delegated by her
to the Federal Government, in case they should be per-
verted to her injury or oppression.

But, it may be asked, were the powers of the Federal
Government perverted to the injury or oppression of any
Southern States? It might be easily shown that they
were indeed perverted to the injury and oppression of
more States than one; but this is unnecessary, since the
parties to the compact, the sovereign States by whom it
was ratified, are the judges of this question.^

^ See Virginia Resolutions of '98 : Kentucky Resolutions of "98
and "99 : the Virginia Report of 1800. etc.

CHAPTEE XIV

ARGUMEXTS AGAIXST THE EIGHT OF SECESSION

Having considered the arguments in favor of the right
of secession, it is, in the next place, proper to analyze and
discuss those which have been most confidently urged
against that right. Among these, none have been relied
on with greater confidence than those which are supposed
to flow from the express language of the Constitution.
This class of arguments shall, therefore, occupy the first
place in the following examination and discussion.

Argument PEoai "the Very Words" of the
Constitution

Xow this argument comes directly to the point. Let us
see, then, these "very words and avowed design of the
compact"^ of 1787, by which the right of secession is
repudiated and rejected. "The contracting parties," we
are told, stipulate that "the Union shall be perpetual."-
Again, the same writer says, "these States are pledged to
a perpetual Union"; quoting, as he supposes, the very
Avords of the Constitution. But, unfortunately, for his
confident argument, these words are not to be found in
the Constitution at all. They are evidently taken from
the old Articles of Confederation! Would it not be well,
if learned doctors of divinity would only condescend to
read the Constitution before they undertake to interpret
it for the benefit of their confiding flocks? Especially
should they not take some little pains to ascertain "the
very words of the compact** of 1787, before they erect on
its very words the grave charge of treason against their
"Southern brethren ?"

The Constitution, says an English writer, does "ex-
pressly prohibit the States from entering into any treaty,

^ "The Rev. Dr. Hodge on the State of the Country," p. 24.
- Ibid., p. 25.

The War Between the States 149

alliance, or confederation, such as the so-called Southern
C'onfederacT.'"'"^ This argument is relied on with great
confidence. It may be found in all the books, pamphlets,
and publications with which the opponents of secession
liave flooded the English public on the "American Ques-
tion."^ Yet. as it appears to me, it clearly admits of two
perfectly satisfactory replies.

In the first place, the Constitution, or the new "Articles
of Union,"' is obligatory only upon the members of the
Union. Xo one supposes that the States could, while
remaining in the Union, form any other "treaty, alliance,
on confederation." But their duty while in the Union is
one thing, and their right to withdraw from the Union is
quite another. In the articles of any partnership, whether
great or small, a clause may be inserted forbidding the
parties to enter into any other partnership of the same
kind, or for the same purpose. Indeed this is often done.
But who, for a moment, ever imagined that such a clause
would render the partnership perpetual, or forever prevent
any of its members from withdrawing from the firm ?

In the second place, the words in question were trans-
ferred from the old to the new "Articles of Union." Thus,
says the old Articles: "jSTo two or more States shall enter
into any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever between
Them.'"- Xow this clause was binding as long as the
Confederation continued. But did it prohibit "any two or
more States" from withdrawing from the Union, in order
TO establish "a more perfect" one ? By no means. It is,
on the contrary, perfectly notorious, that some of the
States did withdraw from that Union in order to form
the Union of 1T87. Hence, nothing but the blind force of
passion can render this clause more obligatory in the new
"Articles of Union"" or in the Constitution, than it was in
the old one.

Xay. if words could have made any union of States per-
petual, the old Articles of Confederation would still form
The siTpreme law of the American Union. For the thir-
teenth Article expressly declares that "the articles of this

'■ Liullow's •Historv of the United States." - Art. vi.

150 The War Between the States

confederation shall he observed by every State, and the
Union shall he perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any
time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such altera-
tions be agreed to by a Congress of the United States,
and he afterward confirmed hy the Legislatures of every
State." Yet, in spite of these words, some of the States
did withdraw from that "perpetual Union," and formed a
new one. The people of 1787 refused to be bound by the
people of 1778. They deemed themselves no less sovereign
than their predecessors. Hence, in the words of the
English writer above quoted, "the plan of course failed,
like all similar attempts to fetter future legislation."^

ISTo words, and no principle of law or Justice, could
render such Articles of Union forever binding on free,
sovereign, and independent States. jSTo thing but passion,
or brute force, could have compelled the millions of 1865
to bend their necks to the legislation of 1787 against their
will. The Union of 1787 owed its existence to secession
from a voluntary association of States ; and, being itself a
voluntary association of States, it could not escape from
the law of its creation. The right of secession was, indeed,
the law both of its origin and its existence.

The English writer, who argues so confidently against
the right of secession from the words of the Constitution,
does not seem to have been at all aware that those words
were borrowed from the old Articles of Confederation, or
that the Convention of 1787 had understood them very
differently from himself. The people of this country were
bound by the legislation of 1787, not by Mr. Ludlow's
mistakes and blunders respecting that legislation.

The right of coercion is sometimes deduced from that
clause of the Constitution which contains the President's
oath of office, and which requires him to "preserve, pro-
tect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."
This is, indeed, the great argument against secession from
the words of the Constitution. But it is a gross solecism ;
a petitio principii as plain as possible. For, if by and
under the Constitution, a State has a right to secede from
the Union, then the President is sworn to preserve, not

' Ludlow's "History of the United States." pp. 143-4.

The War Between the States 151

to destroy, this Constitutional right. Hence, when it is
argued that the President is bound to coerce in order to
preserve, potect, and defend the Constitution, it is assumed
that, in view of the Constitution, secession is wrong and
coercion is right ; which is very clearly to beg the question.
It takes the very point in dispute for granted. Such an
argument, such a fallacy may have satisfied those who
were passionately bent on coercion ; but, in the eye of
reason, it is wholly destitute of force. If a State had the
Constitutional right to secede, and did secede, then she
was out of the Union; and the President had no more
power to execute the laws of the United States within
lier limits than he had to enforce them in the dominions
of Great Britain, or France, or Eussia. The President's
oath of office requires him, not to usurp any power, but
only to exercise those which are conferred on him by the
Constitution.

Argumext From the Wisdom of the Fathers

An argument against the right of secession is deduced
from the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution. It
is supposed that men. who Avere so remarkable for their
.sagacity and wisdom, would not have undertaken to erect
a grand Confederacy of States, and yet have been so absurd
as to allow a State to secede from it. It is argued that
they could not have intended to astonish the world with
the "extraordinary spectacle of a nation existing only at
the will of each of its constituent parts. "^

This argument, which is urged by Judge Story, and
others, amounts simply to this, that the fathers of the
Constitution could not have been such fools as to make a
compact between the States. For it is conceded that this
extraordinary spectacle, this wonderful exhibition of
weakness, results from the doctrine that the Constitution
is- a compact between the States. The conclusions, says
Mr. Justice Story, "which naturally flow from the doctrine
that the Constitution is a compact between the States,"
"go to the extent of reducing the government to a mere

' Story's "Commentary on the Constitution," book iii, chap. iii.

152 The Wae Between the States

confederacy during pleasure ; and of thus presenting the
extraordinary spectacle of a nation existhig only at the
will of each of its constituent parts." Hence, in the
opinion of Judge Story, all that is wonderful in this
spectacle resolves itself into the most unaccountable fact,
that the fathers should have framed "a compact between
the States !" A thing which has been frequently done in
the history of the world, and which, as we have seen, was
actually done by the Convention of 1787. It is impossible,
exclaims Judge Story; we simply reply, it is a fact.

A learned doctor, in one of Moliere's plays, argues that,
after taking his remedy, it was impossible that his patient
should have died. But the poor servant, who was not
blessed with half the doctor's learning or ingenuity, was
weak enough to believe that the fact of his death was
some little evidence of its possibility. The question is
not what the fathers, in the opinion of one of the sons,
ought to have done, but what they have actually done.

The son in question, for example, is shocked and
astonished at the "extraordinary spectacle of a nation
existing at the will of its constituent parts." If this very
learned son had only possessed a little more wisdom he
would never have discovered, perhaps, this Avonderful
spectacle of "a nation" with "its constituent parts," or
subordinate fractions. He would, on the contrary, have
seen that the sovereign States which he calls "the contituent
parts," or the fractions, of his imaginary nation, are really
the units of a confederation. I am rather inclined to
doubt, therefore, whether such a son is the fittest of all
possible tribunals before which to try the wisdom of fhe
fathers.

After all, perhaps, it was no want of wisdom in the
fathers, but only the conceit of wisdom in ourselves, which
causes their work to present so "extraordinary a spectacle."
Indeed, if we infer the nature of their work, not from an
examination of what they have actually done, but frdm
their wisdom, do we not reason from our own notions of
wisdom? And are we not in danger of interpolating
their conceptions with our own devices? The better
method is to listen to the great teacher. Time, which

The AVar Betaveen the States 153

estimates their wisdom from the nature of their work, and
not the nature of their work from their wisdom.

The question is, not what the fathers, as reasonable men.
ought to have done, but what they have actually done.
Perhaps their wisdom, even if perfect in itself, was some-
times held in abeyance by the prejudices, the passions,
and the interests by which it was surrounded. But, for
the sake of argument, let us suppose that the new Con-
stitution was made perpetually binding on the States,
that the right of secession was excluded ; and then ask
ourselves, what sort of spectacle would such a work present
to the minds of reasonable men ? AYould it not appear
far more extraordinary than if the right of secession had
been recognized? Let us examine and see.

The scheme of a perpetual .Union, excluding the right
of secession, proceeded on the supposition that a perpetual
peace, good faith, and good-will would subsist among the
States. This was the idea of Madison. The predictions
of George ]\Iason and others, in which they foretold the
wrongs and aggressions of the Northern States, if armed
with the formidable powers of the new government,^
Mr. Madison just set aside as unfounded and uncharitable
suspicions.- Now, in regard to this point, we need not
ask who was the wiser of the two, George Mason or James
Madison, nor need we try the question by any imperfect
notions of our own ; for Time has pronounced its irre-
versible verdict in favor of the wisdom of George Mason.

Again, as each State bound its citizens to render alle-
giance to the Federal Government by its own voluntary act,
namely, the act of accession to the Constitution, so, if by
her own sovereign will in the same way expressed, she
may absolve them from that allegiance ; we can well under-
stand the reasonableness of the arrangement. But if she
may not secede or Avithdraw the allegiance of her citizens
from the Federal Government, then it would be impossible
for them to escape the crime of treason. For, although
the State should be driven by oppression to withdraw
from the Union, her citizens would, according to such a

^ -Elliott's Debates." vol. Hi, pp. 30, 146, 149. 156, 161, 164, 173,
174, .500. 2 Ibid., .-.30-.562.

154 The War Between the States

scheme, be indisvsolubly bound by a double allegiance.
Hence, if they should follow or obey their own State, they
might be pursued and hunted down as traitors to the
Federal Government. Or, if forsaking the State to which
their allegiance was originally and exclusively due, they
should adhere to the Federal Government, they would be
traitors to their own State, and so regarded. There
would be no possible escape for them. Xow, were such a
scheme wise, or reasonable, or just? Would it not, on the
contrary, present a monstrous spectacle of cruelty and
oppression? Can we believe that the fathers, in order to
secure the liberty of their descendants, erected such an
engine of tyranny? Can we lielieve that they intended,
in any event, to crush and grind their posterity thus
between the upper and the- nether millstones of the two
governments? But whatever they may have intended, or
designed, such is the horrible character of the two govern-
ments in one, as explained by the very learned son in
question. If his exiDlanation be true, then it must l)e
admitted that the fathers, with all their wisdom, first
constructed one of the most horrible engines of oppression
the world has ever seen, and then pronounced it a scheme
to "secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their
posterity." But I have too much respect for the wisdom of
the fathers to construe their work into any such tremen-
dous and terrific engine of oppression. On the contrary, I
believe that as the allegiance of the citizen was originally
and exclusively due to his State, and was extended to the
Federal Constitution only by a sovereign act of his State,
so, by a like sovereign act, the State may reclaim his
supreme allegiance. Otherwise the machine invented by
the Convention of 1787 would divide the citizen from
himself, putting the noblest and warmest affections of his
heart on the one side, and his highest allegiance on the
other ; so that, in case of a conflict betweeii his State and
the Federal Union, he must l)e inevitably lacerated and
torn by the frightful collision.

The fathers always admitted that the noblest and
warmest affections of the citizen would cluster around and
cling to the State in which he was born, and to which his

The Wae Betaveen the States 155

allegiaiieo was. at first, exclusively due.^ Did they mean,
then, that in case of a conflict between a State and the
Union, and the secession of the former, the strongest
affections of the citizen shonld be with the one, and his
supreme allegiance with the other. I have too much
respect for the wisdom and the goodness of the fathers to
impute so horrible an intention to them ; or that they
designed, in any event, to set the citizen against himself,
and rend him asunder by such a conflict between the
elements of his nature. I believe, on the contrary, that
it is the intention of the fundamental law instituted Ijy
them that the allegiance of the citizen should go with his
affections, and cling to the sovereign will of the State in
which he lives, whether that leads him into or out of the
I^nion.

''It is not easy,"" said one of the most sagacious of the
fathers, "to be wise for the present ; much less for the
future." HoAA"" true ! and especially with reference to the
institution of a new government ! Perhaps, if the fathers
had only had a little more of this wisdom for the future,
they would have more profoundly considered the great
question of secession, and settled it beyond the possibility
of dispute in the Constitution framed by them. If, for
instance, in the solemn compact between the States, they
had expressly declared that any one of the sovereign parties
to it might secede at pleasure, this would, it is believed,
have produced the most happy result. The known and
estal)lished fact, that the Union depended on the will of
its members, would certainly tend to beget that mutual
forbearance, moderation, good-will, and sympathy, with-
out which no federation of States is desirable. The wisdom
of the fathers might, in such case, have appeared far
less conspicuous to some of the sons; and yet it might
have saved the sons from the terrible war of words, and
deeds, and blood, by which the civilization of the nineteenth
century has been so horribly disgraced. It might have
appeared a most "extraordinary spectacle" in theory; and
yet, in practice, it might have spared the world the
infinitely more extraordinary spectacle of the war of 1861.

^ Sfe Th< FnlmtUfit . Nos. xvii. xviii. xix. etc.

156 The Wae Betweex the States

I shall conclude my reflections on this argument with
the following judicious observations of Mr. Spence : "It
would appear," says he, "the true policy of such a confed-
eration to remove all doubt, and carry out clearlj^ the
principles of its origin, by openly declaring the right of
secession. Had this been done from the first there would
probably have been no secession this day. The surest
way to end the desire for any object is to give unlimited
command of it. Secession has mainly occurred because it
was denied. How beneficial the consequence had it been
an admitted right for the last forty years ! In place of
the despotic use of political power, in contempt of the
feelings or interests of other portions of the country,
whether of the slave owners or monopolists, there would
have been all along a tempering , moderating influence.
Abolitionism, in all its extremes of virulence, has been
permitted by the Korth because the South was considered
to be fast. It might writhe under it, but it must abide.
But for this unfortunate belief, the intelligence of the
North would have said, 'If to gratify your passionate
opinions, you indulge in such language as this, addressed
to your fellow-citizens, they will separate from us ; we will
not have the Union destroyed at your bidding and pleasure.'
In like manner, when the manufacturers desired to increase
protection to outrageous monopoly, that intelligence of
the North would have said to them, 'Our sister States
shall not be driven from the Union in order to increase
your profits/ The same rule will apply to external afi^airs.
Texas would not have been annexed and beslaved, no
Mexican spoliations — no war of 1813 — no Ostend mani-
festoes need have defaced the history of the country.
Throughout the range of political affairs there would have
been present that influence S(? constantly absent — consider-
ation for others. The sovereignty of the people is a
despotism untempered by division or check. The denial
of secession has invited it to act despotically — to do simply
as it listed, regardless of those supposed to have no
escape from endurance. The more the subject is examined
the more plainly it will appear that, under an admitted
right of secession, there would never have grown up to

The Wak Between the States 157

dangerous magnitude those causes which now produce —
and that in so terriljle a form— the disruption of the
Union. Without tliose causes, had the feelings and in-
terests of others been fairly and temperately considered,
the Union might have existed as firmly this day as at any
former period of its history."^

Argument From the Opixiox of Mr. Madisox

In the Biographical Memoir of Daniel Webster, prefixed
to his works, Mr. Everett says : '"The opinion entertained
of this speech [the speech of 1833], by the individual
who, of all the people in America, was the best qualified
to estimate its value may be seen from the following letter
of Mr. Madison, which has never before been published :

MoNTPELiER, March 15, 1833.

My dear Sir : I return my thanks for the copy of your late
very powerful speech in the Senate of the United States. It
crushes nullification, and must hasten an abandonment of
secession.

Now on what ground Mr. Madison could have based
this opnion, at least in so far as it relates to secession, it
is difficult to conceive. The fundamental premise of ]\Ir.
Webster that "the Constitution is not a compact between
sovereign KStates," and which is adopted as the title of his
speech, was certainly not approved by Mr. Madison; for
this premise, besides being in direct opposition to the
doctrine of his whole life, is denied again in the very letter
in which the above compliment is found. Mr. Webster
has, indeed, very little to say against secession. His argu-
ment is almost exclusively directed against "nullification,"''
the point then in debate between himself and Mr. Calhoun.
But the little he has to say against secession is based on
the idea that the Constitution is not a compact between
sovereign States. Every argument, and every assertion
levelled by him against secession (and they are but few
in number) have no other than this false foundation.

' ■■American T'nion."' pp. 24.5-0.

158 The Wae Between the States

Hence, Mr. Madison could not have approved or applauded
the argument of Mr. Webster against secession, because
he regarded his premise as sound; for he was most pro-
foundly convinced that it was false. On what ground,
then, could Mr. Madison have admired this argument?

If the Constitution is a compact between sovereign
States, as Mr. Madison always contended it was, then Mr.
Webster admits, as we have seen, that the right of secession
follows. Thus this right is conceded by Mr. Webster to
flow from the premise which Mr. Madison always regarded
as perfectly and unquestionably true. How, in the face
of such a concession, Mr. Madison could have pronounced
the opinion that Mr. Webster's argument "must hasten
the abandonment of secession," it is exceedingly difficult
to conceive. The acknowledgment that the right of
secession flows from a position too plain to be denied
would tend, as one would suppose, to hasten its adoption,
rather than its abandonment. How then could Mr.
Madison have said otherwise?

The truth seems to be that Mr. Madison was more
solicitous to preserve the integrity of the Union than the
coherency of his own thoughts. He commends Lycurgus
for having sacrified his life to secure the perpetuity of the
institution he had taken so much pains to establish.^ For
the same purpose Mr. ]\Iadison sacrificed, not his life, but
his logic.

Is it not truly wonderful that Mr. Madison who, on
most subjects, sees so clearly and reasons so well, should
fall into such inanities about secession? From his con-
duct, as well as from his confession in The Federalist,'^ it
is evident that he considered it a duty to veil the idea of
this right, unless a proper occasion should arise for its
assertion. But how imperfectly his arguments and
opinions perform this high office of concealment ! He
would, no doubt, have done better if better arguments
against the right of secession could have been found or
invented. As it is, the ineffable weakness of his views, in
opposition to the right of secession, shows how high and
impregnable is the position which that right occupies.

I ji/jf. Federalist. No. xxxviii. - No. xliii.

The War Between the States 159

Mr. Madison greatly feared that Virginia and New York
would, in their ordinances of ratification, expressly reserve
the right to secede from the Union. This apprehension
is most vividly set forth in his correspondence with Mr.
Hamilton in regard to the proposed conditional ratifica-
tion of Xew York, from which it has been most confidently
inferred that neither Virginia nor New York did reserve
such right. But what Mr. Madison desired, and what
those States did, are two very distinct things. If we
really wish to know what those States did we should, it
seems to me, lool- at their recorded acts, rather than at
what Mr. Madison desired them to do. The conditional
ratification of Virginia was in direct opposition to the
wishes of Mr. Madison. His wish, then, however great
his influence, could not always control the action of his
own State, much less that of New York.

Hamilton and Madison both desired a strong "national
government." It was owing to their influence that the
first resolution of the Convention of 1787 m favor of such
a government was passed. But, as we have seen,^ although
that resolution was afterward set aside by the Convention,
Mr. Webster and Judge Story argue from its momentary
existence that the Convention of 1787 actually established
"a national government.'' In like manner, it is most
confidently inferred from the wish of Mr. Madison, ex-
pressed in his private correspondence, that neither Vir-
ginia nor New York expressly reserved the right of
secession in its ordinance of ratification ! Was Mr. Madi-
son's wish the law of Virginia and of New York? x\nd if
we want to know what those States actually did, must
Mr. Madison's wish pass for everything, and their solemnly
recorded acts for nothing?

Mr. Madison, as his correspondence shows, was extremely
anxious to prevent a conditional ratification of the Con-
stitution in New York, as well as in Virginia. He even
went so far as to advance the extraordinary proposition
that a conditional ratification would be "no ratification at
all,'* and would "not make New York a member of the
new Union." But after Virginia had i^atified the Consti-

• Chap. iv.

160 The Wae Betweex the States

tution on the express condition that its powers should
not be perverted to her injurj^ or oppression, and had
reserved the right to resume the delegated powers in case
that condition should be violated, Mr. Madison retraced
his steps, and freely admitted that Virginia was really in
the Union ! He writes to Hamilton at once, and to Wash-
ington, in order to do away with the impression that a con-
ditional ratification is "no ratification at all," and would
not make any State a "member of the new Union." In
regard to the conditional ratification of Virginia, he says
it contains "some plain and general truth that do not
impair the validity of the act."

jSTow, from these words of Mr. Madison it has been
strenuously argued that Virginia did not reserve the right
to resume the powers she had delegated to the Federal
Government ! It is true, as Mr. Madison said, that the
plain truths referred to did not impair the validity of the
Virginia act of ratification. No one has ever doubted the
validity of that act, or that it made Virginia a member of
the new Union. 'Nov could any one ever dream of doubt-
ing such a thing, unless he had previously embraced Mr.
Madison's most extraordinary proposition that a condi-
tional ratification is no ratification at all. But, while there
is no question whatever as to the validity of the act, it is
denied that it was unconditionally and eternally binding
on the State of Virginia, or that it could never be repealed
b)^ the sovereign power b}^ which it Avas enacted. Is it not
wonderful, then, that Mr. Madison's words merely assert-
ing the validity of the act in question, which no one has
ever denied, should be so confidently quoted to prove that
the act must, in any event, stand forever, unrepealed and
unrepealable, by the power by which it was ordained?

ISTow what is "the plain and general truth" to which
Mr. Madison refers as contained in the Virginia ordinance
of ratification? It is the truth that the powers delegated
to the Federal Government may be resumed in case of
their perversion, and that they may be resumed by the
authority which delegated them. This was a plain truth
then, and this is a plain truth now. It is, indeed, uni-
versally conceded. Xeither Story, nor "Webster, nor Everett,

The Wak Between the States 161

nor Motley has one syllable to say against this plain and
incontestalDle truth. Hence, if Virginia delegated powers
to the Federal Government, then Virginia, and Virginia
alone, had the right to resume those powers. This would
have been the case, even if no express reservation of that
right had been contained in her ordinance of ratification.
But did Mr. Madison deny that the powers in question
were delegated by the State of Virginia? If so, then he
denied a plain fact, and a fact, too, which he invariably
and earnestly proclaimed from the beginning to the end
of his career. Even if he denied that fact by implication,
this would have proved only his inconsistency, and fur-
nished another instance of the blinding influence of his
extreme desire to veil the right of secession.

Argument From the Opinion of Hamilton

"However gross a heresy," says Hamilton, "it may be
to maintain that a party to a compact has a right to revoke
that compact, the doctrine itself has had respectable advo-
cates."^ This, it should be observed, is said in relation to
the old Articles of Confederation, which are universally
admitted to have formed a compact between sovereign
States. It was, then, the opinion of Hamilton that a
State had no right to secede from a confederacy of States,
or from the compact by which they are united. If he
means to assert that it has no natural or moral right to
secede at pleasure from a compact, I have at present no
controversy with him. But if he means that it has no
legal, or Constitutional right to do so, then his own opinion
is "a gross heresy," which has but few respectable advocates
at the present day.

For, as we have already seen, both Story and Webster
concede that the Constitutional right of secession belongs
to States which are united by a compact. ISTow, after
such a concession, is it not too late to quote the opinion of
Hamilton to prove that the very inference conceded is "a
gross heresy"? Yet this is done by Mr. Justice Story.
In one paragraph he admits that if the Constitution is a

• ' The Federalist, No. xxii.

162 The War Between the States

compact between the States, then each State may secede
from that compact at pleasure; and yet, in the very next
paragraph, he proves out of The Federalist,^ that "even
under the confederation," which is admitted to have been
founded on a compact between the States,^ "it was deemed
a gross heresy to maintain that a party to a compact has a
right to revoke that compact";^ or to set it aside at
pleasure. Thus the very inference which he admits in one
breath he pronounces a gross heresy in the next, and proves
it to be such by the authority of Hamilton !

The doctrine which both Story and Webster have been
constrained to- admit is no doubt entitled to more consid-
eration than the naked and unsupported opinion of Ham-
ilton. This opinion seems, indeed, to have grown out of
his deep and intense desire to consolidate the Union, rather
than form his legal studies and knowledge. He was only
thirty years of age when The Federalist was written; and
his life, with the exception of four years, had been passed
in the active duties of the camp, or in his college studies.
Hence, however great his powers, his knowledge of juris-
prudence, and of the opinions of the learned, must have
been exceedingly limited, when compared with those who
have devoted their lives to this study. If, then, Story and
Webster are constrained to admit the right of a State
to secede from a confederacy bound by a mutual compact,
this may surely be taken as an indication of the real
teachings of the law on the point in question, and regarded
as a higher authority than the bare opinion of Hamilton.
This would be so, even if no progress had been made in
the science of international law since the time of Hamilton ;
but, in fact, there has been great progress in this science
during the present century, especially in regard to the
doctrine of compacts between States.

Enlightened by the principles of that doctrine, Mr.
Justice Story could not deny the right of one of the parties
to secede from such "a compact." Hence, he attempted
the more than herculean labor of recasting the whole
political history of his country, and moulding it in con-
formity with his wonderful hypothesis that the Constitu-

' Vol. i, p. 288. = No. xxii. ^ Vol. i, p. 290.

The Wak Between the States 163

tion of the United States is not a compact between States
at all. He first asserts truly that a State may secede
from such a compact, and then proves out of Hamilton
that his own assertion is "a gross heresy V "That gross
heresy," says Hamilton, "has had respectable advocates."
_ Mr. Justice Story himself is one of these advocates. Nor
is this all. The Convention of 1787 advocated the same
heresy; and, moreover, embodied it in their legislation.
Hamilton insisted in that Convention that the States had
no right to revoke the existing compact between them,
or to secede from it in order to form another, without
the consent of each and every State in the Union. But his
opinion was overruled by the Convention; and the States
did, in pursuance of the decision of the Convention,
withdraw from the existing compact to form a new one.
Mr. Hamilton may have been right, and the States may
have been wrong ; but, however this may be, their decision
established the supreme law of the land. The advocates
of the right of some of the parties to a compact between
States to revoke that compact, or to withdraw from it,
may not have been as respectable as the opponents of this
doctrine ; it is certain that they prevailed in the Convention
of 1787, and embodies their own views in the legislation
of the United States. That legislation should be our
guide, not the defeated opinion of Mr. Hamilton. Or,
at least if we happen to believe that legislation to have
been right, and if, in conformity with the opinion of Mr,
Justice Story, we happen also to believe that a State may
secede from a compact between States, may we not humbly
hope that this will not be deemed so "gross a heresy" as to
be treated as treason and rebellion?

Aegument Pkom the Very Idea of a Nation

The "very idea of a nation," it is said, is utterly incon-
sistent with the right of secession. But what is a nation ?
"It is a body politic," we are told, "independent of all
others, and indissolubly one. That is, indissoluble at the
mere option of its constituent parts. "^ Thus the whole

' "Rev. Dr. Hodge on the State of the Country," p. 24.

164 The War Between the States

question is begged, and the whole controversy completely
settled by the definition of "the very idea of a nation."

How great the triumphs of such logic, and how wonder-
ful the displays of such genius ! Setting out from "the
very idea of a nation" in the abstract, and, absolutely
unembarrassed by any other idea or knowledge in the wide
world, this argument just reaches, at one simple bound,
the conclusion that "as the Abbeville district can not
secede from South Carolina, so South Carolina can not
secede from the United States"; a profound view and
striking illustration which the President from Illinois
borrowed from the Preacher of Princeton.^

Aegument From the Purchase of Louisiana,
Florida, Etc.

It is, we are told, absurd to suppose that the people
would have expended so much money for the purchase of
Louisiana, Texas, and Florida, if those States could secede
from the Union.^ It is not at all probable that those
territories were purchased under the belief that they would
desire to secede, whether they possessed the right to do so
or not. And besides, it might be easily shown, that long
being before those States did secede, the government of

1 Bnlightened by the profound view of his reverend guide, Mr.
Lincoln with a naive originality all his own, might well have asked,
what is the difference between a county and a State? Is not a county
a little State, and a State a big county? One striking difference must
have occurred to him in the course of his reading ; the difference,
namely, that a State is spelt with a large S, and a county with a
small c. He must also have observed that a State is sometimes called
"Sovereign." But whether it is called Sovereign because it is spelt
with a large S, or spelt with a large S because it is called Sovereign,
is on« of the nice questions in the science of government which he
does not seem to have very fully considered or positively decided. He
had evidently discovered, for he tells us so himself, that a State is
usually larger than a county in the extent of its territorv ; a discovery
which, perhaps, led to the profound and original reflection that the
United States have been, and must continue to be, one State or Nation,
because their territory is one. It is to be hoped, indeed, that these
sovereign States or counties, as the case may be, shall continue to be
united, and that order, tranquillity, and happiness shall once more
bless their Union. But if so, must not something beside the one
territory help to produce the happy result? Have not simple con-
federations existed on the same territories ? Nay, have not some
twenty distinct nationalities long existed on the territory of Europe?
We may, then, hardly trust the reflection, however profound, that
one territory is in itself a sufficiently active and powerful cause to
produce one very big State, or county, covering a whole continent.

2 "Hodge on the State of the Country," p. 28.

The Wak Between the States 165

the United States had realized far more from them than
she gave for them, which was only a few millions of dollars.
Hence, even on the theory and the practice of secession,
the purchase was far from being absurd. On the contrary,
it was a highly profitable bargain ; and, in order to justify
it, or to show that it was reasonable, it is not at all
necessary to suppose that the sovereign peoples of those
States, with their Constitutional rights and privileges,
were also purchased with the pitiful sum paid for their
annexation to the United States. They were admitted as
sovereign States, with all the rights of the original parties
to the compact, and as such were entitled to the full benefit
of all its provisions.

Indeed, this ad captandum argument appears exceed-
ingly weak, if not absolutely ridiculous. Can any pur-
chases made by any parties to a compact alter the terms of
that compact, or make it more binding than it was before ?
If a State retained its sovereignty in the Union, and, conse-
quently, had a right to resume the powers which it had
delegated to the Federal Government, this right was not
affected by the purchase of Louisiana, or Florida. To pur-
chase those territories is one thing, and to sell the sover-
eignty of each and every State in the original Union is
quite another. If any State should withdraw from the
original compact, and thereby dissolve the Union as to
itself, then the purchase of such territories should be con-
sidered in the final settlement between the parties. But to
argue that they were indissolubly and eternally bound to-
gether because they made such purchases seems, to say
the least, a little ridiculous.

Argument Fkom Analogy

How wonderful soever it may seem, Mr. Justice Story
argues from analogy as follows: As an indivdual has no
right to secede from a State government, so a State has no
right to secede from the government of the Union. Now
this argument proceeds on the supposition that a sovereign
State bears the same relation to the Federal Government,
which it concurred with other States in creating, that a

166 The Wae Between the States

county, nay, that an individual, bears to a State. Mr.
Justice Story was far too learned to endorse so monstrous
a heresy explicitly; but it is, nevertheless, tacitly assumed
as the basis of his argument from analogy against the
right of secession. His whole theory of the Constitution
points, it is true, to the conclusion so openly avowed by
the Eev. Dr. Hodge and Mr. Lincoln, which views a State
as merely a county of one great consolidated nation; but
he never reached this conclusion himself, except surrep-
titiously, as in the above argument from analogy.

But even admitting this false conclusion as a postulate,
the argument of Judge Story is by no means as conclusive
as it appears to his own mind. For the right of an indi-
vidual to secede from a State government is daily exer-
cised by some one or other in every part of the world.
An individual can not, it is true, remain under the govern-
ment of a State, continuing to enjoy its protection, and, at
the same time, refuse to obey its mandates. But this were
nullification, not secession.

The only way in which an individual can secede from
a State is to withdraw from the limits of its dominion, and
this right is daily exercised in every part of the civilized
world, without being called in question by any one. The
Puritans themselves, by whom Massachusetts was originally
settled, withdrew from the government of Great Britain,
and quietly marched off, undisturbed by his Majesty, first
into Holland, and then into the New World. Now sup-
pose this right had been denied to them? Suppose fire
and sword had been used to compel the Pilgrim Fathers,
those meek and holy apostles of freedom, to remain under
the government they detested, would they not have made
the world ring with their outcries at the perpetration
of such injustice and tyranny? But they were allowed to
withdraw to the New World, and there set up the govern-
ment of their choice. The colony of Massachusetts Bay,
then, owed its existence to the acknowledged right of indi-
viduals to secede from the government of a State, and
enjoy one whose "powers are derived from the consent of
the governed."

The War Between the States 167

But a State, united in a confederacy with other States,
can secede from the government of the Union without the
necessity of changing its location. This makes a difference
in the exercise of the right, though not in the right
itself. It is, indeed, quite impossible for a whole State, or
people, to change its location, or abandon their homes.
If the Southern States could have done so, the exodus
would, no doubt, have been most gratifying to some of the
descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers of New England.
This is evident from the eloquent address of Mr. Henry
Ward Beecher to the excited thousands of Exeter Hall in
1863. In reply to the question, ''Why not let the South
go ?" he exclaimed, "0 that the South would go ! but then
they must leave us their lands." If they had only left their
lands and homes, and plunged into the Gulf of Mexico,
this great enemy of secession would have hailed the event
as one most auspicious for the spread, the aggrandizement,
and the glory of the race to which he belongs.

It would have appeared to him, no doubt, lilve the herd
of swine which, being possessed of devils, madly rushed
into the sea, and disappeared from the world. But when
they seceded, without proposing to leave their lands behind,
this made all the difference imaginable; being an out-
rageous violation of one of the great fundamental articles
of the Puritan creed, which, in early times, was expressly-
set forth by the Colony of Connecticut in solemn conclave
assembled. It was then and there decided that "the earth
is the inheritance of the saints of the Lord"; the saints
having, in their declaration, as is believed, an eye to the
beautiful locations and lands of the Indians. It is certain,
if we may judge from the speech of Mr. Beecher in Exeter
Hall, that some of the most influential of the saints had
a longing and passionate eye for the beautiful lands of the
sunny South.-

The truth is that every Constitutional compact, whether
between the people of a single State, or between sovereign
States themselves, forms a voluntary association; the one
between individuals, and the other between sovereign
States. Hence, if the right of secession be denied in
either case, and the denial enforced by the sword of

168 The Wae Between the States

coercion, the nature of the polity is changed, and freedom
is at an end. It is no longer a government hy consent, hut
a government of force. Conquest is substituted for com-
pact, and the dream of liberty is over.

No man has contributed more to this dire result than
Mr. Justice Story, who not only exhausted all the stores
of his own erudition, and exerted all the powers of his own
mind, to prove that the Constitution was not a compact
between the States, but also enlisted the great powers and
eloquence of Mr. Webster in the advocacy of the same
monstrous heresy. This concealed the great fundamental
principle of the Constitution, and kept out of view the
all-important truth, laid down by Mr. Mill, that the very
first condition necessary to a desirable federation of States
"is a sufficient amount of sympathy among its popula-
tions." Nor is this all. His theory of the Constitution
fell in with the corrupt and the corrupting tendency of
the age ; the tendency, namely, to deny the sacred obli-
gation of "The Compact of the CoNSTiTUTiOiSr." For
how can any compact be held sacred which is held not to be
a compact at all, but only the emanation, or creature, of
the sovereign will by which its restraints are abhorred?
May not the creator do what he pleases with his own ? May
not the one great nation, the one sovereign people of
American take some little liberties with the work of its
hands, instead of being scrupulously bound by it as a com-
pact between the States? Nay, may it not take some
little liberties with the rights of the States themselves ;
since the States, as well as the Constitution, were created
by its own sovereign will and pleasure? May it not, in
short, treat the States as counties?

It is possible, indeed, that no learning, or logic, or elo-
quence could have resisted this terrible tendency, or
stemmed the mighty torrent of corruption it continually
fed and augmented. But this is no reason why learning,
and logic, and eloquence should have favored its progress.
That progress was slow, but sure. All power slowly
gravitated toward the federal center, and was there con-
solidated by false theories of the Constitution. In the
towering audacity of that central power (assuming to itself

The Wae Between the States 169

all the glories of the one grand nation, it was gradually
forgotten that honor, and justice, in the observance of the
original compact, no longer regarded as a compact) and
mutual sympathy among the peoples it was intended to
unite, are the indispensable conditions of a free and happy
Federation of States; and for these sacred ties of "the
glorious Union" were substituted the sacrilegious bonds
of fraud, force, and ferocity.

It is no wonder, then, that secession should, in the end,
have been regarded as the greatest of all crimes, since the
Union was then held together, not by the mutual s}Tnpathy
or the conciliated interests of its peoples, but by "the co-
hesive power of public plunder." Mr. Justice Story, be it
said to his eternal shame, took the lead in constructing the
theory of that tremendous scheme of despotic power, and
the politicians of Massachusetts in reducing it to practice.
John C. Calhoun, on the contrary, lived and died in op-
posing all the powers of his gigantic intellect to its over-
whelming torrents, both in theory and practice.

CHAPTEE XV

was secession treason?
Introductory

The doctrine of secession consists of two propositions :
the first asserts that the Constitution was a compact
between the States; and the second that a State^ or one
of the parties, had a right to secede from such a compact.
The second proposition is simply an inference from the
first. Now, if secession is at all tainted with treason, the
crime must lurk in the one or the other of these
propositions.

Withdrawal From a Compact ISTot Treason

Is it treasonable, then, to assert that the Constitution
was a compact between the States, or .the members of the
Union? No one, it is presumed, will venture on so bold
an assertion; for, as we have seen, this was the doctrine
of the fathers of the Constitution themselves. It has been
shown, by an articulate reference to their writing, that it
was clearly and unequivocally the doctrine of Madison,
and Morris, and Hamilton, as well as of other celebrated
architects of the Constitution. Who, then, will pronounce
it treason,* or treasonable? The Federalist, in submitting
the Constitution to the people and in pleading the cause
of its adoption, did not hesitate to say, as a fact then per-
fectly well and universally known, that the Constitution
was "the compacf ^^ to which "the States as distinct and
independent sovereigns"^ were the parties. Did The
Federalist espouse treasonable sentiments ? Both Hamilton
and Madison, the two great architects of the Constitution,
most earnestly and eloquently recommended it to the
people in The Federalist and elsewhere as the compact

BETWEEN thirteen SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATES.
^ No. xxix. - No. xl and No. Ixxxv.

Til's Wae Between the States 171

Is that doctrine treason, then? Is there the least sign, or
symptom, or shadow of treason connected with that senti-
ment of the fathers ? Are those "untrue to their country"
who say, with all the most illustrious fathers of the Union,
that the Constitution was a compact between the States?
On the contrary, are not those untrue to themselves, to
their country, and to their God, who, in the midst of so
many unquestionable proofs on all sides around them,
can assert that the Constitution is not a compact? Is it
"the dialect of treason" to say that "the States acceded
to the Constitution?" In other words, is the language of
Wilson, and Morris, and Randolph, and Franklin, and
Jefferson, and Washington to be renounced as "the dialect
of treason?"

Is it treason to understand the Constitution as it was
understood by the great patriots and statesmen from whose
wisdom it proceeded? Is it treason to adhere to their
views, sentiments, and language? Or is it loyalty to
depart from their views, sentiments, and language, de-
nouncing them as the inventions of modern rebels? No
one can, or will, venture to answer this question in the
affirmative. Ignorance and passion may have done so in
times past. But who can read the history of his country,
who can behold the great fact that the Constitution is

A COMPACT between THE STATES BLAZING ALL OVER ITS

AMPLE PAGES, nay, written there by the fathers of the
Eepublic themselves, and then deliberately pronounce it a
treasonable sentiment? Can any man do so? Has any
man sufficient strength of continence for such an achieve-
ment? If so, then indeed must his front of brass, and
his heart of iron, forever remain an incomprehensible
mystery to all reasonable men. Nay, if any party or
majority, aided by the united strength of all their
countenances, should pronounce such a fact treasonable,
this would only prove that they must have been ignorant
of the history of their country. But. whether from
ignorance, or from malice, or from both, shall it ever be
the lot of American citizens to live in a land in which
truth shall be treason, and history rebellion ? Shall it
ever come to this — 0 ye blessed spirits of departed heroes

172 The Wae Between the States

and patriots !- — shall it ever come to this, that a dungeon
and a halter awaits the man who may have the most
devoutly cherished thy sentiments, and the most implicitly
trod in thy footsteps?

No ! it will be admitted that the doctrine of the fathers
is not treason. Whether that doctrine be true or false, it
will be admitted that it is entitled to the respect of all
who respect the founders of the Republic. Even if the
fathers did not understand their own work — a thought
which is itself almost akin to treason — it is certainly not
an unpardonable heresy to agree with them, or to adopt
their view of the Constitution of the United States.

Will it be said, then, that it is treasonable to assert that
a State may secede from a compact between States? If
so, then Story and Webster were both traitors; for, as we
have over and over again seen, these most admired ex-
pounders of the Constitution expressly concede that a
State may secede at pleasure from such a compact. But,
here again, even if Story and Webster were mistaken in
this principle of law, it is surely absurd to denounce such
an error as treason or rebellion.

Nor is this all. Precisely the same inference is drawn
by another great expounder of the Constitution, namely,
by William Eawle, of Philadelphia. The legal opinion of
Mr. Eawle is entitled to great respect. Mr. Buchanan, late
President of the United States, speaks of him as follows:
"The right of secession found advocates afterwards in men
of distinguished abilities and unquestioned patriotism.
In 1825 it was maintained by Mr. William Eawle, of
Philadelphia, an eminent and universally respected lawyer,
in the 23d [32d] chapter of his 'View of the Constitution
of the United States.' In speaking of him his biographer
says that 'in 1791 he was appointed District Attorney of
the United States' ; and 'the situation of Attorney General
was more than once tendered to him by Washington, but as
often declined,' for domestic reasons."^ Now, Mr. Eawle
wrote his "View," not as a partisan, but simply as a jurist
in the calm and impartial investigation of truth, having
no conceivable motive to reject the plain teachings of his-

1 "Buchanan's Administration," p. 88.

The Wak Between the States 173

tory and law. Indeed, as we have seen, he agreed with
Story and Webster in regard to the principle of law, and
differed from them only in regard to facts. Hence, if they
had not denied that the Constitution was made by the
States, they would have been compelled, like Mr. Kawle,
to admit the right of secession.

"The Union is an association of republics," says Mr.
Eawle. . . . Again, "we have associated as republics.
. . . But the mere compact, without the means to
enforce it, would be of little value."^ Having announced
the truth, that the Constitution is a compact between
republics, he drew. the inference from this which is ad-
mitted to follow by Story and Webster. That is, he in-
ferred the right of secession; just as if there could be no
question on so plain a point of law. "It depends on the
State itself," said he, "to retain or abolish the principle
of representation, because it depends on the State

ITSELF WHETHEK IT CONTINUES A MEMBER OF THE UnION."

Again, he says, "the States may v\^ithdeaw from the
Union, but, while they continue, they must retain the
character of republics," as well as comply with every stipu-
lation of the Constitutional compact. "... The
secession of a State from the Union," he continues,
"depends on the will of the people. The Constitution of
the United States is to a certain extent incorporated with
the Constitutions of the several States by the act of the
people. . . . Nothing is more certain than that the
act [secession] should be deliberate, clear, and unequivocal.
The perspicuity and solemnity of the original obligation
require correspondent qualities in its dissolution."

Fow this is the language of a man, of an eminent
jurist, who was the contemporary and friend of Wash-
ington. He lived before the rise of those new ideas, and
dazzling images of power, which afterward obscured "the
perspicuity and solemnity" of the act by which each State
had acceded to the compact of the Constitution. Was not
this man of "distinguished abilities and unquestioned
patriotism," then, right both in regard to his premise and
to his conclusion ? He took, as we have seen, precisely the

' "Rawle on the Constitution," chap, xxxii.

174 The Wae Between the States

same view of the Constitution as that taken by all his
great contemporaries, the fathers of the Constitution
themselves; and he only inferred from this view the right
of secession, which, according to Story and Webster, is a
legitimate inference? But even if he was not right, if
Eawle, and Story, and Webster were all in error as to the
justness of this inference, still were it not the very height
of absurdity to pronounce such an opinion treason?

If, then, any poor benighted son of the South was really
guilty of treason on account of secession, this must have
been either because he understood the Constitution no
better than those who made it, or because he knew the
law of compacts no better than the most celebrated jurists
of America? On which horn of this dilemma shall he be
hanged? Shall he be tried and found guilty of treason
for not understanding the Constitution better than Morris,
and Madison, and Hamilton, and Washington; or for not
knowing the law of compacts better than Eawle, and
Story, and Webster? If found guilty on either ground it
is to be hoped that his counsel will move an arrest of judg-
ment, that such distressine" ignorance was his misfortune,
not his fault.

Massachusetts and the Haktpord' Convention

The facts, proofs, and authorities going to establish the
right of secession are, indeed, so redundant, so overflow-
ing, nay, so absolutely overwhelming that many of them
have been necessarily omitted in the foregoing argument.
One of them is, however, quite too important and striking
to be entirely neglected. Hence it shall be introduced in
the present place.

The Virginia Eesolutions of '98 were submitted, as the
reader is doubtless aware, to the Legislatures of every
State in the Union. These Eesolutions contained, as we
have repeatedly seen, the very doctrine so eloquently
denounced by Mr. Webster in 1833 ; the doctrine, namely,
that the Constitution is a compact between the States of
the Union. This doctrine was, in fact, made the ground
work of that celebrated manifesto. Kow it is a remark-

The War Between the States 175

able fact that not one of the Legislatures, who replied to
the Resolutions of '98, called this great fundamental
position in question. No one at that early day, so near the
origin of the Constitution, seems to have dreamed that such
a doctrine was tainted with heresy, much less with treason.
Not a single Legislature seems to have imagined, for one
moment, that the United States, or the States United,
did not form a Confederacy, or that its Constitution was
not a compact.

In the answer of the Legislature of Massachusetts,
Mr. Story's and Mr. Webster's own State, by far the most
able and elaborate of all the replies to the Resolutions in
question, there is not one syllable or sign of opposition to
the doctrine that the States formed a Confederacy, or
that their Constitution was a compact between them. On
the contrary, Massachusetts, then and there, in her great
manifesto in opposition to that of Virginia, expressly
recognized the truth of that doctrine. That is, in con-
formity with the uniform and universal usage of the day,
she spoke of the desire of Massachusetts to "cooperate
with ite Confederate States";^ and also of "that
solemn compact which is declared to be the supreme
law oe the land."^ Massachusetts was not, then, one of
that mighty cloud of witnesses, composed alike of "friends
and foes," which Mr. Webster, with his great dark eye "in
a fine frenzy rolling," fancied that he saw in the air, all
uniting in the solemn declaration, as with the voice of
doom, that compact is no more, that Confederacy has
fallen, and that henceforth the sovereign will of the

ONE GRAND NATION, THE PEOPLE OF AMERICA, SHALL

reign FOREVER AND EVER ! On the Contrary, poor, simple-
hearted Massachusetts, of 1799, imagined that a compact,
that even a "solemn compact," not only might be, but
actually was, "the supreme law of the land," and that it
was under or by virtue of that solemn compact that she
•had, only eleven years before, "confederated" with her
sister States !

Nor is this all. Massachusetts continued, for some years
longer, true to the first great article in the creed of the

1 "Elliott's Debates," vol. iv, p. 563. - Ibid., p. 560.

176 The Wak Between the States

fathers. Indeed circumstances greatly favored her fidelity,
and deepened the fervor of her faith. The acquisition
of Louisiana, which added a vast empire to the Southern
end of the Union, produced a profound dissatisfaction
throughout Massachusetts and the other New England
States; causing "the glorious Union" to wane, and the
sovereignty of the States to wax mightily in their eyes.
"At an early period after the formation of the Consti-
tution," as Mr. Buchanan truly says, "many influential
individuals of New England became dissatisfied with the
union between the Northern and Southern States, and
wished to dissolve it." "This design," according to Mr.
John Quincy Adams, "had been formed in the winter of
1803-4, immediately after and in consequence of the
acquisition of Louisiana."^ The embargo and non-
intercourse laws, which were designed to bring England
to terms without the dire necessity of war, augmented the
already great dissatisfaction of New England, because they
affected her commercial interests, and thereby touched
her in by far the most sensitive portion of her frame. She
cried aloud for war ! She cried, down with all your
embargo and non-intercourse laws, and up with the flag
of armed resistance ! Impatient at the slow movements
of the South, she taunted her with cowardice, and
courteously as well as elegantly declared that the South
could not be "kicked into a war with England." But she
was mistaken; she did not fully comprehend the South;
the South is, perhaps, too easily "kicked into a war."

It is certain that the South in the persons of her two
young, ardent, enthusiastic, and chivalrous representatives,
Henry Clay, of Kentucky, and John C. Calhoun, of South
Carolina, responded to the loud, vehement war-cry of New
England. Their eloquence shook the nation. The spirit
of armed resistance was roused, and the war with Great
Britain proclaimed. But, alas ! this did not help the
commerce of New England. The remedy proved worse
than the evil. Her ravenous pockets, instead of being
filled with gold and satisfied, became still more and more
alive to the dreadful state of things, and, thereupon, she

^ "Buchanan's Administration," p. 86.

The AVar Between the States 177

endeavored to "kick the South" out of the war with Great
Britain. In this the dark hour of her agony and distress
she suddenly discovered that war is, at best, a most unholy
and unchristian thing; not to be entered on lightly, or
wlihoiit counting flie cost. She also discovered that, after
all, the number of her seamen, impressed by the tyranny of
Great Britain, had been greatly exaggerated (by whom?) ;
and that consequently the cause of quarrel was far too
small to justify so unholy and so unchristian, that is to
say, so unprofitable a war.

In the dark hour of her distress the glorious rights of
the States came out, and showered down their radiance on
all 'New England, like the stars at night. The sovereignty
of her own beloved Massachusetts, indeed, then totally
eclipsed the full moon of the once '^glorious Union," just
as completely as if Massachusetts had been ''the whole
earth." I speak from the record; from that secret, silent
record of the Hartford Convention, in which all the pro-
found dissatisfaction of New England with the Union cul-
minated; and into which her sons, in spite of all their
prying curiosity, have no. desire whatever to look. Mr.
Webster, for example, in his great debate with Mr. Hayne,
of South Carolina, in 1830, solemnly declared that he had
never read the proceedings of that famous Convention.
No wonder !

"Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise."

"Events may prove," says the Journal of the Hartford
Convention, January 4, 1815, "that the causes of our
calamities are deep and permanent. They may be found
to proceed, not merely from blindness of prejudice, pride
of opinion, violence of party spirit, or the confusion of the
times; hut they may he traced to implacahle combinations
of individuals, or of States, to monopolize power and
office, and to trample ivithout remorse upon the rights and
interests of the commercial sections of the Union."^ Now,
if we only substitute the term agricultural for commercial
in the above passage, how admirably will it express the

' Page 5.

178 The War Between the States

complaint of the South, which, for long years of endurance,
was treated with such imperial scorn and implacable
contempt by the States of Kew England !

"Whenever it shall appear," continues the Journal, "that
these causes are radical and permanent, a separation hy
equitable aiTang ement will he preferable to an alliance,

BY constraint, AMONG NOMINAL FRIENDS, BUT REAL

enemies, inflamed by mutual hatred and jealousies,
and inviting, by intestine divisions, contempt and
AGGRESSIONS FROM ABROAD."^ Precisely thus, and not
otherwise, reasoned the South in 1861 ; and asked for "a
separation by equitable arrangement," instead of "an
alliance by contrast" with "nominal friends, but real
enemies, inflamed by mutual hatred and jealousies." But
the great boon was contemptuously refused, because the
sentiments of JSTew England had undergone a radical and
total revolution. The reason is that those were the senti-
ments of New England in the minority, and these the
sentiments of New England in the majority. Holy, indeed,
was her horror of "an- alliance by constraint," when she
was the party in danger of being constrained; but no
sooner had she acquired the power to constrain than such
an alliance appeared altogether pure and just in her un-
selfish eyes !

The Journal of this Convention has much to say about
"the Constitutional compact"; and hence, if it had only
been read by Mr. Webster, he must have been familiar
with this mode of expression, which so seriously offended
him in the resolutions of Mr. Calhoun in 1833, and called
forth his fine burst of eloquence in defence of the rights of
that "noun substantive," the Constitution. He must
have discovered also that, in the opinion of Massachusetts
in 1815, the rights of sovereign States are at least as
important as those of any noun substantive in the language.
For, in the words of that Convention, the power of con-
scription is "not delegated to Congress by the Constitution,
and the exercise of it would not be less dangerous to their
liberties, than hostile to the sovereignty of the
States.^ ... It must be the duty of the State to-

1 Page 5. = Page 8.

The Wak Betaveen the States 179

watch over the rights reserved, as of the United States to
exercise the powers ivliich ivere delegated/'^

The Hartford Convention, towering in the strength of
its State-rights sentiments, continues thus : "That acts
of Congress in violation of the Constitution are absolutely
void is an undeniable position. It does not, however,
consist with the respect from a Confederate State
towards the general government to fly to open resistance
upon every infraction of the Constitution. The mode and
the energy of the opposition should always conform to
the nature of the violation, the intention of the authors,
the extent of the evil inflicted, the determination mani-
fested to persist in it, and the danger of delay. But in
cases of deliberate, dangerous, and palpable infractions of
the Constitution, affecting the sovereignty of the
State, and liberties of the people, it is Jiot only the right,
hut the duty, of such State to interpose its authority for
their protection in the manner best calculated to secure
that end. When emergencies occur which are either beyond
the reach of judicial tribunals, or too pressing to admit
of delay incident to their forms, States, which have
NO common umpire, must be their own judges, and
execute their own decisions."- Fow, if possible, this
comes more directly and plainly to the point than the
Eesolutions of '98. It not only sets forth the great
doctrine, it sometimes employs the very language of those
Eesolutions.

Having finished its work, and appointed conunissiouers
to lay the complaints of New England before the Govern-
ment of the United States, the Convention resolved, that
"if these should fail,'' it would be the duty of the New
England States to hold another Convention at Boston, on
the 3d Thursday of June, with such powers and instruc-
tions as so momentous a crisis may require.^ No such
Convention ever assembled at Boston, or elsewhere; for,
in the meantime, the great trouble had come to an end.
How, or by what means? Mr. Webster, though he con-
fesses ignorance as to the proceedings of the Hartford
Convention, is nevertheless perfectly ready with an answer

1 Page 7. 2 Pages 10-11. = Page 21.

180 The Wae Betwee^^ the States

to this question. In his senatorial debate with Mr. Hayne,
in 1830, he tells the world that Massachusetts gave up
all opposition as soon as the Supreme Court of the United
States decided the laws of which she complained to be
Constitutional; thus showing her loyalty under the most
severe and trying circumstances ! This was, perhaps, a
thrust at South Carolina, who, as Mr. Webster supposed,
stood far apart from Massachusetts in the heresy that,
in great and trying emergencies, "the States, who have
no common umpire, are to be their own judges, and to
execute their own decisions."

How little he knew the history of his own State ! Hence,
he could fondly imagine that Massachusetts had always
been willing and ready to bow to the Supreme Court as
the common umpire between the States, and proudly
pointed to her conduct in 1815, bending and groaning
under the burden of the laws, and yet loyally submitting
to the high tribunal by whom it was fastened upon her
shoulders ! The truth is, as we have just seen, that Massa-
chusetts had resolved to take that very emergency into her
own hands; to he her own judge, and to execute her own
decision. She eared, indeed, as little for the Supreme
Court, in such an emergency, as she did for the other
Courts of the Union ; Avhose decisions had been repeatedly
treated with contempt, and resisted with impunity, by her
very loyal citizens during the great trouble of the war.

Why, then, did Massachusetts submit at last? Why
did so great a change come over the spirit of her dream?
The answer is a very simple one. It is told in the printed
proceedings of the Hartford Convention. The story is
certainly not so well adapted to the purposes of poetry, or
of oratory, as the fine fiction invented by Mr. Webster,
but it has, at least, the homely merit of truth. Harrison
Gray Otis, T. H. Perkins, and W. Sullivan, the commis-
sioners appointed by the Convention to lay the grievances
of NcAV England before the G-overnment of the United
States, reported that they had declined to do so, ''because
they found, on their arrival at Washington, that peace had
teen concluded."^ That was the secret of the submission

^ "Proceedings of Hartford Convention," p. 33.

The War Between the States 181

of Massachusetts. The war with Great Britain was at an
end; the embargo and nonintercourse would, of course,
no longer vex her righteous soul; she could unfurl the
wings of her commerce to every breeze, and bring in
harvests of gold from every quarter of the globe. That
was the secret of her great-hearted loyalty and submission.
She no longer had anything to submit to !

Sidney Smith complains of "exegesis," that it spoils so
many fine sermons; not allowing the preacher to ramble
in his rhetoric, or to flourish at random, without regard
to the real sense of his text. The same complaint may be
urged against the simple truth of history. How many
splendid orations, and grand soaring flights of rhetoric,
will it not spoil for the people of New England ! How
many self-flattering and glorious illusions will it not
dispel !

"That their object was," said Mr. John Quincy Adams,
"and had been for several years, a dissolution of the
Union, and the establishment of a separate Confederation,
he knew from unequivocal evidence, although not provable
in a court of law ; and that, in case of a civil war, the aid
of Great Britain to effect that purpose would be assuredly
resorted to, as it would be indispensably necessary to their
design."^

This design, says Mr. Adams, he had communicated to
Mr. Jefferson, in 1809. Again, while President of the
United States, Mr. Adams said : "That project, I repeat,
had gone to the length of fixing upon a military leader
for its execution ; and, although the circumstances of the
times never admitted of its execution, nor even of its full
development, I had no doubt in 1808 and 1809, and have
no doubt at this time that it is the key of all the great
movements of the Federal Party in New England [and
that party was then in the ascendancy in New England],
from that time forward till its final catastrophe in the
Hartford Convention."^

"It is but fair to observe," says Mr. Buchanan, "that
these statements were denied by the parties implicated,

1 Letter of Dec. 30, 1828, in reply to Harrison Gray Otis and others.
- "Buchanan's Administration," p. 87.

183 The Wae Between the States

but were still adhered to and again reaffirmed by Mr.
Adams."^ True, it is but fair that their denial should be
known, and estimated at its true value. But who could
expect any men to acknowledge their complicity in such
a design? If, in the dark hour of their country's trial,
engaged in a war with the greatest nation upon earth,
they could conceive the idea of deserting her standard, and
even of invoking the aid and the arms of her powerful
enemy to make their desertion good, is it to be supposed
that, after the scheme had failed or blown over, they
would have pleaded guilty to such a design?

Nor is this all. What did they mean by appointing
another Convention to be held at Boston ? Did they mean
nothing? Or if they had any honorable design — any
design which need not shrink from the light of day — why
Jias it never been avowed by them? The truth is, if any
one shall carefully examine the proceedings of the Hartford
Convention, and the previous history of JSTew England
which culminated in that Convention, he can hardly fail
to perceive that the positive testimony of John Quincy
Adams is most powerfully corroborated by circumstances.
The conclusion of Mr. Buchanan appears perfectly true;
"that this body [the Hartford Convention] manifested
their purpose to dissolve the Union, should Congress refuse
to redress the grievances of which they complained."

Four years before the date of the Hartford Convention,
Mr. Josiah Quincy, an influential member of Congress
from Massachusetts, publicly declared the right of seces-
sion. The extract from his speech on the 14th of January,
1811, is hackneyed- but it is, nevertheless, significant of
what was then passing in the mind of Massachusetts. It
is also exceedingly significant, because it was uttered in
opposition to the admission of Louisiana into the Union
as a State. "If this bill passes," said he, "it is my delib-
erate opinion that it is virtually a dissolution of the Union ;
that it will free the States from their moral obligation,
and, as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of
some, definitely to prepare for separation, amicably if they
can, violently if they must." Nay, upon the purchase of

1 Letter of Dec. 30, 1828, in reply to H. Gray Otis and others.

The Wae Between the States 183

Louisiana, in 1803, the Legislature of Massachusetts passed
the following resolution : "Resolved, That the annexation
of Louisiana to the Union transcends the Constitutional
power of the Government of the United States. It formed
a new Confederacy to which the States, united by the
former compact, are not bound to adhere."

Thus, as we have seen, Massachusetts from the founda-
tion of the Federal Government down to 1815, held the
Constitution to be a compact between the States, and the
LTnion to be a Confederacy. In her ordinance of ratifi-
cation in 1788 ; in her reply to the Besolutions of '98 ;
in her own resolution of 1803-4 she most distinctly an-
nounced this doctrine. Hence, it seems impossible to
doubt the statement of John Quincy Adams,^ that the
Hartford Convention deduced the right of secession from
the fact that the Constitution was a compact between the
States of the Confederacy. This was a clearly legal
inference. Eawle, Story, and Webster all admit it to be
such. Thus the fathers, one and all, laid down the great
premise or postulate of the doctrine of secession at the
very foundation of the Union; and the Kew England
States, in 1815, deliberately drew the inference, and
asserted the right of secession. Yet these States, in 1861,
took the lead of all others in the fierceness and the bitter-
ness of their denunciation of secession as treason and
rebellion ! The first to assert for themselves, and yet the
first to persecute in others, this great right !

It is thus that Josiah Quincy, the Webster of 1815, as-
serted the fundamental principle or postulate of secession :
"Touching the general nature of that instrument called
the Constitution of the United States, there is no ob-
scurity; it has no fabled descent, like the palladium of
ancient Troy, from the heavens. Its origin is not confused
by the mists of time, or hidden by the darkness of past,
unexplained ages; it is the fabric of our day. Some now
living had a share in its construction; all of us stood by,
and saw the rising edifice. There can be no doubt about
its nature. It is a political compact.'' Is this the same
Josiah Quincy, or was it his son, who, in 1861, made him-

'■ Letter of Dec. 30, 1828, to H. Gray Otis, etc.

184 The Wak Between the States

self so conspicuous by denouncing secession as treason?
It is certainly the same Josiah Quincy. who, in 1811, was
called to order in Congress for asserting the right of
secession, and voted to be in order. How rapidly the
New England world turns upon its political axis ! In 1815,
as secession was the right of all, so it was the duty of some
of the States; and, in 1861, it was treason and rebellion !

Did the South Condemn Secession in 1815?

The South, it has been repeatedly asserted, condemned
the secession of 1815 as treason, and is, therefore, estopped
from complaining of the same sentiment in 1861. "This,"
it is urged, "may be said to be 7'es adjudicata. All parties
are committed against the right of secession."

Now, even if the facts were as alleged, still this would
be a one-sided logic. For if the South, in 1815, con-
demned secession, it was the secession which New England
had approved; and if the North, in 1861, denounced
secession, it was precisely the right which the South had
asserted. Hence, it is just as true that all parties were
committed for, as that all parties were committed against,
the right of secession.

If, as is supposed, the minority was, in both instances,
in favor of the right of secession, and the majority opposed
to it, this would have been nothing very strange or wonder-
ful. It would only have illustrated the saying of Aristotle,
which all history confirms, that "the weak always desire
what is equal and just, but the powerful pay no regard
to it."

But the facts have not been accurately stated. It is
true that the South, as well as other portions of the
Union, vehemently condemned the Hartford Convention.
No Convention, or assembly, was ever more odious to the
great body of the people of the United States. But its
proceedings were secret; and, till the appearance of Mr.
Adams' letter of December 30, 1828, its precise object or
design was not generally known. It may be doubted,
indeed, if it was ever condemned by any portion of the
South, on the simple ground that it claimed for the New

The Wae Between the States 185

England States merely the right to secede from the Union,
and to be let alone. It was, however, known to the South
that the New England States had insisted on a war with
Great Britain in order to defend and secure the rights of
their seamen. It was also known that, while the South
was engaged in this war, the New England States not only
failed to do their duty, but denounced the war they had
instigated, and the government by which it was carried on.
It is true that, by these proceedings, the wrath of the
South was awakened, and that she denounced them as
treason, because they gave "aid and comfort" to the.
enemy. From all that had preceded, how could the South
know, indeed, but that the Hartford Convention had
formed the dark design of appealing to arms against the
Government of the United States, and of joining Great
Britain in the war against the people of this country ?

Even if the South had known that New England merely
designed, in 1815, to secede from the Union, still her
indignation would not have been without just cause. For,
having got the South into a war with Great Britain, was
that the time for her to desert the standard of her country,
and leave the other States exposed to the full brunt of its
fury? The clearest right may, indeed, be exercised in
such a manner, and under such circumstances, as to
render it odious. The right of secession has, no doubt,
been made to appear treasonable by its association with
the Hartford Convention of 1815.

Far otherwise was the conduct of the South. She held
no secret Conventions. All her proceedings were as open
as the day. The United States were at peace with all the
world. It was under these circumstances that the States
of the South, each in its own Convention assembled, with-
drew from the Union, and asked to be let alone. But the
South was not permitted to enjoy the government of her
choice. On the contrary, she was subjugated, impover-
ished, and ruined with the avowed design to bring her
back into the Union ; and, now that she is knocking at the
door of the Union, she is not allowed to enter. 'What,
then, is left to her sons and daughters but to weep over
the inconsistency and wickedness of mankind; and, if
possible, to pray for their enemies?

186 The War Between the States

Thomas Jefferson on the Eight of Secession

Though Mr. Jefferson was not one of the architects of
the Constitution; yet has more stress been laid on his
supposed opposition to the right of secession than upon
that of any other statesman of America, especially by
foreign writers. We are gravely told, with the usual
information of such writers, that "Mr. Jefferson was, in
after-life, the foremost champion of States rights."^ We
are also informed that ^Tie would certainly have turned
away with abhorrence from the consequences to which
these [rights] have since been driven."^ This last senti-
ment is, perhaps, conformed to the general opinion at the
ISTorth on the same subject. But is it true ?

It is certain, in the first place, that Mr. Jefferson him-
self deduced the right of nullification from the doctrine of
States rights; not "in after-life," but in 1799, before he
was President of the United States. Mr. Everett, I am
aware, insinuates that Mr. Jefferson never favored the
doctrine of nullification. "Such, in brief/' says he, "was
the main purport of the Virginia and Kentucky resolu-
tions." The sort of interposition, indeed, was left in
studied obscurity. Not a word was dropped of secession
from the Union. Mr. Nicholas' resolution in 1709 hinted
at "nullification" as the appropriate remedy for an un-
constituional law, but what was meant by the ill-sounding
word was not explained."^ Now this statement is of a
piece with the main substance of that grand, swelling
oration of the great Massachusetts declaimer. It is utterly
devoid of truth.

In the first place, Mr. Jefferson himself, in his corre-
spondence, replied to the inquiry of the son of Mr.
Nicholas, that his father was not the author of the reso-
lutions in question. Mr. Jefferson says : "I drew and
delivered them to him."^ Nor is this all. "Two copies
of these resolutions," says the editor of Mr. Jefferson's
works, "are preserved among the manuscripts of the author,

^ "History of the United States," by J. M. Ludlovjr.

2 Ibid.

' "Rebellion Records," vol. 1, p. 20.

* ".lefferson's Works," yol. yii, p. 229.

The Wae Between the States 187

both in his own handwriting. One is a rough draft, and
the other very neatly and carefully prepared. The
probability is that they are the original of the 'Kentucky
Eesolutions' on the same subject."^ Let us see, then, the
very language of these Eesolutions, and the manner in
which they "hinted at nullification."

The first resolution is in these words : ''Resolved, That
the several States composing the United States of America
are not united on the principle of unlimited submission
of their general government, but that, by a compact under
the style and title of the Constitution of the United States^
and of amendments thereto, they constitute a general gov-
ernment for special purposes; and that whensoever the
general government assumes undelegated powers its acts
are unauthoritative, void, and of no force; that to this
compact each State acceded as a State, and is an integral
party, its co-States forming, as to itself, the other party;
that the government created hy this compact was not made
the exclusive or fi.nal judge of the extent of the poiuers
delegated to itself, since that would have made its dis-
cretion, not the Constitution, the measure of its poivers;
but that, as in all cases of compact among powers
having no common judge, each party has an equal
eight to judge for itself, as well of infractions as

OF THE MODE AND MEASURE OF REDRESS."^ So mUch for

the postulate.

The conclusion is in these words : "Resolved, That
. . . where powers are assumed which have not been
delegated, a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy;
that every State has a natural right, in cases not within the
compact [casus non foederis^, to nullify of their own
authority all assumptions of power by others within their
limits; that, without this right, they would be under the
dominion, absolute and unlimited, of whosoever might
exercise this right of judgment for them; that neverthe-
less, this commonwealth, from motives of regard and
respect for its co-States, has wished to communicate with
them on the subject; that ivith them alone it is proper to
communicate, they alone being the paiiies to judge in the

^ ".Jefferson's Works," vol. ix, p. 464. - Ibid., vol. ix, p. 464-5.

188 The Wae Between the States

last resort of the powers exercised under it, Congress
being not a party, but merely the creature of the
compact, and subject as to its assumptions of power
to the final judgment of those by whom, and for
whose use itself and its powers were all created and
MODIFIED," etc. Such is the language of Thomas Jeffer-
son ! Is it merely a modest "hint at nullification" ?

Some alterations were made in the Eesolutions, as penned
by Mr. Jefferson, before they were passed by the Legisla-
ture of Kentucky. But the first resolution above given
was not altered at all; it was passed precisely as it came
from the pen of Mr. Jefferson, with only one dissentient
vote! In the Eesolutions as passed by the State of Ken-
tucky, we find these words : "That the principle and con-
struction contended for by sundry of the State Legislatures,
that the general government is the exclusive judge of the
extent of the powers delegated to it, stop nothing short of
despotism — since the discretion of those who administer
the government, and not the Constitution, would be the
measure of their powers : That the several States who
formed that instrument, being sovereign and independent,
have the unquestionable right to judge of the infraction;

and, THAT A NULLIFICATION BY THOSE SOVEREIGNTIES, OF
ALL UNAUTHORIZED ACTS DONE UNDER COLOR OF THAT IN-
STRUMENT, IS THE RIGHTFUL REMEDY."^ Such is the

language which Mr. Everett so very modestly calls a "hint
at nullification" !

He must be a dull logician, indeed, or a partial one, who
does not see that both nullification and secession flow
from the great fundamental doctrine of the Virginia and
the Kentucky Eesolutions. If, according to that doctrine,
stated in the very words of Massachusetts, "the States,
who have no common umpire, are to be their own judges,
and to execute their own decisions," then most assuredly
they may pronounce in favor of either nullification or
secession. Any State may, it is true, bring reproach on
this right of sovereignty by the manner in which it is
exercised. I have, indeed, always doubted whether nulli-
fication was a wise, or judicious, exercise of the right of

' "Elliott's Debates," vol. iv, p. 571.

The War Between the States 189

State sovereignty. It is certain that Mr. Webster, as well
as many others, has pointed out so many inconveniences,
not to say absurdities, connected with the act of nullifi-
cation, that the right has usually been rejected with
contempt. But the exercise of a right is one thing; and
the existence of that right is another. A man may, in
his own affairs, judge unwisely ; but does that prove that
he had no right to judge for himself? In like manner,
it does not follow that a sovereign State has no right to
be her own judge, because she may judge unwisely. It is,
then, false reasoning to conclude that a State has no right
to nullify, because the act of nullification is full of in-
conveniences, or even absurdities. Yet this kind of
sophistry is precisely the amount of all the logic which
has been urged against nullification.

If a man, who has the right to judge for himself in his
own business, makes an unwise decision, shall the right,
therefore, be taken from him, and given to another ? Shall
his decision be declared null and void, and the decision of
some other person substituted in its place ? ISTothing could
be more unjust and despotic. Xor will any sovereign State
submit to be treated in a similar manner by any un-
authorized power on earth. The act of nullification has,
no doubt, brought reproach on the doctrine of State rights,
and especially on the right of secession; but, then, this
has been just because men have failed to think accurately
and profoundly on the subject. They have confounded the
propriety or judiciousness of an act with the right of the
party to do the act, than which a worse solecism could
hardl}^ be perpetrated.

ISTullification is, however, but indirectly connected with
secession. This right flows, as we have seen, directly
from the doctrine of Mr. Jefferson, "that as in all other
cases of compact, among parties having no common judge,
each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well
of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress."
To say that a State has the right to judge- of infractions
of the compact of the Constitution by the Federal Gov-
ernment, and also of the mode and measure of redress,
and, at the same time, that it has no right to decide upon

190 The Wae Between the States

secession as the proper remedy, is, it seems to me, simply
a contradiction in terms. ISTow the question is, was Mr.
Jefferson guilty of this act of glaring inconsistency, or
self-contradiction ?

He "would have turned away with abhorrence," it is
said, "from the consequences" which have been deduced
from the doctrine of State rights. In this bold assertion,
the writer had special reference to the right of secession,
which his history of the United States, as it is called, was
written to demolish. Hundreds have, indeed, attempted
to throw the great weight of Mr. Jefferson's authority in
the scale against the right of secession, by means of the
following extract from his works: "If to rid ourselves of
the present rule of Massachusetts and Connecticut we
break the Union, will the evil stop there? Suppose the
New England States alone cut off, will our nature be
changed? Are we not men still to the South of that, and
with all the passions of men ! Immediately we shall see
a Pennsylvania and a Virginia party arise in the residuary
confederacy. What a game too will the one party have
in their hands, by eternally threatening the other that
unless they do so and so they will join their Northern
neighbors ! If we reduce our Union to Virginia and North
Carolina, immediately the conflict will be established be-
tween the representatives of these two States, and they
will end by breaking into their separate units."

Now this partial extract, which has gone the rounds of
the civilized world, gives an utterly false view of Mr.
Jefferson's opinion. The context to the above passage,
which is sometimes permitted to accompany it, shows
that Mr. Jefferson really believed in the right of secession,
and only argued against the intemperate and too hasty
exercise of that right. "If," says he, in the sentence im-
mediately preceding the above extract, "on the temporary
superiority of one party, the other is to resort to a scission
of the Union, no federal government can exist."

How perfectly true ! If, for so trifling a cause, any
union of States should be dissolved, it would soon be re-
solved into its original units. The union would not long
exist, and it would not deserve to exist if its members

The War Betweex the States 191

were such fools as to resort to the right of secession "on
the tem]3orary success" of every party therein. But to
argue, as Mr. Jefferson does, against the too hasty and
intemperate exercise of the right is to acknowledge the
existence of the right itself.

In the Declaration of Independence, Mr. Jefferson said
"that long-established governments should not be changed
for light and iransient causes." Nor, however clear the
Constitutional right, would he have dissolved the Union
for such causes. But does he say that he would not advo-
cate a scission of the Union for any cause whatever?
That in no event whatever he would resort to the right of
secession? There is no such doctrine in his writings; no
such glaring self-contradiction in any portion of his works.

On the contrary, in consultation as to what the Ken-
tucky Eesolutions of '98 and '99 should contain, he wished
the following sentiments to be incorporated therein : "Ex-
pressing in affectionate and conciliatory language our warm
attachment to the union with our sister States, and to
the instrument and principles by which we are united;

THAT WE AEE WILLING TO SACRIFICE TO THIS EVERYTHING
BUT THE RIGHTS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THOSE IMPOR-
TANT POINTS WHICH WE HAVE NEVER YIELDED, AND IN
WHICH ALONE WE SEE LIBERTY, SAFETY, AND HAPPINESS."^

Is it not perfectly obvious, from this passage, that Mr.
Jefferson had not been so dazzled by the glories of the
new Union as to forget the immortal principles of the
Declaration of Independence?

Devoted to the Union, but still adhering to the great
principles of 1776, he mimediately adds that we are "not
at all disposed to make every measure of error, or of
wrong, a cause of scission." Could language more clearly,
or more necessarily, imply that there are measures of
error, or of wrong, which he would make a ground of
scission, or secession from the Union? Or could any
doctrine be more clearly asserted, than is the opinion of
Mr. Jefferson, that the States, and the States alone, are to
be the judges whether the measure of error, or of wrong,
which justifies her secession, has been filled or otherwise?

^ "Jefferson's Works," vol. iv, p. 305-6.

192 The Wae Between the States

The Political Cbeed of the State-Eights Party

The Virginia Eesolutions of '98 and the Kentucky Eeso-
lutions of '98 and '99, the former from the pen of "the
father of the Constitution/' and the latter from the pen
of the author of the Declaration of Independence, consti-
tuted, for at least fort}^ years, the political creed of the
great State-Eights party. They were, as every one knows,
the manifestoes on which Thomas Jefferson went before
the people, in 1800, as candidate for the Presidency of the
United States. They were also inscribed on the banners
of the party by which Madison, and Monroe, and Jackson,
and other candidates, were supported for the same high
office. AVere they, then, at that time, deemed treasonable
by the people, or by their leaders? Let us glance at the
record and see.

In 1800, Mr. Jefferson beat his opponent, John Adams,
then President of the United States, by a majority of
eight votes in the electoral college, or by a vote of 73 to 65.

In 1804, Mr. Jefferson, the champion of State Eights,
beat his opponent by the overwhelming majority of 162
votes to 14. In the Northern States alone, Mr. Jefferson
received 85 votes, and his opponent only 9.

In 1808, Mr. Madison beat his opponent by a vote of
122 to 47; and, in spite of the dissatisfaction of the N"ew
England States, he received from the whole ISTorth a
majority of 50 to 39 votes.

In 1812, he defeated DeWitt Clinton, a distinguished
citizen, and formerly Governor of New York, by a major-
ity of 128 to 89 ; receiving in the jSTorthern States only
40 votes to his rival's 80.

In 1816, James Monroe, of Virginia, received 183 votes,
and his opponent only 34; and more than one-half of
these 183 votes were given by Northern States.

In 1820, Mr. Monroe was elected over John Quincy
Adams, of Massachusetts, by the majority of 231 votes to
13. Two other candidates were in the field at the same
time, Crawford and Jackson, both of whom together re-
ceived only 11 votes.

The Wae Betaveen the States 195

This vote, however, can hardly be regarded as a test of
the popularity of the doctrine of State Eights, since this
was, in 1820, professed by all the candidates for the Presi-
dency. Yet this fact shows that the opposite party had
been so often and so completely defeated that it refused
to nominate a candidate. But James Monroe, the suc-
cessor of Jefferson and Madison, and Avell known as an
ardent advocate of the doctrine of State sovereignty, swept
the whole country, and carried everything before him like
a tornado. Henceforth all aspirants for the Presidency
bowed down to that great symbol of political truth and
power, the Virginia Besolutions of '98. Even Mr. Webster
approached them wdth evident signs of awe, and never
ventured to speak of them otherwise than in terms of
marked respect, if not of veneration. No living soul dared
breathe the suspicion that any one of their doctrines was
treasonable.

How, then, did it happen that those doctrines were
afterward arraigned by Story and Webster as at war with
the Constitution of the United States ? How did it happen
that, witliout the most distant allusion to the Virginia
Besolutions, under which so many battles had been fought
and so many victories won, the great orator of New
England had the audacity to declare that all the fathers
of the Constitution, that all the publications of friends
and foes, denied the Constitution to be a compact between
sovereign States? The foregoing brief sketch of the
progress of opinion in regard to the nature of the Con-
stitution would be incomplete without an answer to this
question ; without some notice of the causes by which so
marvelous a revolution was produced.

The Decline of the Doctrine of the Sovereignty of
THE States and Its Causes

Mr. Dane says: "For forty years one great party has
received the Constitution, as a federative compact among
the States, and the other party, not as such a com-
pact, but in the main national and popular."^ Now, as

^ Quoted in Stnry"s "Commentaries,"' vol. 1. p. 288, note.

196 The War Between the States

we have seen in this chapter, the above statement is not
true. The Federal party itself, with Hamilton at its head,
admitted the Constitution to be a compact between the
States. The State of Massachusetts, the great leading
State of that party, always held the Constitution to be such
a compact previous to the year 1830. She held this
doctrine, as we have just seen, in 1788, in 1799, in 1803 ;
and she continued to hold it until, in 1815, it culminated
in the avowed right of secession. There is, then, no truth
in the statement that for forty years one great party denied
the Constitution to be a federative compact among the
States. One great party, it is true, showed a strong dis-
position to deny the sovereignty of fhe States in the Union,
and to assert the sovereignty of the Federal Government.
But the doctrine imputed to it was not one of its heresies.

Neither Mr. Dane, nor Judge Story, who quotes his
words, is pleased to inform the reader that "the great
party," which is asserted to have sanctioned their own
heresy, was swept from existence by the other great party.
It sank so low, in fact, after the war of 1812, and became
so odious, that none was so humble as to do it reverence.

Nor did they inform the reader that the great leaders
of this very party in New England became, in 1815, when
in distress, the warmest of all existing advocates for the
rights and the sovereignty of individual States. They do
not even drop a hint that those leaders, those staunch
advocates of the sovereignty of the Federal Government,
were the first to insist on the right of secession; a fact
which would have detracted very much from the weight
of their authority against the doctrine of "a federative
compact among States," even if they had ever rejected
that doctrine.

History acquits the old Federal party of the monstrous
heresy imputed to it. Having been chief agents them-
selves in framing "the federative compact" for the States,
and having anxiously watched the States as, one after
another, each acceded to that compact, such a heresy, such
a perversion of the facts falling under their own observa-
tion, would have been utterly beyond their power. How,
then, and why, did the heresy in question raise its head in
the Northern States?

The War Between the States 197

This question is easily answered.

1. The doctrine of a compact is attended with one
great inconvenience; the inconvenience, namely, that if it
be violated by one of the parties, the other parties are
absolved from its obligations. This great inconvenience is
set forth by Dr. Paley ; to whose chapter on the subject, in
his "Political Philosophy," Mr. Justice Story refers. Now
this doctrine makes the stability of the Federal Compact
depend on the good faith of all the parties, which seemed
quite too frail a foundation for the Union. Hence, the
doctrine of a federative compact, which, for forty years
had been held by both the great parties of the United
States, was explained away, and the will of the strongest
substituted in its place. According to his theory, then, the
Union rested, not on the justice of the parties, but on the
despotic power of the dominant faction. He thus placed
the Union, by his construction, on what he conceived to
be a more solid foundation "than a federative compact
between the States." But this, as we have seen, was to
subvert the foundation laid by the fathers of the Union;
and, in order to make good his theory, he had to falsify
the whole political history of the United States during the
first forty years of the existence of the new Union; espe-
cially the views and the authority of its founders.

2. The right of secession had never been seriously con-
sidered by any party, so long as the Union was prosperous
and happy. But, during the period from 1803 to 1815, the
great leaders of Kew England, regarding their section as
grievously oppressed in the Union, revolved the great
theme in mind, and, for the first time in the history of
parties, deliberately asserted the right of secession. In
view of this alarming event, it became still more important,
in the opinion of Mr. Justice Story and other con-
structionists, to deny the doctrine of a federative compact,
from which, as he saw and admitted, so frightful a con-
sequence necessarily resulted.

3. This denial became the more indispensable, in Judge
Story's opinion, because Mr. William Eawle had, in 1825,
asserted the right of secession in his work on the Consti-

198 The Wae Between the States

tution. Mr. Justice Story alludes to the opinion of Mr.
Eawle, and, deploring it, he bent all his energies and
erndition to demolish the doctrine of a federative compact,
from which that right necessarily results. Thus, accord-
ing to his theory, the Union was to be hooped with bands
of iron, and not trusted to the mutual sympathy and good
faith of its members.

4. But, however great and commanding the influence
of Story's opinion, or view of the Constitution, it would
have been comparatively feeble if it had not been aided
by public events. South Carolina, feeling herself and some
of her sister States grievously oppressed in the Union, by
the tariffs of. 1824 and 1828, planted herself on the great
platform of State Eights, and nullified the act of Congress.
The indignation of the North was aroused. ISTullification,
it was said, led directs to secession, or a dissolution of the
Union. The Xew England States, which had only fifteen
years before advocated the right of secession, now led the
fierce crusade against its advocates. John C. Calhoun,
the great nullifier, was the mark of their fury. It was in
this contest, as every one knows, that the great orator of
Xew England, ]\Ir. Webster, put forth "the greatest intel-
lectual effort of his life,'' if not of the human mind. The
whole Xorth was electrified by his eloquence, and became
intoxicated with his fictions.

Much has been said about the N^orthern and the South-
ern theories of the Constitution. The true word is, how-
ever, the theories of the majority and of the minority.
For the Southern theory, as it is called, originated in ISTew
England; and, passing from minority to minority, found
a permanent resting place in the South. Yet it may, with
truth, be called the Southern theory, since the South has
always been in the minority in the new Union.

Mr. Webster lived to pronounce a splendid eulogy on
the virtues, the patriotism, and the genius of John C.
Calhoun, with whom he had long served in the Senate of
the United States. But the successors of Mr. Webster
have, for more than eighteen long months, held the bosom
friend and the peer of John C. Calhoun in prison at

The War Betweex the States 199

Fortress JMonroe, as if he were already a convicted felou
and traitor. Yet is it, as we have seen, his only crime, that
he sat at the feet of Thomas Jefferson, "the immortal
author of the Declaration of Independence," and there
learned the right of secession ? Shall the people, then, who
sang loud hozannas to the great master, follow the equally
great disciple with the cry of crucify him, crucify him?
Or shall it be said that they voted the Presidency for the
one, and a prison for the other?

CHAPTEE XVI

THE CAUSES OP SECESSIOlsr

Inteoductory

In the preceding chapters the Constitutional right of
secession has, it seems to me, been demonstrated. If so,
then, in the eye of reason, the Southern States are ac-
quitted of every offence against the Constitution, or the
supreme law of the land. But, however clear a legal or
Constitutional right, it may not be always proper to exer-
cise it. If the Southern States exercised the right of
secession merely because they possessed that right, or
merely because they were beaten at an election, or for any
such "light and transient cause," then they committed a
great wrong. Then, although they violated no law of the
land, they committed a great and grievous wrong against
the moral law of the world, by a capricious exercise of
their sovereign right and power. Hence, the vindication
of the Southern States in the forum of conscience, as Avell
as in that of the law, demands an exposition of the causes
of secession. It would require a volume to do justice to
this subject; and yet, at present, a brief sketch is all that
can be attempted.

The Balance of Power

From the foimdation of the American Union to the
present day the provision of its Constitution for the frac-
tional representation of slaves has been more talked about,
and less understood, than any other clause of that "sacred
instrmnent." One would suppose that if any one really
desired to ascertain the reason or design of this "singular
provision," as it is called, he would look into the debates
of the Convention by which it was inserted in the Consti-
tution.

In these debates, as reported in "The Madison Papers,"
the reason or design of the fathers in the enactment of

The War Between the States 301

that clause is as clear as the noonday sun. Yet, in all that
has been written by the Korth on the subject, there is not
even a glimmering of light as to that reason or design.
"Men make books," says old Burton, ^'as apothecaries make
medicines, by pouring them out of one bottle into another."
This has most emphatically been the way in which men
have made books on "the American Question"; and, in
the case before us, the bottles were originally filled, not
at the pure fountains of historic truth, but from the turbid
streams of ignorance, falsehood, and misrepresentation.
Yet, for three-quarters of a century, has all this stuff
been continually poured out of one book into another !
Accordingly, we find it in a hundred books on both sides
of the Atlantic, uttered with just as much confidence as
if the authors had some knowledge on the subject.

Thus are we gravely told, and with great confidence,
that "the weakest point in the Constitution lies elsewhere.
It lies in that truckling to the slave-power which is obvious
in it. It lies especially in that singular provision for what
is termed 'black' or 'slave' representation, whereby alone,
amongst all species of property, that in human flesh is
made a source of political power."^ N'ow, if anything
in history is certain it is that, after a protracted debate,
the Convention of 1787 agreed that population, and popu-
lation alone, should constitute the basis of representation.
The slaves were not represented at all as property. This is
evident, not only from the debates of the Convention of
1787, but from the very face of the Constitution itself.
"Representatives," says that document, "shall be appor-
tioned among the several States which may be included
within this Unions according to their respective numbers
[not one word is said about property], which shall be
determined by adding to the whole number of free persons,
including those bound to service for a term of years, and
excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other
persons." Thus, in this very clause, the slaves are called
"persons," and are to be represented as such, not as
property. Hence, when Mr. Greeley, in his "American
Conflict," wishes to prove that the Constitution regards

^ "History," by T. M. Ludlow, pp. 44-5.

303 The Wae Between the States

slaves as "persons/' lie quotes the clause in question. Nay,
Mr. Ludlow himself, when it suits his purpose, can recog-
nize the truth that the Constitution "never speaks of the
slaves as a property, but as a person."^ If, indeed, slaves
had not been regarded as persons, they would not have
been admitted into the basis of representation at all.

Now, did the North truckle to the South, in conceding
that slaves are "persons" ? Mr. Patterson, of New Jersey,
and some other Northern members, endeavored to ex-
clude slaves from the basis of representation on the ground
that they were "property" ; but Mr. Butler and Mr. C. C.
Pinckney, both of South Carolina, insisted that they were
"persons," that they were a portion of the laboring and
productive "population" of the South; and, as such,
should be included in the basis of representation on a
footing of equality with other "inhabitants." The Con-
vention decided that they were "persons." Was this
decision correct? Or was it, on the contrary, a mean
"truckling to the slave power"?

In the declamations on this subject it is usually taken
for granted by Northern writers, as well as by Mr. Lud-
low, that free citizens or voters alone are included in the
basis of representation for the North, while three-fifths
of the slaves are embraced in it for the South. Hence,
this is vehemently denounced as a "singular provision,"
as a "strange anomaly," as a most undue advantage to
the South. But the fact is not so. The assumption is
utterly false. By the decision of the Convention, and by
the very terms of the Constitution, "the whole number of
free persons," whether men, women, children, or paupers,
are included in the bases of representation. All "persons,"
of every age, color, and sex are included in that basis.
Hence Mr. Ludlow is mistaken in calling the clause in
question "the provision" for "black" representation. The
blacks, as such, were included in the general provision,
and ranked as equal to the whites. In like manner.
Professor Cairnes errs in saying the clause under consider-
ation "is known as the iliree-fifilis vote."" No such thing
as a "three-fifths vote" is known to the Constitution of the

^ Page .">]. -"The Slave Power," chap. vi.

The War Between the States 203

United States, and the name is the coinage of ignorance.
The three-fifths clause has nothing to do with votes or
voting. No slave could cast the three-fifths, or any
fraction, of a vote. The free blacks were, in most cases,
denied the exercise of the elective franchise. It was in
counting the number, not of those who should vote, but
only of those who should make up the basis of representa-
tion that five slaves were to be reckoned equal to three
white persons, or three free negroes.

Now, why was this? Had the Convention any rule of
vulgar fractions l)y which a slave was shown to be only
the three-fifths of a person ? And if they had, did not the
clause in question result from a mathematical calculation,
rather than from a "truckling to the slave power"? or, if
that was treated as a question of vulgar fractions, why
did the Convention stop there? Whj not raise other
questions of the same kind? Why not consider the
problem, if a full-grown slave is only the three-fifths of a
person, what fraction of a person is the infant of a day
old, before the power of thought, or of local motion, has
even begun to infold itself in him or her? The truth is
that the Convention of 1787 indulged in no such trifiing
with the great, practical questions demanding a solution.

The States were exceedingly jealous of "the sovereignty,
freedom, and independence," which they had expressly
retained under the Articles of Confederation. The Federal
Government claimed, on the other hand, an augmentation
of its joowers; a claim eloquently urged by the tongues
and pens of many of the ablest men in America. Hence
arose the great conflict between the States and the central
Power; which, from that day to this, has agitated the
minds of the Anglo-Americans. In approaching this
conflict, the Convention first determined, in outline, the
form of the General Government. It was readily agreed
that it should )3e a Eepublic, with a Legislature consisting
of two branches, a Senate and House of Eepresentatives,
a Judiciary, and an Executive. The next question was,'
what powers shall the States delegate to this General
Government, this grand Eepublic? . After debating this
question for some time, the Convention discovered that it

304 The Wah Betweeist the States

had begun at the wrong end. None of the parties were
willing to say with what powers the new Government
should be invested, until it was ascertained what share
they were to have in the exercise of those powers. Hence
the Convention found it necessary to retrace its steps,
and begin with the question of the distribution of power
among the various members of the Union. In this contest
for power each and every party, of course, claimed "the
lion's share.'' But each and every party could not have
"the lion's share." Hence the two memorable quarrels or
controversies of the Convention of 1787 ; the one between
"the large and the small States," and the other between
"the Forth and the South." Much is known about the
first of these quarrels, but the history of the last yet
remains to be written. Its very first chapter is still
enveloped in the most profound obscurity. I speak
advisedly, and with the proofs on all sides around me,
when I say that the Americans themselves have not studied
this first chapter in the history of the great quarrel between
"the North and the South." Let us look into it, then, and
see what it teaches.

In order to adjust and settle the two quarrels above
mentioned, Mr. Madison laid down the general principle
that "wherever there is danger of attack there should be
a Constitutional power of defence." ISTo principle could
have been more reasonable or just; since the object of all
government is to protect the weak, or those most exposed
to danger, against the aggressions of the powerful. The
Convention, without difficulty, agreed to the above prin-
ciple when only stated in general terms; but, as usual in
such cases, a great difference of opinion arose in regard to
the application of the principle.

The small States, for example, fearing lest the large
States should "annex" them, or swallow them up in some
other way, refused to increase their power in the Union.
They insisted that each State, whether small or great,
should have precisely the same power in both branches of
Congress. This would have placed all the powers of the
Federal Legislature in the hands of the small States. They
were willing, nay, they were eager, to possess them all;

The War Between the States 205

just as if they had not the least fear that they coukl ever
be tempted to do the least injury to the large States.
But the large States, not having this perfect confidence in
the justice of their little neighbors, refused to entrust them
with the supreme control and destiny of the Union. Hence
they refused "the lion's share" to the small States. They
contended, however, for this share for themselves. They
contended that each State should, in each branch of the
Federal Legislature, have a power exactly proportioned to
its size or population; an arrangement w^hich would have
given the absolute control of the whole government of
the thirteen States to three States alone. Yet those three
States (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia),
with a perfect unanimity and a burning zeal, contended
for this supreme dominion in the new Union. The small
States, till then equal in Constitutional power with the
large ones, resented this as a design to degrade and enslave
them. This contest was the most obstinate and violent one
of the Convention of 1787. "The truth is," said Alexander
Hamilton, in regard to this very quarrel, "it is a contest
for power, not for liberty." Each party, in its eagerness
to grasp the supreme power, neglected the rights and
interests of the other.

This violent contest, which threatened to break up the
Convention and blast all hope of a "more perfect Union,"
was finally settled by one of "the compromises of the Con-
stitution." It was agreed that the States should retain
their equality in the Senate, each having two representa-
tives in that body, and that they should be represented in
the other branch of Congress in proportion to their popu-
lations. Thus the small States controlled the Senate, and
the large ones the House of Representatives. Hence
neither party could oppress the other. As no law could
be passed without the concurrence of both Houses of Con-
gress, so it must obtain the consent of the small States in
the one, and of the large States in the other. Each class
of States had a check upon the power of the other. Thus,
where "there was a danger of attack," there was, on both
sides, given "Constitutional power of defence." This was,
in deed as well as in word, to "establish and ordain

306 The Wae Between" the States

liberty." Hence the most violent contest of the Convention
of 1787 ceased to agitate the bosom of the new Union.
This admirable arrangement was proposed by Oliver Ells-
worthy of Connecticut, and recommended on the ground
that, in a Eepublic, it is always necessary to protect the
minority against the tyranny of the majority.

The same principles and policy governed the Conven-
tion in its attempt to adjust and settle the great antago-
nism between the ISTorth and South. Mr. Madison was
so deeply impressed with the importance of arming each
of these sections with a defensive power against the other,
that he proposed "the numbers of free white inhabitants"
as the basis of representation in one House of Congress,
and the whole population, including blacks as well as
whites, as the basis of representation in the other. This
distribution of power would have given the North a
majority in one branch of the Legislature, and the South
a majority in the X)ther. But the proposition failed. Mr.
Madison did not urge it, indeed, because, as he said, it
presented a cause of quaiTel which was but too apt to arise
of itself.

After the States were made equal in the Senate, each
having two representatives in that body, the North had
the entire control of it. As there were eight Northern
States (Delaware was then considered a Northern State),
and only five Southern States, so the North had a majority
in the Senate of 16 to 10. Hence, if the South was to
have any defensive power at all it should have had a
majority of representatives in the other branch of Congress.
Accordingly, Southern members insisted on the full repre-
sentation of the whole population of the South, as well as
of the North, in order that their section might have a
majority in one branch of the common Legislature. The
North, on the contrary, insisted that the slaves should be
entirely excluded from the basis of representation; which
would have given that section a decided majority in both
branches of Congress. Thus, while the South contended
for a power of self-defence or protection, the North aimed
at no less than absolute control and dominion. The South
would not submit.

The Wai! Between the States '^IO?

The North and the South were then, as they afterward
appeared to De Tocqneville, "more like hostile nations,
than rival parties, under one government." The fierce con-
test for power between them resulted in the compromise
of the three-fifths clause of the Constitution. In proposing
tliis clause, Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, said it could not
be justified on principle, whether property or population
were regarded as the basis of representation, but that it
was deemed "necessary as a compromise between the North
and the South." As such it was seconded by Mr. C. C.
Pinckney, of South Carolina, and as such it was adopted
by the Convention. This clause was, then, a compromise,
not between abstract metaphysical principles of govern-
ment, but between the opposite and conflicting claims of
the two rival sections. Did the North, then, "truckle to
the slave power"? It is certain that she grasped at and
gained a majority in both branches of the common Legis-
lature. For, in spite of the clause in question, the North
had a majority of 36 to 39 in the House of Representatives,
as well as of 16 to 10 in the Senate; a share which cer-
tainly ought to have satisfied any ordinary lion.

But it is the fate of a democracy to be governed more by
words than by ideas, more by "telling cries" than by
truth. The cry has always been that the slaves, who had
no wills of their own, were represented in Congress; and
that this "singular provision," this "strange anomaly,"
had resulted from a base "truckling to the slave power."
But for this provision, says Professor Cairnes,^ there
seemed to be nothing in the Constitution "which was not
calculated to give to numbers, wealth, and intelligence
their due share in the government of the country." Did
the general clause, then, which places idiots, paupers, free
negroes, and infants of all ages, in the basis of representa-
tion, provide for nothing but a representation of "the
intelligence and wealth of the country"? The truth is
that none of these clauses were represented in Congress;
they were merely considered in the difficult question of
the distribution of power among the States and the
sections. The only persons really represented were the

' "The Slave Power," p. 164.

308 The War Between the States

voters, who had the legal right to choose their own repre-
sentatives. It was in this way, and in this way alone,
that the Convention sought to secure a representation of
the "wealth and intelligence" of the country. But who
cared for the truth? The telling cry, that slaves were
represented in Congress, inflamed the passions of the
North, and served the purpose of demagogues infinitely
better than a thousand truths. Hence the world has been
filled with clamors about "the slave representation of the
South."

The deceivers are, however, careful to conceal the fact
that all classes of "persons," except the slaves, are reckoned
at their full value in constituting the basis of representa-
tion. The women and children of the North alone, many
of whom were born in foreign countries and had never
been naturalized in America, have been the source of far
greater political power than that which has resulted from
the whole population of the South. Is it not much nearer
to the truth, then, to say that the South has been governed
by the women and children of the North, than that "the
North has been governed by the slaves of the South" ?

Immense, indeed, has been the advantage of the clause
in question to the South ! Only let Mr. Ludlow, or one
of his school, estimate this advantage, and it is sufficient
to astonish the world ! Is gives to "every poor white"
at the South, "however ignorant and miserable," "ten
times the political power of the Northerner, be he never so
steady, never so wealthy, never so able."^ How wonderful
the disparity ! And, considering that "all men are created
equal," how infinitely more wonderful that the wealthy and
the able Northerner should have so long and so patiently
submitted to such an amazing inequality ! What ! The
rich Northerner, the merchant prince, or the great lord
of the loom, only the one-tenth part of the political power
of the "poor white" at the South ! Is it possible ? Mr.
Ludlow proves the whole thing by figures; and "figures,"
it is said, "can not lie." Let us see, then, this wonderful
proof of the wonderful fact. "Suppose," says Mr. Ludlow,
"300,000 be the figures of population required to return a

^ "History/' P- -^^-

The War Betweex the States 209

representative, then, whilst 300,000 freemen of the North
are required for the purpose, 30,000 Southerners, owning
collectively 450,000 slaves, or 15 on an average (many
plantations employing hundreds) are their equals politic-
ally, and every 'poor white,^ however ignorant and miser-
able, has his vanity gratified by standing at the ballot-box
the equal of his richest slaveholding neighbor, whilst each
of them is equally invested with ten times the political
power of the N'orthemer, be he never so steady, never so
wealthy, and never so able." But he must, indeed, have
been a most "ignorant and miserable" white, if he could
have had his vanity gratified, or his judgment swayed, by
any such logical process or conclusion. This specimen of
logic, or rather of legerdemain, only assumes that none but
"the 30,000 Southerners," with their "450,000 slaves, or
fifteen on an average," are included in the basis of repre-
sentation. But since, in fact, all persons are included in
that basis, Mr. Ludlow should have taken some little pains
to explain to his poor ignorant readers how it is possible
for eight millions of whites to own only four millions of
blacks, and yet for each white to own, "on an average," as
man}^ as "fifteen slaves."

It would seem, without much calculation, that, in such
a case, there could be only one slave to every two whites.
If so, then, if the slaves had been regarded as whole
"persons," the Southerner would have had only one and
a half times the power of the ISTortherner. But as, in fact,
the slave was counted as little more than the half of a
person, so the Southerner possessed only a little more
than one and a quarter times as much political power as
his Northern neighbor. There was, then, no reason why
the vanity of the poor, ignorant white of the South should
have been so highly gratified, nor why the pride of the rich
na])ob of the ISTorth should have been so deeply wounded.

But this whole way of viewing the subject is, in reality,
perfectly puerile. What lias the political power of the indi-
vidual to do with such a question? There is the broad
fact, acknowledged by all the parties and all sections, that,
at the time the Constitution was formed, the South was
superior to the ISTorth both in wealth and population.

-210 The Wae Between the States

Hence, if either wealth or po2)ulation had been made the
basis of representation, and fairly carried out in practice,
the South would have had the majority in one branch of
Congress. As it was, however, the jSTorth resolutely fought
for and secured the majority in both branches thereof.
Was not this, then, sufficient to gratify the pride of the
North, as well to humble that of the South ?

Suppose that in a society of ten millions of people, eight
millions are united by one interest, and the remaining two
millions by another interest. Suppose, again, that in order
to get the two millions to enter into such a society, each
individual of them had been allowed two votes, or twice as
much power as an individual of the eight millions. Would
this render the two millions secure? AYould this give the
minority a "defensive power" against the majority?
"Ignorant and miserable,'"' indeed, must be the individual
in such a minority, if his vanity could be gratified by the
possession of twice as much power as an individual of the
majority, while that majority had the power to rob him
of both his purse and his goocl name.

The only strange thing in the transaction is, why the
South should have consented to enter into so unequal a
union with the North; why she should have entrusted her
rights, her interests, her honor, her glory, and her whole
destiny to the care and keeping of a foreign and hostile
majority. This seems the more wonderful, because, at
that time, every statesman in America regarded nothing
as more certain than the tyranny of the majority. "Com-
plaints are everywhere heard," said Mr. Madison, in The
Federalist, "from our most considerate and virtuous citi-
zens . . . that measures are too often decided, not
according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the
minor party, but by the superior force of an interested
and overbearing majority."^

It was the grand object of the Convention of 1787 to
correct this tendency, this radical vice, if not this in-
curable evil of all democratic republics. The evils under
which the country labors, it was said in that Convention,
are, on all hands, "traced to the turbulence and violence of

1 No. X.

The War Between the States 811

democracy/' to the injustice and tyranny of the majority.
"To secure the pul)lic good, and private rights," said The
Federalist, '^'against the danger of such a faction [i. e., of
such ''an interested and overbearing majority"] , and at the
same time to preserve the spirit and the form of a popular
government, is then the great object to which our inquiries
are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratuin,
by which alone this form of government can be rescued
from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored,
and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of
mankind."^

Did the South, then, with her eyes open, willingly put
her neck in the yoke of such a majority? If, as every
Southern statesman knew perfectly well, "it is of great
importance in a repul)lic to guard one part of society
against the injustice of another part,"- did the South
really fail to clemand such a safeguard? Did she place
herself under the rule of the Xorth, without taking any
security for her protection, without claiming any "Con-
stitutional power of defence" ? ISTothing was further from
her thoughts. If she had been seduced into the Union by
the idea, by the immense advantage, that each of her
citizens would have a little more power in one branch of
Congress than those of the Xorth, she would have been
the weakest and most contemptil)le of creatures.

The citizen of a small State, such as Delaware or Ehode
Island, might have had ten, or twenty, or thirty times
the power in the other House of Congress, which a citizen
of Pennsylvania or Virginia possessed ; and yet this would
not have satisfied him unless the small States could have
controlled that branch of the Legislature. This control of
the Senate was demanded for the small States, as one of
the indispensable conditions of Union, and this demand
was conceded to them ; in order that the minority might,
in this instance, enjoy that freedom, and independence,
which it had resolutely refused to hold at the mercy of the
majority.

By all the principles, then, of the Convention of 1T87,
by the great object for which that Convention assembled,

^ The Federalist, No. x, - Ibid.

312 The Wae Between the States

by. the very nature and design of all Constitutional
republics, they were bound to protect the minority against
the majority. They were, especially, bound to protect the
South against the North; the weaker and the richer sec-
tions against the stronger and the more rapacious. Ac-
cordingly, this was the grand object of the Convention.
The design was good, but the execution was bad. The
South insisted on the three-fifths clause, and some North-
ern members resisted its enactment; because it was be-
lieved, on both sides, that this would ultimately give the
South a majority in the House of Eepresentatives. It
would, as every one knew, give the North the majority
at the outset; but population was, before the adoption of
the new Union, so much more rapidly increasing at the
South than at the North, that the Convention believed
that the South would soon gain the ascendancy in the
lower House of Congress. The debates of the Conven-
tion bear ample and overwhelming testimony to the
prevalence of this belief. The speeches of Madison, Mason,
Pinckney, Butler, and others from the South, as well as
of Morris, King, Wilson, and other from the North, con-
clusively show that the Convention intended to allow the
South the prospect of a majority in one branch of Con-
gress. Such was the object and design of the three-fifths
clause. Such was the reason of the Convention for ad-
mitting a fraction of the slave population into the basis
of representation. From this point of view, that provision
appears as reasonable and just to every thinking man, as
from any other it seems strange, singular, anomalous. It
was, as Eufus King, of Massachusetts, declared in the
Convention, clue to the South, as a Constitutional power
of defence, or protection, in the new Union.

This "singular provision," then, about which so much
has been said and so little known, did, according to the
design of its authors, lie at the very foundation of the
Constitution of the United States. Neither the large
States nor the small States, neither the North nor the
South, would agree to enlarge the powers of the common
government, until they could first see how those powers
were to be distributed among themselves as the principal

The Wae Between the States 213

parties to "the compact of the Constitution." Neither the
North nor the South would, for one moment, have dreamed
of entering into the new Union, if it had believed that the
other would continue to have a majority in both branches
of the Federal Legislature. Neither Avould have consented
thus to hold its rights and interests at the mercy of the
other. Each was, as the debates shoAv, perfectly willing to
hold the reins of empire and dominion over the other. But
while each was thus perfectly willing to rule, it had some
little objection against being ruled. It could easily trust
itself, but not its rival, with the control of the supreme
power, and it was, no doubt, amply prepared to bear with
becoming fortitude any hardship or danger which might
result to its ally from such an arrangement in its own
favor. Hence the absolute necessity of the compromise in
question. On no other terms, or conditions, could the new
Union, with its vastly augmented powers, have arisen
between the two great sections, which were so violently
agitated and repelled by similar electricities. That "com-
promise," then, that "singular provision," that partial
admission of slaves in the basis of representation was
introduced and enacted to adjust the balance of power
between the North and the South. It was one of the
fundamental principles of the Constitution, without which
"the more perfect Union" could not have been formed
between the sections.

The three-fifths clause or compromise, then, intended to
give the one section, as well as the other, a defensive power
in the new Union, was absolutely indispensable to the
formation of that Union. Such a defensive power was,
indeed, deemed by a majority of the fathers of the Con-
stitution, absolutely indispensable to the safety, freedom,
and independence of each of the sections in the Union.
Yet, however strange it may seem, no public man in
America has, from that da}^ to this, taken the pains to
make himself acquainted with the reason and design of
that fundamental provision of the Constitution of the
United States !

The author of the "American Conflict" regards slaves
as "human beings" ; and quotes the • clause in question,

214 The War Betweex the States

"three-fifths of all other persons/' to prove that the Con-
stitution regards them in the same light. Why, then, says
he, were they not represented "like other hmiian beings,
like women and children, and other persons, ignorant and
hmiible, and powerless, like themselves?" The answer is
very easy. Although the Convention did, as their pro-
ceedings show, adopt population as the basis of repre-
sentation ; yet was the majority more bent on the possession
of power, than on the preservation of their logical con-
sistency. If, instead of compromising the difficulty, the
vSouth had persisted in pushing the principle adopted by
the Convention to its logical conclusion, then would the
great design of that body of legislators have been spoiled,
and all prospects of the "more perfect Union" blo^\^l
into thin air. So much for one horn of his formidable
dilemma. "If, on the other hand," says he, "you con-
sider them property — ^mere chattels personal — why should
they be represented any more than ships, or houses, or
cattle? Here is a nabol), who values his favorite high-
bred horse at five thousand dollars, and five of his able-
bodied negroes at the same amount. Why should his
five negroes count as three men in apportioning the
representatives in Congress among the several States, while
the blooded horse counts for just nothing at all?" Here,
again, the answer is perfectly easy. The slaves were not
counted as property at all; and, consequently, there was
no inconsistency in excluding horses, or other quadrupeds,
from the basis of representation. Thus, neither horn of
the dilemma is quite as unanswerable as the author
imagines it to be, and utterly fails to show the absurdity
of the clause in question as one of the "unsightly and
anomalous" excrescences of the slave power.

In reply to the two questions of his o^vn dilemma the
author says: "'We can only answer that Slavery and
Season travel different roads, and that he strives in vain
who labors to make these roads even seem parallel." Such
is his profound commentary on one of the most important
clauses, one of the most indispensable provisions, of the
Constitution of his country. He is, in the same spirit,
jjleased to speak of this provision of the Constitution, as

The War Between the States 215

if it had been hastily adopted by the Convention, 'Vith-
ont much debate or demur" ;^ and that, too, just after he
had quoted the undeniable words of one of the most cele-
brated members of the Convention, which show that it had
"been settled"^ only "after much difficulty and delib-
ration."- Eoger Sherman was right; and Horace Greeley
was wrong. The Convention had something more to do
than merely to "split the difEerence" between two hairs,
or abstractions; they had to adjust the balance of power
between the two great rival sections of the United States ;
a problem which lay at the very foundation of the new
Union, and upon the satisfactory solution of which the
whole superstructure was destined to depend. It is absurd,
as well as untrue, to say that such a question was settled
without much difficulty. It exercised, to the utmost, all
the sagacity and wisdom of the Convention of 1787. That
wisdom is, no doubt, utter foolishness to the radical re-
formers, who never fail to condemn Constitutions and laws
without even knowing, or caring to know, the reasons on
which they are founded.

"Slavery and Eeason" have, it is true, often traveled
"different roads."' But, in the case before us, the South
would have been glad to travel the same road with Eeason,
and follow the principle of the Convention to its logical
conclusion. But the sturdy North would not listen to
that conclusion. Hence if the South departed from the
road of Eeason at all, it was in order to meet the hard
demands of the ISTorth, and join in the Union, which has
proved her ruin. It proved her ruin; just because the
balance of power, which the fathers intended to establish
between the two sections, was overthrown and destroyed.
That equilibrium, or balance of power, was, in the opinion
of the fathers, indispensable to the safety, freedom, and
independence of each section in the Union; and its
destruction has illustrated and confirmed the wisdom of
their decision.

On this subject a distinguished Northern writer, in
1860, used the following language:

"At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution
the condition of slaves was very different at the South

' "The American Conflict," p. 46. - Ibid,, p. 43.

216 The Wae Between the States

from what it has since become. At that time there was,
as we have shown in a previous chapter, no large branch
of industry to engage the blacks, and their future fate
was matter of anxiety. The progress of the cotton cul-
ture has changed that, and the interests of millions of
whites now depend upon the blacks. The opinions of
statesmen of that day were formed upon existing facts;
could they have seen fifty years into the future their views
upon black employment would have undergone an entire
change. The blacks were then prospectively a burden;
they are now an absolute necessity. They then threatened
American civilization; they are now its support. With
multiplying numbers they have added to the national
wealth. They have become the instruments of political
agitation, while they have conferred wealth upon the
masses.

"From the moment of the formation of the Federal
Union there commenced a struggle for political power
which has not ceased to be directed against the Slave
States. The instrument of union, while it provided for
the extinction of the slave-trade, which then formed so
large a portion of ISTorthern traffic, contained also a pro-
vision for black representation in the Southern States,
stipulating that that representation should not be changed
until 1808, and thereafter only by a vote of three-fourths
of all the States. That 'provision has been the ground-ivork
of that constant Northern aggression upon Southern inter-
ests which has so successfully gained on the Federal power
until now it imagines the desired three-fourths is ivithin
its reach, when the South, vjith its interests, ivill he at the
feet of the abolitionists. The South has stood steadily on
its defence, but while the circle has narrowed in upon it,
the North has not ceased to clamor against Southern ag-
gression ! Like Jemmy Twitcher, in the farce, who, having
robbed a passenger, loses the plunder, and exclaims,
"there must be some dishonest person in the neighbor
hood! . . . "

The original thirteen States that adopted this Consti-
tution were all Slave States with the exception of Massa-
chusetts, which, although it then held no slaves, had an

The Wae Between the States 217

interest in continuing the slave-trade, in opposition to the
wishes of the Slave States. The struggle in the Convention
in relation to the discontinuance of the slave-trade was
between the New England States, that desired the traffic,
and Virginia and Delaware that wished no more slaves,
while those Southern States that had but a few blacks
desired to import them without tax. On the vote iSTew
Hampshire and Massachusetts voted to continue the trade
imtil 1808, and Virginia and Delaware voted "nay," or
for its immediate discontinuance.

'No sooner had the Constitution been adopted, however,
than the annexation of Louisiana became a necessity, in
order to give an outlet to the sea for the produce of the
West, but, notwithstanding the great advantage which the
annexation was to confer upon Massachusetts, she opposed
it to the point of threatening to dissolve the Union if it
was carried out. That, after the great rebellion of Shay
within her border, was the first disunion threat, and the
motive was fear of the political increase of Southern
strength. Those fears were like all party pretences, short-
. sighted, since that territory has given more Free than
Slave States to the Union. This threat of disunion was
made while yet Massachusetts was engaged in the slave-
trade, that the State had voted to prolong to 1808. The
same cry was renewed in respect to Florida, and again,
with greater violence, in the case of Missouri ; to be again
revived in respect to Texas; and once more, with circum-
stances of greater atrocity, in the case of Kansas. It is
remarkable that while Free States come in without any
great struggle on the part of the South, the safety of
which is threatened by each accession, the admission of
Slave States is the signal of so much strife, and this
resistance to a manifest right of the South is denounced
as "Southern aggression."

The gradual abolition of slavery in the old Northern
States, and the rapidity with which Eastern capital, fol-
lowing migration, has settled the Western States, has
given a large preponderance to the free interest in the
national councils. Of the 26 senators that sat in the first
Congress, all represented a slave interest, more or less;

218 The Wae Betweex the States

with the States and territories now knocking for admis-
sion there are 72 senators, of wliom 32 only represent the
slave interest. That interest, from being "a unit" in the
Senate, has sunk to a minority of four, and yet the
majority do not cease to complain of Southern "aggres-
sion/' With this rapid decline in the Southern vote in
the great "conservative body" of the Senate, the repre-
sentation in the lower House has fallen to one-third. How
long will it be before the desired three-fourths vote, for
which a large party pant, will have been obtained, and,
when obtained, what will have become of those Southern
rights Avhich are even now denied by party leaders to be
any rights at all? In the last 30 years 11 Free States
have been prepared for the Union; a similar progress in
the next 30 years, and the South will have fallen into that
Constitutional minority which may deprive it of all re-
served rights. This circle is closing rapidly in upon it,
amid a continually rising cry of abolition, pointed by
bloody inro£ids of armed men. This is called Southern
"aggression."^

The balance of power was overthrown. The South
lost, more and more, her original equality in the Union;
and the just design of the fathers was despised and
trampled underfoot by the Northern Demos. Every cen-
sus showed that her power had diminished, as her dangers
had increased; and she no longer found herself in the
original Union of equal sections. On the contrary, she
found herself in a minority, which the Southern men of
1787 would have shunned as the plague, and threatened by
a vast majority as cruel as death, and as inexorable as the
grave. This was not the Union of the fathers, but the
warped and perverted Union of unjust rule and domina-
tion. The States of ISTew England never failed to threaten
a dissolution of the Union whenever, in their jealous
imaginations, there seemed even a prospect that the balance
of power might turn in favor of the South in only one
branch of Congress. Yet the more this balance was
actually turned in their favor, and the South, contrary to
the design of the fathers, reduced to a hopeless minority,

1 "Soutliei-n Wealth and Nortliern Profits."' p. 1.30-40.

The Wae Between the States 319

the more imperiously they demanded her implicit sub-
mission to Northern rule, and the more fiercely was de-
nounced here every struggle to maintain her original
equality and independence as "Southern aggression."

Froni a table in the work above quoted it appears that,
at each succeeding census, the relative increase of the two
sections in the House of Eepresentatives was as follows:

Before Census 1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850

North, 35 57 77 104 133 141 135 144

South, 30 53 65 79 90 100 88 90

-Majority, 5 4 12 25 43 41 47 54

Thus, in one branch of the Legislature, the Northern
majority, counting Delaware as a Southern State, had
increased from a majority of five to a majority of fifty-four
representatives. The South, as every reader of American
history must know, never would have entered into so un-
equal a Union with the North; and the North would not
have continued in the Union, if she had not always retained
the balance of power in her own hands, and in both
branches of Congress.

As the North had so great a majority in the House, it
was the more important that the South should, at least,
retain her original share of power in the Senate. But
even this she was not allowed to do. In order to gain
the complete and uncontrolled ascendancy in the Senate,
as she had done in the House, the North began to exclude
all slaveholding States from the Union. This she at-
tempted in regard to Missouri, and persisted in her un-
constitutional attitude until she was defeated by the votes
of a few Northern democrats, who sacrificed themselves to
save the Union and their own party.

After the restoration of the Democratic party, and dur-
ing its reign, the rights of the States were so clearly vindi-
cated, and so firmly established, that few ventured to claim
for Congress the power to exclude a State from the Union,
because she held slaves. Hence the Eepublican party
changed its tactics, and endeavored to effect the same un-
constitutional design in another way. Not daring to say,
as their predecessor had done, that Congress coulcl exclude

220 The Wak Between the States

a slaveholding State from the Union, they determined that
no more such States should be formed. For this purpose,
they resolved to exclude the South from all the territories
of the Union; so that no addition should ever be made
to her power, while that of the North was allowed to
increase with still greater rapidity. The North resolved,
in fact, that every new State formed, and admitted into
the Union, should be an accession to her own overgrown
power. The South might object and complain; but what
could she do ? Was she not already in a helpless minority ?

If we count Delaware as a Southern State, then the
North, instead of a majority of one State in the Senate,
had a majority of three States, or of six votes, before the
first Southern State seceded from the Union. There were
eighteen Northern, and only fifteen Southern States repre-
sented in that branch of Congress; which was designed
to act as a check on the majority in the House of
Eepresentatives. Nor was this all. For there were, at
that time, nearly ready to come into the Union — Kansas,
Minnesota, Oregon, Washington, Nebraska, Utah, and New
Mexico, which would have made the Northern majority as
overwhelming in that body as it was in the other branch
of the Federal Legislature. If the tables had been turned,
if the picture had been reversed, the North would have
laughed such a Union to scorn. She could not even tol-
erate, indeed, the bare thought, or imagination, that the
South might gain the ascendancy in the Senate in only
one branch of the Federal Legislature.

Thus, while the greedy North continued to grow in
power, and in a determination to crush the South beneath
her feet, she filled the earth with her clamors about "the
aggressions of the slave power" ; appealing to the preju-
dices and passions of mankind in her crusade against an
unknown and despised people. The South simply stood
on the defensive. The one struggled for empire, for
dominion; the other for independence, for existence. The
one struggled to preserve her original equality in the
Union; the other to destroy that equality. The one
directed all its efforts to uphold the balance of power
established by the authors of the Constitution, and deemed

The "War Between the States 221

by them the only safeguard of freedom in the Union; the
other bent all its energies to break that balance, and grind
its fragments to powder.

Hence the South became extremely sensible of the
dangers of her position in the Union. All hope of a
"Constitutional power of defence" therein had been wrested
from her grasp. That safeguard of her freedom and inde-
pendence, which the founders of the Eepublic deemed so
essential to both ends of the Union, no longer existed for
the South ; and she held her rights and interests at the
mercy of the North, as it was never intended she should
hold them. She could see, therefore, as clearly as Pro-
fessor Cairnes, that the extinction of her freedom and
independence was, sooner or later, her inevitable destiny in
the Union. That dark destiny, however, she beheld with
far other eyes than those with which it was contemplated
by the Professor of Jurisprudence. Beholding, with
delight, the ultimate ruin of the South in the Union, he
denounced secession as treason and rebellion ; but it is to
be hoped that, in the estimation of mankind, it will not be
deemed an unpardonable offence, if she was not entirely
devoid of the natural instinct of self-preservation.

Jefferson Davis, in the name of the South, gave utter-
ance to this natural instinct in the Senate of the United
States in 1850. "The danger," said he, "is one of our own
times, and it is that sectional division of the people which
has created the necessity of looking to the question of the
balance of power, and which carries with it, when dis-
turbed, the danger of disunion." Such was the treason of
Jefferson Davis in 1850 ! But far bolder language had
been used by Northern statesmen, and by Northern
Legislatures, in behalf of the North ; not because the
North was in a present or real, but only because she was
in a future and purely imaginary, minority. The treason
of the weak is the patriotism of the strong.

The Eelative Decline of the South in the
New Union

It is a remarkable fact that from the first settlement of
the country the South continued to increase in population

223 The War Between the States

and wealth more rapidly than the North, till the new
Union was established. In the Convention of 1787 it was,
on all sides, conceded that the South surpassed the iNTorth
both in ]3opulation and in wealth. But from that event,
from the inauguration of the "more perfect Union," her
relative decline began. This fact has always been ascribed,
by the enemies of the South, to the malign influence of the
institution of slavery. But slavery existed before the new
Union without producing any such effect. Hence, how-
ever great the evil influence of slavery may have been, it
was not sufficient to counteract the great natural advan-
tages of the South, until the new Union came to its aid.
The action of the Federal Government was, in the opinion
of many impartial Judges, the great cause of this relative
decline of the South, in spite of the resources which nature,
with a large and liberal hand, had lavished on her teeming
soil and beneficent climate.

The influence of this cause is well explained by a devoted
friend to the Union. Eice and indigo were, says he, the
great staples which, under the protection of the British
Cro\^al, had been the sources of the superior wealth of the
South before the Eevolution. But under the protection,
or rather under the neglect, of the Federal Government,
these great interests languished, and these great staples
were finally crushed out of the markets of the world by
the hostile legislation of foreign powers. The decline of
the South would have been as hopeless as it was rapid, if
the cultivation of cotton, in consequence of several well-
knoA\ai improvements and inventions, had not become
sufficiently remunerative to stand alone Avithout the aid
or support of the Federal Government. This great staple
and source of wealth caused the South to revive. It not
only arrested the sort of "galloping consumption" under
which she was fast sinking into comparative insignificance,
but it also restored her to something of the fulness and the
glow of her former prosperity. But the ]S'orth fixed her
eagle eye on the rising prosperity of the South, and soon
planted the talons of her tariffs deep in its very vitals.

"The tariff question," says Mr. Ludlow, "may be easily
disposed of."^ He certainly disposes of it with very great

1 '-History," p. 305.

The War Betweex the States 223

ease. A few prudently selected, and carefully trimmed,
extracts from Mr. Benton are among the facile means he
employs for the purpose. Let us, then, hear ■Mr. Benton
himself, not in garbled extracts merely, but in the full,
round utterance of great historic truths. Mr. Benton was
no friend to the institution of slavery, or to its extension.
In regard to this last most exciting question, he was
decidedly with the ISTorth. But yet, unlike Mr. Ludlow and
his school, Mr. Benton could Ijoth see and feel that some-
thing else beside slavery exerted an evil influence in the
Laiited States of America. Accordingly, in 1828, he
uttered the following words in the Senate : ^T feel for the
sad changes which have taken place in the South during
the last fifty years. Before the Eevolution it was the seat
of wealth as well as of hospitality. Money and all it
commanded abounded there. But how now? — all this is
reversed. Wealth has fled from the South and settled in
the regions Xorth of the Potomac ; and this in the face of
the fact that the South in four staples alone has exported
produce since the Eevolution to the value of eight hundred
millions of dollars; and the Xorth has exported com-
paratively nothing. Such an export would indicate un-
paralleled wealth, but what is the fact? In the place of
wealth a universal pressure for money was felt — not
enough for current expenses— the price of all property
down — the country drooping and languishing — towns and
cities decaying — and the frugal hal)its of the people pushed
to the verge of universal self-denial for the preservation
of their family estates. Such a result is a strange and
wonderful phenomenon. It calls upon statesmen to en-
quire into the cause."

How did slavery produce this wonderful transformation ?
How did slavery work all this ruin? Slavery, it is well
known, existed before the Eevolution, as well as afterward ;
and accompanied the South in the palmiest days of her
prosperity, as well as in the darkest and most dismal hour
of her adversity. Hence it was not, and could not have
been, the one cause of so great and so sudden a change.
And besides, instead of having ceased to produce, the fair
and faithful South continued to pour forth, in greater

224 The Wae Between" the States

abundance than ever, the broad streams of national pros-
perity and wealth. Hence she was impoverished, not
because the fountains of her former supply had been dried
up, or even diminished in volume, but because the great
streams flowing from them did not return into her own
bosom. Into what region of the earth, then, did these
streams empty themselves?

Mr. Benton answers this question ! and though his
answer is diametrically opposed to the views of the Bright
and Cobden school, he is the great authority whom Mr.
Ludlow himself had brought upon the stand. Under
"Federal legislation," says Mr. Benton, "the exports of
the South have been the basis of the Federal revenue.
Virginia, the two Carolinas, and Georgia may he
said to defray three- fourths of the annual expense of
supporting the Federal Government; and, of this great
sum annually furnished by them, nothing or next to
nothing is returned to them in the shape of Government
expenditures. That expenditure flows in an opposite
direction — it flows northwardly in one uniform, unin-
terrupted, and perennial stream. This is the reason ivhy
wealth disappears from the South and rises up in the
North. Federal legislation does all this. It does it by the
simple process of eternally taking from the South and
returning nothing to it. If it returned to the South the
whole or even a good part of what it exacted, the four
States south of the Potomac might stand the action of the
system, but the South must be exhausted of its money and
property by a course of legislation which is forever taking
away and never returning anything. Every new tarifi
increases the force of this action. No tariff has ever yet
included Virginia, the two Carolinas, and Georgia, except
to increase the burdens imposed upon them."

Kor was Mr. Benton alone in this opinion. The politi-
cal economists of the North, such as Carey, Elliott,
Kettell, and others, who had studied the sources of national
wealth in America, gave precisely the same explanation of
the sudden and wonderful disappearance of wealth from
the South. The North might easily satisfy its own con-
science, by making slavery the scapegoat for its sins; but

The War Between the States ' 225

thinking men, even at the North, were not so readily
deceived. Hence, in an able work, entitled "Southern
Wealth and Northern Profits," the author does not hesi-
tate to tell the people of his own section that it was gross
injustice, if not hypocrisy, to be always growing rich on
the profits of slave-labor; and, at the same time, to be
eternally taunting and insulting the South on account of
slavery. Though it was bitterly denounced as "the sum
of all villainies," it was, nevertheless, the principal factor
in Northern wealth.

In like manner, Professor Elliott, though a Northern
man, and an enemy to slavery, yet, as a political econo-
mist, and teacher of the science in a Northern college, he
denied that it had impoverished the South. On the con-
trary, he has, in a work styled "Cotton is King," shown
that slave-labor has been one of the great sources of
Northern wealth. Is it any wonder, then, that the think-
ing men of the South should have entertained the same
opinion? Is it any wonder that they should have agreed
with Benton, and Kettell, and Elliott, and other Northern
writers that it was legislation, and not slavery, which had
impoverished the South? It is certain that such was the
conclusion of the thinking men of the South, in view of
her sad and frightfully altered condition.

"Such a result," says Mr. Benton, "is a strange - and
wonderful phenomenon. It calls upon statesmen to enquire
into the cause ; and if they enquire upon the theater of this
strange metamorphosis they will receive one universal
answer from all ranks and ages, that it is Federal legis-
lation which has worTced this ruin." If, under such cir-
cumstances or belief, the South has been satisfied with the
action of the Federal Government, her people must have
been the greatest of all simpletons, or the most patient of
all saints. They were neither; they were merely human
beings, who had some little regard for their own interests,
as well as for those of their neighbors. Hence, the tariffs
of the United States, by which one portion of the people
was impoverished for the benefit of another portion of the
people, left in the minds of the most influential men of the
South a deep and abiding sense of the injustice of
Northern legislation.

226 The Wae Between" the States

Wliat less could have been anticipated? All majorities
are, in fact, unjust, despotic, and oppressive. Hence, in
the opinion of the Convention of 1787, if either section
should have the majority in both branches of Congress, it
would oppress the other. As this opinion was founded on
the experience of the past, so it was afterward confirmed
by the history of the future. Indeed, if the North, with
a majority in both branches of Congress, had not op-
pressed the South, it would have been unlike every other
unchecked power in the history of the world.

There have been, no doubt, lets, hindrances, and pauses
in this onward march of the triumphant power of the
North. But it has always had its eye fixed on one object
of supreme desire, namely, on absolute dominion and
control. It had already become absolutely overwhelming
in one branch of Congress, with the certainty of soon be-
coming equally overwhelming in the other. There was
not a member of the Convention of 1787, who, if his own
section had been in the minority, would not have shrunk
from such a Union with horror. He must, indeed, have
been profoundly ignorant of the sentiments of the fathers,
as well as of the character of all interested majorities, who,
could have supposed, for a moment, that the South might
have been free, or safe, or happy in such a Union. What !
is that freedom which is held at the mercy of another?
Is that safety which depends on the will of an interested
majority ?

What was to have been expected from such a majority
is well described in the speeches of John C. Calhoun; in
the "Essay on Liberty," by John Stuart Mill; and in the
celebrated work of De Tocqueville on "Democracy in
America." Both De Tocqueville and Mill are advocates
of democracy ; and yet, if possible, they draw more fright-
ful pictures of the tyranny of an unchecked majority than
has John C. Calhoun himself. "The majority in that
country [the United States]," says M. De Tocqueville,
"exercise a prodigious, actual authority, and a moral
influence which is scarcely less preponderant ; no obstacles
exist which can impede, or so much as retard its progress,

The War Between the States 227

or which can induce it to heed the complaints of those
whom it crushes "upon its path."^

But if such was the unprejudiced conclusion of a great
philosophic observer, in 1833, what was to have been ex-
pected from a sectional majority, growing continually in
greatness, in power, and in hatred of the sectional
minority? Had the South no reason for her fears? If
not, then De Tocqueville, and Mill, and Calhoun were the
veriest simpletons that ever lived. If not, then the
founders of the Eepublic had all read the history of their
own times wrong, and wrote libels on the character of
unshackled majorities ?

M. De Tocqueville has told the exact truth. "This
state of things," said he, in 1833, "is fatal in itself, and
dangerous for the future. ... If the free institutions
of America are ever destroyed that event may be attributed
to the unlimited authority of the majority.
Anarchy will then be the result, but it will have been
brought about by despotism."^

The Formation of a Faction

There is a vast difference between a political party and
a faction. The one is legitimate, healthful, and conserva-
tive; the other is the fatal disease of which nearly all
republics have perished. The one is united by principles,
or designs, which persons in any part of the Eepublic may
freely adopt and cherish; the other is animated by a
"common interest, or passion," which is hostile to other
interests of the same community. ISTow^ the great object
of the legislation of 1787 was to provide a remedy for the
fatal effects of faction.

"Among the numerous advantages," says The Federalist,
"promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to
be more accurately developed than its tendency to break
and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular
governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their
character and fate, as when he contemplates their pro-
pensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore,

' "Democracy In America," vol. i, p. 301. - Ibid., p. 317.

328 The War Between the States

to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the
principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure
for it."i

Mr. Madison, the author of the above words, used still
more impressive language on the same subject, in the
Virginia Convention of 1788. "On a candid examination
of history," he there said, "we shall find that turbulence,
violence, and abuse of power, hy the majority trampling
on the rights of the minority, have produced factions and
commotions, which, in republics, have, more frequently
than any other cause, produced despotism. If we go over
the whole history of ancient and modern republics, we shall
find their destruction to have generally resulted from those
causes. If we consider the peculiar situation of the
United States, and what are the sources of that
diversity of sentiment which pervades its inhabit-
ants, WE SHALL FIND GREATER DANGER TO FEAR THAT THE
SAME CAUSES MAY TERMINATE HERE, IN THE SAME FATAL
EFFECTS, WHICH THEY PRODUCED IN THOSE REPUBLICS."^

Here, then, was the rock on which the new Eepublic was
in the greatest danger of being dashed to pieces. Hence,
Mr. Madison well adds : "This danger ought to be wisely
guarded against." Otherwise the great republic must in-
evitably split on the rock of faction, and go to the bottom
with the republics of the past.

It was, therefore, the great object of the legislation of
1787 to guard the new Eepublic against the rise, or for-
mation, of a faction. This, as we have already seen, is well
stated in The Federalist, as follows : "When a majority is
included in a faction, the form of popular government en-
ables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion, or interest, both
the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure
the public good, and private rights, against the danger of
such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit
and the form of a popular government, is the great object
to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it
is the great desideratum by which alone this form of gov-
ernment can be rescued from the opprobrium under which
it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem
and adoption of manhind."^

1 No. X. - "Elliott's Debates," vol. ill, p. 109. ■'' No. x.

The Wae Between the States 229

By what means, then, did the legislators of 1787 hope
to remedy the evils of factions; to subdue, if not to eradi-
cate, that fatal disease of republics ? Mr. Madison replies :
"Perhaps, in the progress of this discussion, it will appear
that the only possible remedy for those evils and means of
protecting the prmciples of Republicanism, will be found
in that very system which is now exclaimed against as the
parent of despotism."^ That is, in the new Union of 1787.
Now where, and how, did the new Union provide "the
only possible remedy" against the evils of faction? Ac-
cording to the view of Mr. Madison, and of the majority
of the Convention of 1787, neither the North nor the
South would be able to form itself into a dangerous
faction; because, as they said, each section will have a
majority in one branch of Congress, and thereby hold a
Constitutional check on the power of the other. But this
remedy, as every one knows, proved a total failure.

The other great remedy against the evils of faction,
which, as the legislators of 1787 supposed, existed in the
new system, would be found in the great extent of the
Union, in the great number and diversity of its interests,
which would prevent "any one party being able to out-
number and oppress the rest."- This remedy against fac-
tion is repeatedly urged by Mr. Madison. Thus, he speaks
of the new Union "as the proper antidote for the diseases
of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular gov-
ernments, and of which alarming symptoms have been
betrayed by our own";^ because "the influence of factious
leaders," who "may kindle a flame within their particular
States," . . . "will be unable to spread a great con-
flagration through the other States."* Now this great
remedy also proved a failure. Factious leaders did kindle
a conflagration through all the Northern States; and the
great North, animated by one "passion, or interest," did
form itself into the most terrible faction the world has
ever seen, and point all the lightnings of its wrath at the
devoted South.

1 '•Elliott's Debates," vol. iil, p. 109.
. - The Federalist, No. xiv.
3 Ibid,
■ilbid., No. X.

230 The Wae Between the States

The fact is not denied by many of the great champions
of the Northern power. On the contrary, it was made a
ground of exultation and boasting by some of her most
eloquent orators. Thus, it was said "no man has a right
to be surprised at this state of things. It is just what we
have attempted to bring about. It is the first sectional
party ever organized in this country. It does not know its
own face, and calls itself national; but it is not national —
it is sectional. The Republican party is a paety of
THE North pledged against the South."^ Nothing
could have been more true. Thus, under and in spite of
the Constitution designed for the protection of all sections
and of all interests alike, the North did form itself into a
faction, and seize all the powers of the Federal Govern-
ment. This may have been rare sport to the leaders of the
faction; it was the death-knell of the Republic. It was—
the founders of the. Union themselves being the Judges —
the fall of the Republic, and the rise of a despotism.

This faction, it is said, did "not know its own face.^'
Perhaps it was a little ashamed of its own face. It is
certain that it was very loud in its professions that all its
designs were national and Constitutional; even while it
avowed the purpose to "use all Constitutional means to
put an end to the institution of slavery." But no such
means were known to the Constitution, which, as the
leaders of that faction perfectly well knew, was estab-
lished and ordained to protect all the institutions of the
South, as well as of the North. Use all Constitutional
means indeed ! Why, the very existence of such a faction
was an outrageous violation of the whole spirit and design
of the Constitution of 1787. It was, in one word, the last
throe of the mighty Republic, as it succumbed to the fatal
disease of which so many republics had previously per-
ished. Conceived in profound contempt of the wisdom of
Washington, who, in his "Farewell Address," had so
solemnly warned his countrymen against the dangers of a
sectional party, or faction, it just marched right onward
in the light of its own eyes over broken Constitutions, and
laws, and oaths ; trampling on all alike with imperial scorn
and proud disdain.

1 WendeU Phillips.

The Wae Between the States 231

The South was advised to "wait for some overt act."
But if one finds himself in company with a strong man
armed, who is both able and willing to crush him, is it
wise to "wait for the overt act," or to withdraw from his
society as soon as possible? If the strong man armed
should make his withdrawal the occasion of his ruin, that
would only prove that the companionship was neither safe,
nor desirable.

The South, it is true, did not better her condition by
her withdrawal from the ISTorth. But is not all history
replete with similar instances of failure in the grand
struggle for freedom, safety, and independence? In the
golden words of The Federalist: "Justice is the end of
government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has
been, and it ever will be, pursued imtil it be obtained, or
until liberty be lost in the pursuit."^ It was thus, in
the pursuit of justice, that the South lost her liberty. If
she had not engaged in the pursuit she would have
deserved to lose her liberty.

The South, it was said, had nearly always been in the
possession of the Government; and it was right, there-
fore, that the North should take possession of it in her
turn. But this is one of the fictions of the Forth. The
South never had possession of the Government at all.
All the great powers of the Government are, for the most
part, lodged in the Congress of the United States, in
neither branch of which did the South ever have a major-
ity. She was, indeed, when she entered into the new
Union, promised a majority in one branch of Congress;
but that promise, like an apple of Sodom, soon turned to
dust and ashes in her hands.

N"or had the South, as such, ever had a President of the
United States. The great Democratic party generally
selected its President from the South, but this did not
make them sectional Presidents. ISTeither Washington, nor
Jefferson, nor Madison, nor Monroe, nor Jackson, nor
Polk was a sectional President. On the contrary, so little
was there of a sectional nature in their characters, or
designs, that each and every one of them was elected to

1 No. li.

232 The Wae Between the States

the Presidency of the United States by a large majority
of the Northern votes. Mr. Lincoln, on the other hand,
who was a sectional candidate, and put forth on purely
sectional grounds, did not receive a single Southern vote.
He was, then, the candidate not of a legitimate party, but
of the great unconstitutional and anti-republican faction
of 1861 ; that is, the candidate of "the party of the ISTorth
pledged against the South."

The North, with a majority in both houses of Congress,
was perfectly protected against every possible danger of
oppression. If, then, a statesman from the South had
always filled the ofl&ce of President, still her situation
would have been far more precarious and unprotected
than that of the ISTorth. The President could introduce
no bill into Congress; he could only veto those which he
might deem unjust and oppressive. Surely, a most feeble
and uncertain protection to the South; since no man
stood the least chance for the Presidency, who was not
known to favor the wishes and the interests of the mighty
North.

The North, then, in possession of both branches of
Congress, and the dazzling prize of the Presidency to
influence the leading politicians of the South, was suffi-
ciently secure in the Union ; even if all the Presidents had
come from the South. But all this did not satisfy the
North. On the false plea that the South had nearly
always been in possession of the Government, she deter-
mined to take possession of all its departments, the supreme
Executive, as well as both branches of the Federal Legis-
lature. Nor is this all. She determined to take and to
keep possession of them all in the name of the North,
alleging that the South had enjoyed them all long enough ;
and to wield them all by the terrible faction of "the North
pledged against the South." Nor was this all. The great
leader, or the great tool, of this faction declared that he
was not bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States ; that he would enforce the Constitution
as he understood it, and not as it was understood by that
high judicial tribunal. Indeed, this mighty faction was
got up and organized in direct opposition to, and in open

The Wak Between the States 233

contempt of, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States; both in the Dred Scott case, and in the
case of Prigg vs. the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Its
own will was its only law.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Prigg,
which authorizes the master to seize his fugitive slave
without process in any State of the Union, was the first
object of attack by the great leaders of this faction. The
Court was denounced as having been corrupted by pro-
slavery sentiments ; though this very opinion was delivered
by a Northern abolitionist, by Mr. Justice Story himself.
Mr. Justice Story could, as we have seen, go great lengths
in his advocacy of the Northern cause ; but yet, as a Judge
of the Supreme Court of the United States, he could not
decide in direct and open violation of his oath of office.

This instance of his integrity, in which other Northern
Judges concurred, brought down the indignation and
contempt of the great leaders of the Eepublican party upon
the Court, whose opinion he had delivered. It was then
threatened by those factious leaders that the Supreme
Court of the United States should be reorganized, and
made to conform to the wishes and sentiments of the
North; a purpose which was sure of its fulfilment after
the election of Mr. Lincoln, and which would have capped
the climax of the lawless designs of the Northern faction
"pledged against the South."

Mr. Madison, "the father of the Constitution," believed
that such a faction would never arise in the new Union.
But he never doubted, for a moment, that if it should arise
therein, this would prove that the Federal Government
had failed to answer the great end of his creation. For,
as we have seen, it was, in his own words, the great object
of that Government, "to secure the public good, and private
rights against the danger of such a faction," by providing
against the possibility of its appearance in the bosom of
the Bepublic. This is the great desideratum , which, ac-
cording to the legislators of 1787, is necessary to remove
"the opprobrium under which that form of Government
has so long labored," and "to recommend it to the esteem
and adoption of mankind" ; and which they supposed had

334 The Wak Between the States

been supplied by their legislation. But their remedies
were too weak. Their practice was not sufficiently heroic.
Hence the fatal disease of republics, the rise of faction,
was not only engendered, but developed to a degree which
is without a parallel in the history of the world. The
design was good, but the execution defective. The fathers,
in one word, did not begin to foresee the weakness, the
folly, the madness of their descendants. Hence, their
sublime attempt to "establish Justice, ensure domestic
tranquillity, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to their posterity" proved an awful
failure. Indeed, if they could only have witnessed the
gigantic and terrific faction of 1861, they would have
pronounced their own ''grand experiment" a disastrous
failure. It was so regarded by the South; and, for that
reason, the South wished to make an experiment for her-
self. But, unfortunately, she was already in the clutches
of a relentless and a remorseless faction.

Factions have no heart, no conscience, no reason, no
consistency, no shame. Would you reason with such a
remorseless monster ? You might just as well read the riot
act to a thunderstorm. Would you appease its wrath?
Would you soothe its rampant and raging ferocity?
Would you appeal to all the tender mercies of our holy
religion? You might just as well sing a lullaby to the
everlasting roarings of the Pit. The South did not enter
into the "new Union" to be governed by any such faction.
She entered into the new Union, on the contrary, in order
to secure her freedom, her independence, her happiness,
her glory ; and she lost them all — except her glory.

Even Mr. Madison, with all his devotion to the great
work of his own hands, never became so blind an idolater
as to resemble that epitome of meanness and climax of
servility — "an unconditional Union-man." On the con-
trary, still breathing the spirit of a freeman, he said:
"Were the plan of the Convention adverse to the public
happiness, my voice would be, Eeject the plan. Were the
Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, it
would be. Abolish the Union."i Even as late as 1830,

^ The Federalist, No. xlv.

The War Between the States 235

he declared that "it still remains to be seen whether the
Union will answer the ends of its existence or otherwise."
If he had lived till 1861 he would have seen that the
Union, having failed to pr.event the rise and reign of fac-
tion, had not answered "the great object" of its creation;
and, consequently, no longer deserved to exist. Hence,
m 1861, he would either have unveiled the right of seces-
sion, or else he would have belied all the great principles,
and sentiments, and designs of his life.

Other Causes of Secession

The foregoing grounds or causes of secession are, it
seems to me, amply sufficient to justify the South in the
exercise of a Constitutional right; for which she was
amenable to no tribunal on earth, except to the moral
sentiments of mankind. But there are still other and
powerful causes of secession, which it is unnecessary to
discuss in the present work. All the grounds of secession,
including those above considered, may be 'stated as follows :

Firstly, the destruction of the balance of power, which
was originally established between the North and the
South ; and which was deemed by the authors of the Con-
stitution to be essential to the freedom, safety, and happi-
ness of those sections of the Union.

Secondly, the sectional legislation, by which the original
poverty of the North was exchanged for the wealth of the
South; contrary to the great design of the Constitution,
which was to establish the welfare of all sections alike,
and not the welfare of one section at the expense of
another.

Thirdly, the formation of a faction, or ^^the party of the
North pledged against the South," in direct and open
violation of the whole spirit and design of the new Union ;
involving a failure of the great ends for which the
Eepublic was ordained.

Fourthly, the utter subversion and contemptuous dis-
regard of all the checks of the Constitution, instituted and

236 The Wae Between the States

designed by its authors for the protection of the minority
against the majority; and the lawless reign of the
Northern Demos.

Fifthly, the unjust treatment of the slavery question,
by which the compacts of the Constitution made by the
Forth in favor of the South were grossly violated by her;
while, at the same time, she insisted on the observance of
all the compacts made by the South in her own favor.

Sixthly, the sophistry of the North, by which she
attempted to justify her injustice and oppression of the
South.

Seventhly, the abuse and slander heaped on the South
by the writers of the North.

Eighthly, the denial of the right of secession; the false
statements, and the false logic by which that right was
concealed from the people of the North; and the threats
of extermination in case the South should dare to exercise
that right.

These, it is believed, are the principal causes by which
the last hope of freedom for the South in the Union was
extinguished; and, consequently, she determined to with-
draw from the Union. Bravely and boldly did she strike
for Liberty ; and, if she fell, it was because, as the London
Times said, "she had to fight the world.'^

CHAPTEK XVII

the legislatoes of 1787 as political prophets

Introductory

"Every particular interest," said Mr. Madison, in the
Convention of 1787, "whether in any class of citizens, or
any description of States, ought to be secured as far as
possible. Wherever there is danger of attack there ought
to be given a Constitutional power of defence." But he
contended that the States were divided into different
interests, not by their difference of size, but from other
circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly
from climate, but principally from the effects of their hav-
ing or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in
forming the great division of interests in the United
States. It did not lie between the large and small States.
It lay between the Northern and Southern; and, if any

DEFENSIVE POWER WERE NECESSARY^, IT OUGHT TO BE
MUTUALLY" GIVEN TO THESE TWO INTERESTS.^ In this

opinion of the leading member from A^irginia, the leading
member from Massachusetts fully concurred. For Mr.
King "was fully convinced that the question concerning a
difference of interest did not lie where it had been hitherto
discussed, between the great and the small States, but
between the Southern and the Eastern. For this reason he
had been willing to yield something in the proportion of
representation for the security of the Southern."^ That
is, for the protection of the Southern interest, he had, as
we have seen, been willing to vote for the fractional repre-
sentation of slaves. Such was, indeed, the opinion of the
Convention.

But while the legislators of 1787 agreed in this opinion,
they looked into the future with very different eyes.
Considered as political prophets they may, in fact, be
divided into three classes.

1 "The Madison Papers," p. 1006. = Ibid., p. 1057.

238 The War Between the States

James Madison

At the head of the first class there stands James Madi-
son, "the father of the Constitution." Seeing, as he did,
that the great diiSculty before the Convention was to ad-
just the antagonism between the ISTorth and the South,
he must have known that the perpetuity of the new Union
would depend on the manner in which this difficulty should
be settled by their labors. Just before the meeting of the
Convention, indeed, this great antagonism had given birth
to a tremendous conflict between the North and South,
by which the Union was shaken to its foundations. Hence,
Mr. Madison had good reason to fear the violence of this
antagonism for the future ; and he ^did fear it. For he
tells us that there ought to be given a Constitutional power
of defence to each of these sections, so that neither could
take advantage of the other.

He hoped, he fancied, he predicted that this had been
done. The South, he said, would soon have a majority in
the House of Eepresentatives, in consequence of the rapid
increase in her population, by which she would hold a
check on the power of the Forth. But this adjustment of
the great difficulty in question rested on the unstable and
fluctuating basis of population. It soon proved to be a
foundation of sand. The hope and the prediction of Mr.
Madison soon appeared to have been a delusion and a
dream. He staked the freedom, the safety, and the happi-
ness of the South on the happening of a future event,
which never came to pass.

Indeed, he did not urge his plan for the adjustment of
the formidable antagonism in question, because, as he
said, it suggested a difficulty which was too apt to arise
of itself. It was, therefore, never adjusted at all, on any
solid foundation, or secure principle; and, consequently,
it did continue to arise of itself, and disturb the new Union
with convulsions from the beginning of its career to the
grand explosion of 1861.

Mr. Madison always feared the effects of this great and
imperfectly adjusted antagonism between the North and
the South. It seems, indeed, as if he wished to hide it from

The War Between the States 239

his own eyes, as well as from those of the people. It is a
very remarkable fact that although, in the secret Conven-
tion of 1787, he pronounced the antagonism between the
Northern and the Southern States the greatest of all the
difficulties they had to deal with; yet, when, in The
Federalist, he enumerated the difficulties the Convention
had to encounter, no allusion whatever is made to this
stupendous one.. He seems to have imagined that, since it
is SO- apt to arise of itself, the less that is said about it the
better. This would, no doubt, have been very wise and
prudent, if a great danger might be remedied by simply
closing one's eyes upon its existence.

Nothing more easily disturbed his patience than any
allusion to the great danger created by the fearful antago-
nism in question. In The Federalist — how unlike his
usual style ! — he pours forth the following strain of lachry-
mose philanthropy or patriotism : "Hearken not to the
unnatural voice, which tells you that the people of
America, knit together as they are by so many cords of
affection, can no longer live together as members of the
same family; can no longer continue mutual guardians of
their mutual happiness. . . . No, my countrymen,
shut your ears against this unhallowed language. Shut
your hearts against the poison which it conveys. The
kindred blood which flows in the veins of American
citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in the
defence of their sacred rights, consecrates their union, and
excites horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals,
enemies."^

Yet, in spite of all this, Mr. Madison himself must have
had serious misgivings with respect to his beautiful dream
of a perpetual peace. For he laiew, as we have seen, that
there was a danger of a collision between the North and
the South. It is certain that the voice which he pro-
nounced unnatural was the voice of truth. For American
citizens did become aliens, rivals, enemies; and mingled
their blood far more freely and fearfully than they ever
had done in the defence of their common rights. But
Mr. Madison knew that, in order to secure the adoption

1 No. xiv.

240 The Wae Between the States

of the new Union, it would be necessary to persuade the
people that the very first condition of such a Union would
always obtain; namely, "a sufficient amount of sympathy
among its populations/' Hence, perhaps, his dream of
peace was not all a dream, but partly rhetoric.

Othee Prophetic Views

The second class of prophets seems to have been with-
out a head. Indeed it may, perhaps, be doubted whether
they spoke as prophets, or as diplomatists. It is certain
that they encouraged the notion of Mr. Madison and other
Southern legislators that the South would certainly have
a majority in the House of Eepresentatives. Several of
the most influential of the Northern legislators seemed
quite confident that such would be the good fortune of the
South; and none more so than Mr. Gouverneur Morris.
But were they always sincere in their belief ? Or did they
sometimes flatter the false hopes of the South in order to
be able to drive a better bargain with her? No finite
mind can, perhaps, answer these questions ; or tell Avhether
the legislators in question always spoke as prophets, or
sometimes as diplomatists. It is certain that the expecta-
tion held out to the South, that she would be able to
control one branch of Congress, was the promise, the
prospect, the bait by which she was entrapped into the
new Union; into that tremendous dead-fall, by which, in
1861, she was crushed to the earth. Patrick Henry stood
at the head of the third and last class of prophets.

No man ever more clearly foresaw, or more confidently
predicted, the future than did Patrick Henry the calami-
ties which have fallen on his beloved Virginia. With some
of the passages from this class of prophets, I shall con-
clude this little book.

General Pinckney, of South Carolina, declared, that "if
they [the Southern States] are to form so considerable a
minority, and the regulation of trade is to be given to the
General Government, tliey will he nothing more than over-
seers for the Northern States."^

1 "The Madison Papers," p. 1058.

The Wau Betaveen the States 241

In like manner, Mr. Williamson, of North Carolina,
said : "The Southern interest must be extremely endan-
gered by the present arrangement. The Northern States
are to have a majority in the first instance, with the means
of perpetuating it."^

George Mason said : "He went on a principle often ad-
vanced, and in which he concurred, that a majority, when
interested, would oppress the minority. This maxim
[than which none is more just] had been verified in the
Legislature of Virginia. If we compare the States in this
point of view, the eight Northern States have an interest
different from the five Southern States; and have, in one
branch of the Legislature, thirty-six votes against twenty-
nine, and in the other in the proportion of eight to three.
The Southern States harl, therefore, grounds for their
suspicions. "-

Mr. Henry said : "But I am sure that the dangers of
this system are real, when those who have no similar inter-
ests with the people of this country [i. e., Virginia and the
South] are to legislate for us — when our dearest interests
are to be left in the hands of those whose advantage it
will be to infringe them."-^

In the same Convention, Mr. Cxrayson, after declaring
that it was a struggle between the North and the South
for empire, proceeded to say: "Are not all defects and
corruptions founded on an inequality of representation and
want of responsibility? My greatest objection is that it
will, in its operation, be found unequal, grievous and op-
pressive. If it have any efficacy at all, it must l)e by a
faction of one part of the Union against another. If it be
called into action by a faction of seven States, it will be
terrible indeed. We must be at no loss how this combina-
tion will be fonned. There is a great difference of cir-
cumstances between the States. The interests of the
carrying States are strikingly different from those of the
productive States. 1 mean not to give offence to any part
of America, Init mankind are governed by interest. The
carrying States will assuredly unite and our situations will

'••The Madison I'apers," p. ions. -Ibid., p. 1.S87.

■ ••Elliott's Debates." vol. iii. p. I'sO.

242 The AVar Between the States

tlien be wretclied indeed. Wc ought to be wise enough to
guard against the abuse of such a government. Kepublics,
in fact, oppress more than monarchies."

"The voice of tradition," said Henry, "I trust will in-
form posterity of our struggles for freedom. If our de-
scendants be worthy of the name of Americans, they will
preserve and hand down to the latest posterity the trans-
actions of the present times, and, though I confess my ex-
planations are not worth the hearing, they will see 'I
have done my utmost to preserve their liberty'." Tyler
responded, "I also wish to hand down to posterity my
opposition to that system. Britivsh tyranny would have
been more tolerable."

THE end

No. ? ^ J Sect, a Shelf.
CONTENTS

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